{"created":"2023-05-15T12:20:25.862982+00:00","id":11001,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"ac3b57ec-7b19-4351-be53-38afea5f31d4"},"_deposit":{"created_by":1,"id":"11001","owners":[1],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"11001"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00011001","sets":["528:1538:1541:1580"]},"author_link":["23487","23485","23488","23486"],"item_10_alternative_title_20":{"attribute_name":"その他のタイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"Three Criteria on Judging Sustainable Cooperation"}]},"item_10_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2017-07-20","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"39","bibliographicPageStart":"23","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"46","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"情報研究 : 関西大学総合情報学部紀要"}]}]},"item_10_description_4":{"attribute_name":"概要","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"本稿の目的は，繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲームにおける持続的相互協力状態の発現を判定するために3つの基準を設けてその判定を自動化するとともに，初期戦略分布の偏りを前提としたゲームを行い，環境に依存しない戦略評価の下，通常のエリート保存と強エリート保存，2ついずれかの意味でのエリート保存を学習過程としての遺伝的アルゴリズムと併用するならば持続的相互協力状態が発現する可能性が大きくなることを数値的に確認することにある．特に，強エリート保存を併用するとき，初期戦略分布に1人でもGRIM戦略者が存在するならば持続的相互協力状態が必然の結果となることを確認する．合わせて，環境に依存する戦略評価の下では持続的相互協力状態への進化は困難であることも確認する．もとより相互協力状態発現の定義に関して研究者間で共有されたものがなく，我々が与えた判定基準についても若干の曖昧性は残っている．しかしながら，判定を自動化したことは数値実験結果の解釈の時間短縮と数値データに基づく客観的な分析に寄与することになるであろう．","subitem_description_type":"Other"},{"subitem_description":"This paper presents three criteria that can automatically judge whether sustainable cooperation finally emerges in an iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Using the three criteria, we numerically confirm that the potential for developing a sustainably cooperative state increases, if we use simple genetic algorithm in conjunction with elite preservation in either of the two meanings as a learning process: One is usual elite preservation and the other referred to elite preservation in the strong sense. The game has a bias in the initial distribution of strategies and evaluates the player’s payoff independently of the environment. We emphasize that sustainable cooperation becomes inevitable if we use elite preservation in the strong sense, when there is at least one grim trigger strategy in the initial distribution. Moreover, we demonstrate the difficulty of sustainable cooperation under the environment-dependent evaluation. Since there is no common definition of sustainable cooperation among researchers, our criteria might indicate some ambiguity. The criteria, however, seem to contribute to shortening the hours for interpreting the results of numerical calculations and analyzing them objectively.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"23487","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"Shiomura, Takashi"}]},{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"23488","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"Ohta, Keisuke"}]}]},"item_10_publisher_34":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"関西大学"}]},"item_10_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN10484636","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10_source_id_8":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"1341156X","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_10_version_type_17":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"塩村, 尊"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]},{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"大田, 圭佑"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2019-05-22"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"KU-1100-20170720-04.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"983.3 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"KU-1100-20170720-04.pdf","url":"https://kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/11001/files/KU-1100-20170720-04.pdf"},"version_id":"e6bb0596-85fd-427b-bf2e-0c0df8c5c359"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"関西大学","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Kansai University","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲーム","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"遺伝的アルゴリズム","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"マルチエージェントモデル","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"iterative Prisoner’s Dilemma game","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"genetic algorithm","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"multi-agent model","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"持続的相互協力状態発現の判定基準","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"持続的相互協力状態発現の判定基準"}]},"item_type_id":"10","owner":"1","path":["1580"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2017-09-14"},"publish_date":"2017-09-14","publish_status":"0","recid":"11001","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["持続的相互協力状態発現の判定基準"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":1},"updated":"2023-05-17T02:01:17.253493+00:00"}