@article{oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00013110,
 author = {Sakane, Hirokazu},
 journal = {Kansai University review of economics},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {A strategic behavior taken by many agents in a group is investigated. In our game model, n-coalitions are formed by many agents. The optimum coalition strategy is selected in accordance with a consensus of almost each agent which belongs to the coalition, given the other coalition's strategies. The state that almost each agent in every coalition no longer has any insentive to change its strategy is called equilibrium points. The purpose of this note is to present an existence theorem of equilibrium points for the game.},
 pages = {69--72},
 title = {On the Existence of Equilibria for an n-Coalitions Game},
 volume = {3},
 year = {2001}
}