

How Much Does an Understanding of History Help?: Naitō Konan’s Reading of “Communism” in China

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In 1911, as the Qing dynasty verged on collapse, ultimately succumbing to the revolution in October of that year, Japan’s famed Sinologist Naitō Konan 内藤湖南 (1866–1934) tried to explain how it was that, not only was the Qing *kaput* but China’s entire dynastic form of government was doomed — a position not at all widespread among scholars. In the process, he traced events back to the earliest years of the dynasty, more than two-and-a-half centuries previous, and sought to locate longer-term trends that rang the death knell not just for the Qing, as it turned out, but for what he dubbed “monarchical autocracy” (*kunshu dokusai* 君主獨裁), the entrenched power of the dynastic authorities and their proxies, the examination officialdom. He would, most famously, identify “monarchical autocracy” as one of the two essential features of *kinsei* 近世 (the modern era) that emerged out of the destruction of China’s medieval aristocracy in the late Tang, Five Dynasties, and early Northern Song periods. The logical result, as he saw it, could only be republicanism based in constitutionalism, which was (in his understanding) the natural outcome of modernity (everywhere). Perhaps even more importantly, such a conclusion could not be reached in a journalist’s or political scientist’s manner of addressing the immediate

issue at hand on the basis solely of proximate causes, but it had to be seen over *la longue durée*. That things did not turn out as neatly as he hoped and predicted, despite the better intentions of Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 (1866-1925) and his colleagues, was something that Naitō would address many times over the last two decades of his life.

In 1911, Naitō had two decades as a journalist under his belt and half a decade as a professor at Kyoto University. He was hired when the latter launched its East Asian history department in 1906, but unlike so many of his contemporaries, he retained at least one eye focused on the contemporary scene while also teaching earlier period of Chinese history. And, to be sure, the lion's share of his numerous journalistic articles were well-informed by a scholar's knowledge of China's (and Japan's) history. That dual attention served him well in essaying an explanation with deep historical roots for the fall of the Qing dynasty¹⁾.

In the process of connecting the dots to the demise of the Qing, Naitō drew a straight line from the Taiping rebels to the Wuchang rebels. How so? He offered plaudits and kudos to men such as Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811-1872) and Hu Linyi 胡林翼 (1812-1861) for their tactics in defeating the Taipings, but then he went on to offer an internal assessment, as presented orally in May 1911 and published the next month, still four to five months before the final uprising that would force the Qing emperor to abdicate:

Furthermore, although communism was implemented [by the Taipings] at that time, it ended in defeat. When the Taiping rebels took Nanjing, which they made their capital for over ten years, they at first summoned the men of the city. Not allowing the men to

return to their families, they built male compounds to house them. They believed there would be divine punishment if these men returned home and had contact with women. The Taipings were followers of a strange Christianity and were completely wrapped up in their God. Several days later they decided to build special dormitories for the women to live in as well. The men and women were completely segregated, and even when husbands and wives saw one another or mothers and sons met, they could not exchange words. They were treated virtually as prisoners. A perusal of the records of the Taiping Loyal King Li Xiucheng 李秀成 [1823-1864] will reveal that these orders were strictly kept and that people complied with them.²⁾

(それから又共產主義の實行のあつたのも其の時であるが、是は失敗に終つた。南京を十數ヶ年間首府にして居つた長髮賊が南京を取つた時に、初めは城内の男子だけを呼出して、家に歸ることを許さずに、南館と云ふ者を立て、そこへ打込んで仕舞つた。家へ歸つて婦女に接すると天罰があるといふのである。これは長髮賊は一種の變つた天主教徒で、何事でも天主を振廻す為である。數日の後には女も一定の居場所を造つてそこへ置くことにした、之を女館と云うた。それで男と女をマルで分けて仕舞つて、夫婦が顔を合しても、母子が出合うても、語を交すことも出来ぬ。恰も監獄のやうな扱ひである。長髮賊の巨魁忠王李秀成の記録を見ると、其の時の號令が嚴々整々で、人民が佩服したと書いてある。)

He goes on to describe various Taiping institutions in detail, based on sources available at the time, and then concludes:

No country in the world could do all these things and hope for success. Communism was temporarily put into effect by the Taipings, but without giving rise to any results, it has not lasted until now in either custom or thought. Li Xiucheng was an extraordinary man among the Taipings, and there are some people who occasionally pay homage to him today, but no one goes so far as to refer to the system put into effect by the Taipings as good. I think that among the phenomena that have existed in China for a time, this [communism] will certainly have no bearing on China's future constitutionalism.³⁾

