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Optimal Banking Contracts with an Informed Bank
http://hdl.handle.net/10112/789
http://hdl.handle.net/10112/789fd848733-46f9-46f6-99b2-d78fe200b362
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
KU-1100-20090425-02.pdf (1.1 MB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文 / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||
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| 公開日 | 2010-02-02 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Optimal Banking Contracts with an Informed Bank | |||||
| 言語 | en | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||
| 著者 |
宇惠, 勝也
× 宇惠, 勝也 |
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| 概要 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | This paper concerns optimal banking contracts in the case of common value, that is, where the bank's utility as well as the firm's profit functions depend on the state of nature. We assume that an informed bank is strictly risk averse and makes a contractual offer to a firm who is risk neutral. According to Laffont and Martimort (2002, chapter 9), to avoid the difficult issues of signaling, we assume that the bank makes his contractual offer before he learns the state of nature θ. This paper has pointed out that the firm's wealth constraint as well as risk preferences of both parties play an important role in financial contracting. When the firm is wealth constrained, an upward distortion for the lending is obtained in efficient state θ₁. On the contrary, when the firm is not wealth constrained, a downward distortion for the lending is obtained in inefficient state θ₀. Different conclusions are reached, though, if the bank as well as the firm is risk neutral. That is, no allocative inefficiency is obtained in the case of the wealth unconstrained firm, while allocative inefficiency is still obtained in the case of the wealth constrained firm. | |||||
| 書誌情報 |
關西大學商學論集 巻 54, 号 1, p. 15-30, 発行日 2009-04-25 |
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| ISSN | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | PISSN | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | 04513401 | |||||
| 書誌レコードID | ||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||
| 収録物識別子 | AN00047023 | |||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | 關西大學商學會 | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Common value | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | informed principal | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | wealth constraint | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | risk preference | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | banking contracts | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 関西大学商学論集 | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 関西大学 | |||||
| キーワード | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Kansai University | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
