@article{oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00008578,
 author = {Ishii, Akira},
 issue = {1},
 journal = {關西大學經済論集},
 month = {Jun},
 note = {This paper analyzes the differential effects of equally restrictive access price regulations in an industry where a vertically integrated firm has a monopoly on the supply of an essential network service and also operates in a competitive product market. The vertically integrated firm invests strategically to reduce the cost of using the network before the market competition. Social welfare is maximized under a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations which induces a smaller cost reduction than price-cap regulation, when the vertically integrated firm produces at a sufficiently low marginal cost compared with its rival firms in the product market. Otherwise, it is maximized under price-cap regulation or under a hybrid form of price-cap and cost-of-service regulations which induces a larger cost reduction than price-cap regulation.},
 pages = {89--111},
 title = {Access Price Regulation and Strategic Infrastructure Investment},
 volume = {65},
 year = {2015}
}