(何處の國でもそんな事をやつて成功するものはない。此の共產主義も長髮賊が一時行つて居つたが、何の結果も來さずに、實際の習慣としても、思想としても、今日は残つて居らぬ。長髮賊の中に居つた李秀成などは餘程の人物で、之を崇拜する者も近頃往々あるが、併し其の長髮賊が行つた制度までを良いと云ふ人はない。是れは一時支那にあつた現象でも、其の立憲政治には將來關係を及ぼすことはあるまいと思ふ。)

Imagine my surprise when I read those lines some forty years ago as a young graduate student, with the Cultural Revolution winding down and the Chairman in his waning years. I kept wondering: Didn't Marx have a rather different assessment of the Taipings? Isn't China now putatively a Communist country a century or so after the demise of the Taiping Rebellion? What could Naitō have been thinking, I wondered many years ago, about when he made these assessments?

Naitō was not through, though, describing the "communist" institutions these Christian rebels established. He went on to explain their textile factory, the *paiweiguan* 牌尾館 (Tag Tail Halls) and *paimian* 牌面 (Tag

Faces)⁴⁾, various military-like brigades to attend to their occupational needs, and how the literate among them were selected and taught to transcribe a variety of pronouncements coming from their commanders in wartime. He drew his information from the work of Wang Tao 王韜 (1828-1897), who, as is well known, had considerable contact with the Taipings and accordingly had to escape from Qing China⁵⁾. Drawing on Wang's writings and whatever else may have been known from other sources in 1911, Naitō gave as full a description of the social and economic institutions of the Taipings as one might find outside of China at the time. He focused on the perverse separation of the sexes, periodic conjugal visits, and strict monogamy enforced on all followers except for Jesus's younger brother and his extended and fictive male family members who had their own mini-harems. "Women who expressed displeasure with their marriages were punished by having their hands or feet severed. That was how business was actually carried out in the walled city of Nanjing." (結婚を嫌ふ女があると、手足を斫つて懲らしめにした。かう云ふやうに南京城の中では實際に施行して居つた。) Whether or not this was actually true, Naitō would have obtained such information from Wang Tao's work; that is, he would not have based such a statement on gossip. In a summary sentence, though not at the end of his description, Naitō stated: "In the walled city of Nanjing over 100,000 people operated within this communistic system [or: with these communist institutions]." (南京城の中では十何萬人と云ふ人が共產主義の制度でやつて居つた。)⁶⁾

How does the Taiping Rebellion foreshadow the decline and death of the form of government against which it had actually fought for fourteen years? If Sun Yat-sen could style himself a latter-day Hong Xiuquan 洪

秀全 (1814-1864), how could the revolution he putatively was leading ultimately betoken the end of political and social institutions inimical to republicanism? It all seems very complicated and confusing, requiring some unpacking.

“Communism” (*kyōsanshugi* 共產主義)

First, what would the term *kyōsanshugi* (*gongchanzhuyi* in Chinese) have meant in 1911 when Naitō first employed it? Indeed, what *could* it have meant? There was no “Communist Party” anywhere in East Asia then, nor would there be for another decade or more. The Bolshevik Revolution was still over six years away, and its future leaders were in exile or prison. So, I turn first to the major multi-volume dictionaries. It is telling that Morohashi Tetsuji’s 諸轍徹次 *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* 大漢和辭典 (Great Sino-Japanese dictionary) and the *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典 (Great dictionary of Chinese) are both useless for etymologies here. Both do indeed have entries for the four-character term, but neither has an etymology. This is a strong clue that the term is not of Chinese origin, as both of these works are, first and foremost, dictionaries of the Chinese language. Had there been a Chinese *locus classicus*, it would surely have been there.

The *Nihon kokugo dai jiten* 日本国語大辭典 (Great dictionary of the Japanese language) fills the gap nicely.⁷⁾ For the term *kyōsanshugi* it cites three sources from mid- to late-Meiji times. The first, dating to 1886, is the *Futsu-Wa hōritsu jii* 佛和法律字彙 (French-Japanese legal vocabulary) of Fujibayashi Tadayoshi 藤林忠良 and Kabuto Kuninori 加太邦憲 (1849-1929), which states simply: “COMMUNISME. 共產主義.” If this is, in fact, the *locus classicus*, then it would indicate that the term entered Japanese

(and later Chinese from Japanese) via French. But, what sort of influence would France or the French language have had on Japanese in the early or mid-Meiji? Slight, at best. Perhaps, there was a tie with the Paris Commune, only fifteen years before this dictionary appeared in print, but there appears to be no lexical relationship. The Japanese term for the “Paris Commune” (*La Commune de Paris, Pari komyūn*) パリ・コミュニオン is unrelated in any fashion to the term *kyōsanshugi* and thus offers us no help. In fact, it now seems the French “Communisme” was merely a translation of the term, not an etymological hint of any sort. Strike one.

