@article{oai:kansai-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00010250,
 author = {加藤, 雅人},
 journal = {関西大学外国語学部紀要 = Journal of foreign language studies},
 month = {Oct},
 note = {In this paper we analyze the nature of existential propositions, such as (1) Socrates is wise. (2) Socrates is not. (Socrates doesn't exist.) (3) There are no dragons. (Dragons don't exist.) (4) There are tame tigers. (Tame tigers exist.) These propositions are called existential
because their predicate seems to attribute some kind of being or existence to the
reference(s) of their subject. Is this the case? The answer to this question differs in each case. We, critically reconsidering the argument by G. Frege about the nature of existence, try to analyze what is meant by each proposition above. There is no disagreement among observers about the proposition (1) above, which attributes
the property of wisdom to Socrates. The problem is whether the propositions (2), (3),
and (4) attribute the property of existence (or non-existence) to what their subjects refer to. According to Frege's view, existence, like number, is not a property of individual things, but a characteristic of concepts which have some instantiations falling under them. We agree with him about the nature of general existential propositions such as (3) and (4), but
disagree about that of singular existential proposition like (2).},
 pages = {35--51},
 title = {存在命題の意味論的分析 : フレーゲ再考},
 volume = {17},
 year = {2017}
}