@techreport{oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003140,
 author = {西崎, 勝彦 and Nishizaki, Katsuhiko},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {This paper studies the possibility of secure implementation (Saijo,T., T. Sjӧstrӧm, and T. Yamato (2007) 〝Secure Implementation," Theoretical Economics 2, pp.203-229) in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions. Although Saijo, Sjӧstrӧm, and Yamato (2007) showed that the Groves mechanisms (Groves, T. (1973) 〝Incentives in Teams," Econometrica 41, pp.617-631) are securely implementable in some of the economies, we have the following negative result: securely implementable social choice functions are dictatorial or constant in divisible and non-excludable public good economies with quasi-linear utility functions., 平成26年関西大学若手研究者育成経費, This paper is a product of research which was finacially supported (in part) by the Kansai University Subsidy for Supporting Young Scholars (2014)“Robustness of Secure Implementation”},
 title = {Securely Implementable Social Choice Functions in Divisible and Non-Excludable Public Good Economies with Quasi-Linear Utility Functions},
 year = {2016}
}