Let us turn to the next source given in the *Nihon kokugo dai jiten*, this one dating to 1893: the novelist and journalist Matsubara Iwagorō’s 松原岩五郎 (1866–1935) *Saiankoku no Tōkyō* 最暗黒之東京 (In darkest Tokyo), part 9: “Seeing items covetously acquired being distributed to both sides of the wall and watering the land uniformly, this is the implementation of a society just like communism (*kyōsanshugi*).” (其貪り獲たる物品は、直ちに兩鄰合壁へ向って散じ、萬遍なく其土地の霑澤となるを見るは、殆んど類似たる共產主義(ケウサンシュギ)の斯の社會に行はれ居るが故なり) This is a fairly primitive explanation of the basic principles of communism. It does vaguely suggest that the idea was sufficiently current by 1893 that one could make the connection between such a description and the name for such a system. One factor militating against this argument, though, is the simple fact that the term had to be glossed (or, at least, provided with a reading in *kana*) for readers. Ball, just outside; maybe, a foul tip.

The third instance dates to 1904, roughly a decade after Matsubara’s piece: the Christian socialist Kinoshita Naoe’s 木下尚江 (1869–1937) *Hi no hashira* 火の柱 (Pillar of fire), section 2.2: “Is not a home whose doors

are not shut tight prime evidence of the professor's communism?" (戸締なき家と云ふことが、先生の共産主義の立派な證據じゃないか) Taken out of context, it is not entirely clear whether this is supporting or denigrating the idea, but ultimately that is less important than the fact that this was the general view — irrespective of one's perspective on it — at the end of the Meiji period in the early years of the twentieth century. Naitō was writing only few years later. Home run.

The Communist Manifesto in Japan

The relatively new language of “communism” might have come to Naitō's attention via another route, translations and discussions of the *Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Although Naitō was frequently painted as a dyed-in-the-wool conservative (even imperialist), in recent years assessments of this sort have receded before the facts. More to the point, his colleague in the Economics Department at Kyoto University, Kawakami Hajime 河上肇 (1879-1946), one of the founders of Japanese Marxism, began teaching to packed classes in 1908, and Naitō was a frequent auditor of his early lectures on *Das Kapital*⁸⁾. Naitō knew no foreign languages other than (various lects of) Chinese, and the first Chinese translations of the *Communist Manifesto* were apparently based on the first Japanese ones.

The initial Japanese translation (minus the third section of the text which concerned theories of socialism and communism) appeared in the weekly *Heimin shinbun* 平民新聞 (The Commoners' newspaper) on November 13, 1904, a joint effort by Kōtoku Shūsui 幸徳秋水 (1871-1911) and Sakai Toshihiko 堺利彦 (1871-1933). This was not a direct translation from the German original, but retranslation from the English

version of Samuel Moore (1823-1899). The Japanese text was banned by government officials on the very day that it appeared in print. Kōtoku and Sakai were promptly indicted for violating the government's newspaper regulations and both were assessed a fine.

On March 15, 1906 the journal *Shakaishugi kenkyū* 社會主義研究 (Studies of socialism) commenced publication, and Sakai produced for its initial number a full translation of the *Manifesto* (including that earlier missing third section). It included a number of corrections to the *Heimin shinbun* edition, but it was substantially the same — and this time it was printed and circulated legally. Soon thereafter, though, the Akahata Incident of June 1908 transpired, in which an anarchist activist was released from prison and was greeted by a group waving “red flags” (*akahata* 赤旗) and shouting slogans such as “anarcho-communism” (*museifu kyōsan* 無政府共產); they were, of course, broken up and arrested by the police. Then, the Great Treason Incident of 1910 — as a result of which Kōtoku was executed with ten others — transpired, which led to repression of whatever was deemed “dangerous thought.” As a consequence, virtually all writings associated with socialism were placed on the index.

