{"created":"2023-05-15T12:18:58.369047+00:00","id":9080,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"8250ea4c-afc8-464b-8e53-5ea1b5f703da"},"_deposit":{"created_by":1,"id":"9080","owners":[1],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"9080"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00009080","sets":["528:1287:1304:1343"]},"author_link":["18021"],"control_number":"9080","item_10_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2009-04-25","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicIssueNumber":"1","bibliographicPageEnd":"30","bibliographicPageStart":"15","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"54","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"關西大學商學論集"}]}]},"item_10_description_16":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10_description_4":{"attribute_name":"概要","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"This paper concerns optimal banking contracts in the case of common value, that is, where the bank's utility as well as the firm's profit functions depend on the state of nature. We assume that an informed bank is strictly risk averse and makes a contractual offer to a firm who is risk neutral. According to Laffont and Martimort (2002, chapter 9), to avoid the difficult issues of signaling, we assume that the bank makes his contractual offer before he learns the state of nature θ. This paper has pointed out that the firm's wealth constraint as well as risk preferences of both parties play an important role in financial contracting. When the firm is wealth constrained, an upward distortion for the lending is obtained in efficient state θ₁. On the contrary, when the firm is not wealth constrained, a downward distortion for the lending is obtained in inefficient state θ₀. Different conclusions are reached, though, if the bank as well as the firm is risk neutral. That is, no allocative inefficiency is obtained in the case of the wealth unconstrained firm, while allocative inefficiency is still obtained in the case of the wealth constrained firm.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10_publisher_34":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"關西大學商學會"}]},"item_10_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN00047023","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10_source_id_8":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"04513401","subitem_source_identifier_type":"PISSN"}]},"item_10_version_type_17":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"宇惠, 勝也","creatorNameLang":"ja"},{"creatorName":"Ue, Katsuya","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"familyNames":[{"familyName":"宇惠","familyNameLang":"ja"},{"familyName":"Ue","familyNameLang":"en"}],"givenNames":[{"givenName":"勝也","givenNameLang":"ja"},{"givenName":"Katsuya","givenNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"18021","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"},{"nameIdentifier":"10203423","nameIdentifierScheme":"e-Rad","nameIdentifierURI":"https://nrid.nii.ac.jp/ja/nrid/1000010203423"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2019-05-22"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"KU-1100-20090425-02.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"1.1 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"KU-1100-20090425-02.pdf","url":"https://kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/9080/files/KU-1100-20090425-02.pdf"},"version_id":"c30481e7-6880-49d0-8333-64211c7f0fa4"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Common value","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"informed principal","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"wealth constraint","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"risk preference","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"banking contracts","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"関西大学商学論集","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"関西大学","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Kansai　University","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Optimal Banking Contracts with an Informed Bank","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Optimal Banking Contracts with an Informed Bank","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"10","owner":"1","path":["1343"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2010-02-02"},"publish_date":"2010-02-02","publish_status":"0","recid":"9080","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Optimal Banking Contracts with an Informed Bank"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-11-14T03:20:53.777015+00:00"}