{"created":"2023-05-15T12:20:24.695457+00:00","id":10974,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"f94e47d0-4957-4617-989c-8845804102e8"},"_deposit":{"created_by":1,"id":"10974","owners":[1],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"10974"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010974","sets":["528:1538:1541:1575"]},"author_link":["23394","23393"],"item_10_alternative_title_20":{"attribute_name":"その他のタイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_alternative_title":"Reconsideration of Axelrod’s Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game"}]},"item_10_biblio_info_7":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2014-08-08","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"70","bibliographicPageStart":"61","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"41","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"情報研究 : 関西大学総合情報学部紀要"}]}]},"item_10_description_4":{"attribute_name":"概要","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Axelrodが行った繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲームに関する一連の数値実験の結果によれば，TFT戦略を現実世界の囚人のジレンマ状況において採用することが推奨される．しかしながら，後の研究により彼のシミュレーション結果は様々な条件に依存しており，TFT戦略の平均的優位性は決して自明のものではないことが明らかになっている．本稿の目的はレプリケータ・ダイナミクスを模した数値実験により，この点を強調するとともに，従来のシミュレーション分析においては，どちらかといえば重要視されていなかったGRIM戦略の平均的優位性とエンフォーサーとしての役割を強調することにある．合わせて，多くのシミュレーション分析において観察される全面協力と全面裏切りの振動を抑える鍵が，上品であるがゆえに高い平均利得を獲得できるエンフォーサーの急成長にあることを示唆する．According to the results of a series of numerical experiments on Axelrod's iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, people should adopt the tit-for-tat strategy for resolving dilemmas in the actual world. The success of this strategy is, however, by no means obvious, since the results depend heavily on various conditions of the experiments. This study reconsiders Axelrod's computer tournament and ecological system, as well as reconfirms that his results depend, in particular, on the set of strategies played in the game and their initial distribution. Moreover, we emphasize the success of the grim trigger strategy and its importance as an enforcer that suppresses the prosperity of naive cooperators and cunning defectors. The key to damping an oscillation, which appears in many simulations (and generates perpetual alternation between mutual cooperation and mutual defection), may be the rapid proliferation of nice enforcers which are to say never being the first to defect.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_10_full_name_3":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"23394","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}],"names":[{"name":"Shiomura, Takashi"}]}]},"item_10_publisher_34":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"関西大学"}]},"item_10_source_id_10":{"attribute_name":"書誌レコードID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AN10484636","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_10_source_id_8":{"attribute_name":"ISSN","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"1341156X","subitem_source_identifier_type":"ISSN"}]},"item_10_version_type_17":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"塩村, 尊"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2019-05-22"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"KU-1100-20140808-04.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"299.0 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"KU-1100-20140808-04.pdf","url":"https://kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/10974/files/KU-1100-20140808-04.pdf"},"version_id":"a3f89cca-136c-4884-9cd5-632e56f3ea2e"}]},"item_keyword":{"attribute_name":"キーワード","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲーム","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"レプリケータ・ダイナミクス","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"シミュレーション","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Iterated prisoner's dilemma game","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"replicator dynamics","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"simulation","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"Axelrodの繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲーム再考","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Axelrodの繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲーム再考"}]},"item_type_id":"10","owner":"1","path":["1575"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2014-09-04"},"publish_date":"2014-09-04","publish_status":"0","recid":"10974","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Axelrodの繰り返し囚人のジレンマゲーム再考"],"weko_creator_id":"1","weko_shared_id":1},"updated":"2023-05-17T02:01:40.871982+00:00"}