With the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the famous Rice Riots the next year, the brief era known as Taishō Democracy ensued, and an equally short period in which socialism enjoyed a mini-renaissance circa 1920. The Peace Preservation Laws of 1925 pulled the curtain down on this intellectual respite, and it would continue through the end of the Pacific War. Interestingly, in 1919 the Home Ministry's Police Affairs Bureau produced its own translation of the text — though not for popular consumption⁹⁾.

Some fifteen years after the 1906 publication of the full *Manifesto*, in 1921 Sakai brought a much revised translation. For the first time, this was a direct translation from the German original. Both Kawakami Hajime and Kushida Tamizō 榑田民藏 (1885–1934), another early Japanese Marxist economist, worked on the German text to come up with a translation, and Sakai made use of their work. Also, the earlier translations were effectively written in an elite literary style, while the 1921 version was more vernacular in tone. The translators’ names were given as Sakai and Kōtoku, but inasmuch as Kōtoku had already paid the ultimate price a decade previous, this was probably the work largely of Sakai¹⁰.

In any event, it would be more than safe to assume that Naitō probably did not see the 1904 translation, which scarcely circulated, but did see either the 1906 version or the reverberations from it in the scholarly press. And, if activists had popularized slogans by 1908 including phrases such as *kyōsan* 共產, then these terms were already in the air. That would have been sufficient for him to gain an introductory socialist–communist vocabulary.

“Communism” and the Taipings

At the most general level, then, this understanding of *kyōsanshugi* roughly corresponds, it would seem, to what Naitō had in mind when assessing the Taiping Rebellion. We also need remember that the Taipings were only finally defeated two years before he was born, making it an event somewhat comparable to what World War II was for some of us or perhaps the American war in Viet Nam for others, or the Six Day War for many younger Israelis — namely, a recently fought war we talk about and even use in comparisons, despite the fact that we never

personally experienced it. “Communism” entailed, often in the utopian sense, the sharing of possessions and real estate, and it forbade the holding of private property. These characteristics would fit most depoliticized definitions (assuming that is possible) of communism even nowadays. In Naitō’s day, it did not as yet have a hyper-politicized connotation.

Naitō, though, had much more in mind, one level deeper, in his analysis of local Chinese society, and this was profoundly tied to his larger claims about the “modern” development of China in all regards. At the time of the Taiping Rebellion, Japanese intellectuals who were trying to assess what was happening in China may have hailed the effort to topple the Qing as they dismissed or even scorned its Christian underpinnings¹¹). For his part, Naitō had nothing to offer pro or con about Christianity. He was arguing that the Taipings with their idiosyncratic institutions and their assault on the very fabric of Confucian society completely failed to appreciate the essence of local society in China — which spelled their ultimate doom. Perhaps they understood all too well — a concession he was not prepared to make — and simply were out to destroy it; certainly, the Taipings had an entirely different vision of what the social order should look like, albeit rather fuzzy round the edges. He called the reorganization they attempted to effect “communism” (*kyōsanshugi* 共產主義) — his term, not theirs — and that system, he opined, was utterly inimical to the core fabric of local society. What, then, was the quintessential core of Chinese society in his view?

Naitō was, of course, aware of the fact that local conditions varied greatly over Chinese space and time, but he nonetheless went for the (much) bigger picture. Using a familiar image, but not specifically mentioned, local Chinese society seemed to live as if “heaven was [very]

high and the emperor [very] far away (*tiangao diyuan* 天高帝遠). At the village level it was, if not an egalitarian world, then its perceived longevity was the result of a fair and balanced distribution of resources. The entity he notes many times as the virtual quantum unit of Chinese society was the *xiangtuan* 鄉團 (*kyōdan* in Japanese)¹². At the head of these *xiangtuan* were village elders (*fulao* 父老 [J. *furō*]). They all worked collectively to protect local society from invasion and to facilitate the smooth operations of local affairs with the periodic appearance of centrally appointed bureaucrats who would have known little or nothing about their communities. Zeng Guofan and his colleagues understood this basic fact and worked through local leaders to build their *tuanlian* 團練 system¹³, which posited local “braves” as protectors of their local communities — rather than the utterly ineffective standing armies of the Qing.

Thus, as of 1911, Naitō appears to have understood “communism” — actually, *kyōsanshugi* — to refer to all things not intrinsic to Chinese society. While not a direct critique of China’s “distinctive” brand of Christianity, his analysis did point to aliens invading the Chinese social and economic body and attempting to establish institutions to which that body was allergic — though allergic in such a way that the body itself would not die but would fight off and destroy the invader. One can play with these metaphors only so far, but Naitō elsewhere frequently used the metaphor of the life of an organism to portray historical developments.

The Rise of Anti-Japanese Sentiment and “Communism” in China

In the years immediately following his 1911 essays on the decline and fall of the Qing dynasty, Naitō continued to contemplate how China had

reached such a state of affairs. As a consequence of that period of reflection, in 1914 he published what may constitute his most influential work: *Shina ron* 支那論 (On China). In it he offers his famous thesis that understanding the collapse of dynastic China (not just the Qing but the form of government it embraced) requires looking back to the onset of modernity in the Song dynasty¹⁴⁾. He actually welcomed the revolutionaries' promise of republicanism, which he saw as the natural historical development for China (and, eventually, elsewhere), and regarded Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916) as an opportunistic villain, but he could see by 1913 that the revolutionaries had greatly miscalculated:

We have expressed our sympathies for the revolutionaries who have failed. Because the revolutionaries themselves did not understand the national character of the Chinese people, they reduced the fruits of their labors to naught. The national character of the Chinese is to seek peace at any sacrifice.

(我々は今以て失敗したる革命黨の人々に同情を表する。革命黨の人々は、自から支那の國民性を了解せなかつたので、其の限りなき辛苦の効果を水泡に歸せしめてしまったのである。支那の國民性は何物を犠牲にしても平和を求める。)¹⁵⁾

Outmoded notions such as “national character” notwithstanding, what is important here is Naitō's recurrent claim that the political actors in China did not comprehend their own people's essence. When discussing the Taipings, it was they who failed in this regard, while Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 (1823–1901), and others did understand and were thus able to defeat the rebels. With the passage of time, Naitō might retain

sympathy for the Chinese revolutionaries in 1911 (Sun Yat-sen and his colleagues) but pity their ignorance and thus their failures. As time would continue, the same claim reappears but his mood would change.

Shina ron is a profoundly scholarly work, with the political ramifications of his conclusions cropping up here and there. It makes no mention of radical students or “communism.” Ten years later, he would return to many similar themes but the tone had now changed considerably — and what a difference a decade, this decade, makes! Between 1914 and 1924, we get the following: the Russian Revolution had successfully brought the Bolsheviks to power in China’s immense neighbor Russia; the Chinese labor movement had grown remarkably; the China Communist Party had been founded; the Great Kantō Earthquake and subsequent devastating fire had destroyed large swaths of Tokyo; anti-foreign sentiment in general and anti-Japanese sentiment in particular were on the rise in China; the May Fourth and New Culture Movements emerged full-blown; and the extraordinary explosion of Chinese nationalism (especially after the Twenty-One Demands of 1915) seemed to target Japan.

Although his 1924 work would provide a fuller treatment of the topic, readers did not have to wait a full ten years to see him use a new term for this idea. In a New Year’s Day article in 1921 for *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun* 大阪毎日新聞, he described in highly condensed form many of the trends in modern history that he had outlined in far greater detail earlier but with an acute concern for the imminent pitfalls confronting China and the dangers of the radical and anti-Japanese movements getting stronger:

Many people have recently discussed the issue of whether or not

China will go communist. The group which at present shows the most likely communist inclination is the military. In the Shanghai area right now, the most radical group in China is trying to proselytize communism to the military. The extent to which soldiers along the Yangzi River who have either risen up recently or have tried to do so have indicated a desire to move in a communist direction is unclear, but non-payment of salaries and fluctuations in the value of silver have provided ample reasons for the soldiers to go communist. In particular, the peasants living in the surrounding area have sufficient wealth to be able to satisfy themselves by plundering by the soldiers, and this enhances all the more the possibility of communism. However, at the same time that it enhances the possibility of communism on the part of the military, the wealth of the peasantry also should give them greater capacity for self-defense.

(近來屢、支那が赤化するか否やの問題を論ずる人がある。今の所で先づ赤化すべき傾きを有するものは兵隊である。又現に上海邊の支那一流の過激派なども先づ兵隊に赤化宣傳を行はんとしてゐる。近頃或は勃發し或は勃發せんとする状態の存する長江沿岸の兵隊等が、何れだけ赤化せるかを示すことは明かでないけれども、給料の不渡とか、銀貨の變動とかの事からして兵隊の赤化すべき原因は多く具備してゐる。殊に其の周圍に居る農民が兵隊の掠奪を飽足らすべきだけの富裕の状態にある所から、益々赤化の可能性を増すのである。しかし兵隊の赤化の可能性を増すと同時に、又農民の富裕は農民の自衛の實力をも増すべき筈である。)¹⁶⁾

As can be readily seen, he does not use *kyōsanshugi* here for the seven times the word translated as “communist” or “communism” appears, but

instead a parallel, possibly newer, term for Communism: *sekka* 赤化 (*chihua* in Chinese, literally, “becoming, or turning red”).

The New Year’s Day article compares the present situation in China to that facing the peasantry at the time of the Taipings — using the Qing-era government term “Changfazei” 長髮賊 (long-haired bandits) — and positing the capacity again in the early 1920s for the peasantry to form local self-defense units to defeat those who would radically transform the social order. We shall return below to why he chose at this point to switch to *chihua* from *kyōsanshugi* as the preferred term for “communism.” Suffice it here to note that what he meant by either term at this point, when no Communist Party in China or anywhere else in East Asia as yet existed, needs to be addressed as well. Several years later, when there were Communist parties throughout the region, *sekka* appears to have acquired a decidedly negative connotation. It was associated with any sort of leftist or left-of-center, anti-government, liberal-socialist, and, of course, communist thought. The notorious 1924 incident involving Kawai Seiichirō 川井清一郎 (1894–1930), who used a textbook not designated for use by the state in his elementary-school class at the Matsumoto Women’s Normal School, sent shivers throughout the educational establishment: it marked a severe attack on freedom of thought in the late Taishō period (1912–1926). At this point, the language of *sekka shisō* 赤化思想 (communist thought) and *sekka seinen* 赤化青年 (communist youth) came into wider circulation¹⁷⁾.

In the year 1924, Hakubundō 博文堂 published Naitō’s much shorter work, *Shin Shina ron* 新支那論 (On the new China), the immediate stimulus for which was, he says, the startling rise of anti-Japanese incidents in China¹⁸⁾. He announces from the start that anything

resembling Chinese patriotism in the anti-Japanese movement is pure fiction; the cause (just as he saw Yuan Shikai a few years earlier manipulate Chinese public opinion) was agitators, if only because the Chinese had little or no concept of a nation or nation-state. Then, why worry about it? The problem was that it might at any moment explode once again and cause serious damage. He had absolutely no faith in Chinese politicians either to grasp the problems facing their country, in domestic or foreign affairs, as they lacked the earnest spirit of reform that the previous generation had embodied. As a lack of commitment to anything but lining their own pockets, they were, in his opinion: “Just like wildly drunk people, and if bystanders don’t stand in their way as an obstruction, they take that to be success.” (まるで酔狂人の如く狂ひ廻つて、見物人が妨害さへしなければそれを成功だと心得てゐる。)¹⁹⁾

With more than enough blame for China’s quagmire to spread around among domestic and foreign parties — and no small share was placed at the door of Japan — Naitō went on to assert that those (Chinese and Japanese) who considered that Japan would be solely at fault should China collapse and break apart were entertaining an utterly absurd idea. Why? Because they “have no knowledge whatsoever of the foundation of the Chinese nation and the history of Chinese societal organization.” (支那の國家の成立、支那の社會組織の歴史を全く知らぬ) What in particular did they fail to understand? The national condition of China was like that of a planarian-worm: Sever one part and the rest survives, as the Chinese people and their culture have done for centuries. Chinese society possesses, he claimed, a firm sense of security (*anzensei* 安全性), a kind of self-defense mechanism, and later in this piece he claims that the “Chinese national character” is to be “content with one’s lot” (*anbun* 安

分). And, that is the reason he states unequivocally for the utter lack of success, despite repeated efforts over the most recent few years, of Communist propaganda: China’s “immunity” (*men’ekisei* 免疫性) to it²⁰).

We return to the alternative word for *kyōsanshugi* (communism), namely, *sekka*. Why he adopted it is unclear, though the two may have possessed altogether different connotations in his mind, and indeed he may simply have identified *kyōsanshugi* solely with the Taipings at this point. In 1924 *sekka* was still in its terminological infancy, dating back less than a decade and clearly pointing to the radical developments in the world that Naitō found so worrisome. Its literal meaning of “becoming red” reflected the increasingly omnipresent “red banners” that marked the emergence of Communists (and, now, Communist Parties) everywhere. On the sense of the word “Communist,” a 1921 volume by Kobayashi Kamin 小林花眠, entitled *Atarashiki yōgo no izumi* 新しき用語の泉 (The source of new terms), reads as follows:

Sekka bears the meaning of becoming radical [extremist]. As red carries the meaning of the radicals [extremists], “to become red” implies a saturation with its principles. In the United States the subjugation of radicals is called the “red hunt” [or “red scare”].

(赤化(セキカ)過激化の意。赤は過激派を意味するので、其の主義に浸潤することを「赤化する」といふ。米國では過激派退治のことを「赤狩(あかがり)」と呼んでゐる。)

Writing just a few years later (1926), reporter Ubukata Toshirō 生方敏郎 (1882–1969) noted in his *Meiji Taishō kenbun shi* 明治大正見聞史 (Things seen and heard in the Meiji and Taishō eras) in a chapter on

student life in the Meiji period: “From about Taishō 6 or 7 [1917–1918], ... the term *sekka* newly emerged” (大正六七年頃から新に。。。赤化だのと云ふ言葉が出来て)²¹⁾.

The dating here speaks volumes, as this early reference places the term in the immediate context of the Bolshevik Revolution and the rapid spread of radical thought around the world in its aftermath (the repression that followed). Fearing its further spread eastward, Japan at that time sent troops to join the Siberian Expedition in an attempt to smother the Bolsheviks in the crib—a colossal failure. The Japanese government in the 1920s spread its anti-*sekka* net further and pulled in Communists, anarchists, socialists, and labor activists, and in several notorious cases these people never re-emerged. There was a long-standing fear of Russia in Japan, even predating the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, and Naitō appears to have shared it to a certain extent, but much more was at work here.

He was now dealing with self-avowed (capital “C”) “Communists,” and his fears were that the reform movement in China might veer off in a radical direction and find China forging some sort of rapprochement with Soviet Russia. Lenin was offering China bait in the early post-Revolution years, as the Karakhan Declaration made clear, and Naitō was also well aware of the fact that the most outspoken anti-Japanese elements in China were the Chinese Communists. Like the Taipings before them, the pre-1927 Chinese Communists were focused on urban labor and worker-peasant organizations intent on thoroughly destroying the fabric of Chinese society, which was to be replaced by something utterly inimical to it.

There is another interesting and early Chinese reference to *chihua*

(as mentioned above, it is the Chinese way of pronouncing the two characters for *sekka*), from the Chinese press. Writing under the pen name Shuanglin 雙林, Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白 (1899–1935) penned an essay in 1925 entitled “Diguozhuyi de yongpu yu Zhongguo pingmin” 帝國主義的傭僕與中國平民 (Servants of imperialism and the common Chinese people). Qu asks (rhetorically, to be sure) in this piece (and using our term in a highly positive manner):

What is *chihua*? *Chihua* is revolution — the revolution of the Chinese people; it is also the struggle for China’s liberation and independence and so that the foreign capitalists are not able to enslave the Chinese people. In the eyes of the foreign imperialists and their running dogs, [such revolution] is utterly reprehensible and [thus] *chihua*.

(什麼是赤化？赤化便是革命：中國的民族革命，便是爭中國的解放獨立，使外國資本家不能奴隸中國人。這在外國帝國主義及其走狗的眼里看來，便算是罪大惡極，便算是赤化。)²²⁾

In *Shin Shina ron*, Naitō goes on to say that the Communists’ propaganda was not panning out, largely because the forces of Chinese society were more powerful. The Communists “advocate the destruction of the family system” (家族破壞論を主張する) in China and see its Confucian underpinning as the “morality of slavery” (奴隸主義の道德). That their efforts were going nowhere was “due to the fact that China’s social organization is an advanced communal family system” (支那の社會組織が進歩した共産的の家族制度から成立つて居るがため). Note that the last term translated as “communal” was *kyōsanteki* 共産的. In the context

of his earlier writing on the Taipings, this may either be a slip of the brush or just an indication of terminological anarchy.

As this unusual essay nears its end, Naitō explicitly mentions the New Culture Movement and the Literary Revolution, both still reverberating at the time of composition. Some critics, he argues, claim that advocates of the destruction of China’s “old morality” — meaning Confucianism — have “completely adopted individualism, socialism, and communism, newly arrived from the West, while others say that they have adopted old ideas from Mozi and Laozi” (全く西洋から新らしく来た個人主義とか、社会主義とか、共産主義とかを採用せんとし、或る者は舊い墨子、老子などの主義を採用せんとして居る).²³ Here, we have *kyōsanshugi* for “communism” in a vaguely negative sense, but the overarching point in this essay — as in virtually all of his writings — is that without a firm grasp of history, no accurate assessment of the present and future is possible. Of course, there are at least as many assessments of history as there are observers, but Naitō here, as elsewhere, claims to have not just a firm understanding but one that goes back several thousand years and clearly points to trends over time.

Back to the Real China! Further Thoughts on “Communism”

Naitō returned one last time to the topic of “Communism” in China in a somewhat notorious article of 1926. Entitled “Shina ni kaere” 支那に還れ (Go back to China!), it was a long piece, printed over six consecutive days (May 25–30), again in the *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun*²⁴. The year 1926 was his retirement year, and he began a host of scholarly projects, but, as always, he also kept a close eye on current events, and the press solicited his historically informed opinion on those events. By 1926 Naitō had witnessed

the early failures of the CCP to score victories among the peasantry; Mao Zedong's 毛澤東 (1893-1976) "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" (Hunan nongmin yundong kaocha baogao 湖南農民運動考察報告 would not be published until the following year.

As the title of this 1926 essay indicates, Naitō was arguing strongly for China and the Chinese (government, people, everything) to stay the course — the long historical course — and not get caught up in the heady events he now consistently identified as *sekka* 赤化 (Communism); *kyōsanshugi*, though, will later reemerge from the dead — zombie-like. Why he chose this term now over *kyōsanshugi* is not immediately obvious, though. Despite passages like that quoted above, from Qu Qiubai's 1925 writing (Qu being one of the principal leaders of the Chinese Communist Party), *chihua* would never really catch on in China.

What, then, did Naitō actually have to say in the essay? His first paragraph reads:

The recent disruptions in China have turned startlingly volatile, battles fought repeatedly, with centers of power moving each and every time. The changes we are seeing, however, are merely superficial, with no appreciable links to the fundamental ideas of the Chinese people. Genuine change in China has nothing to do with such things as the vicissitudes of the warlord regimes but rather lies in the basic notions of how to reform China. In this regard the Chinese have in recent years abruptly demonstrated a communist (*sekka*) inclination, to which intellectuals inside and outside China have responded either with concern or interest.

(支那近年の變動は實に目まぐるしいほどに激しく、屢屢戦争を繰

かへし、勢力の中心もその度毎に移動してゐるが、しかしこれは單に外形にあらはれた變化で、支那の國民の根本の思想には大した關係がないものである。眞の支那の變化はむしろかくの如き軍閥などの勢力の消長にはあらずして、支那を如何に改革すべきかといふことに關する根本思想にある。近年支那人が急激に赤化してゐる傾きをあらはし來つたので、支那の内外における有識は、その點において非常に憂慮もし或は興味をももつに至つた。) ²⁵⁾

The “recent disruptions” of his first sentence may point to the May Thirtieth Movement which had been violently crushed only months before. More likely, though, he was referring to the warlord fighting taking place in North China especially, and in his next paragraph (see below) he will explicitly mention the Fengtian 奉天 and Zhili 直隸 cliques. As was frequently his wont, he cautioned against jumping to an uninformed conclusion that the most immediate thing before your eyes is the most important. No, he averred in a fashion not dissimilar from his earlier dismissal of the Taipings, these are all entirely epiphenomenal, but they have given rise to something which is highly important. For, he was essentially saying here, warlords come and go, they win one day and lose the next, but this new radical trend is far more haunting: it is the specter of Communism.

In his next paragraph he proceeded directly to the point:

If a country such as China, the most populous in the entire world, goes Communist and assumes the same attitude and changes to the same social organization as Russia, this will constitute a problem of utmost gravity for the entire world. Advocates of communism in

China plan, of course, to create a new China on this basis to resist the oppression of all the capitalist countries, beginning with Japan. Japan and England [i.e., their interests in China] have already been attacked. Even the United States, which has until now professed to be China's friend, is beginning to be worried about how to ward off an attack in the future. The Nationalist Army [of Feng Yuxiang 馮玉祥 (1882-1948) et al.], considered the center of Communist power in recent years, may have collapsed, and the Fengtian and Zhili [warlord] cliques regained prominence, but this is still superficial. For Communism, embraced in the ideology of "young China," has not as yet completely collapsed.

(支那の如き、全世界の中、最も多数の人口を有する國が赤化してロシアと同一態度をとり、同一社會組織にかはるといふことになれば、たしかに全世界にとつてゆゑしい問題であらねばならぬ。支那における赤化論者は、勿論これを以て新支那を形作り、日本を初めあらゆる資本主義の國々の壓迫に對抗しようと企てたので、すでに日英兩國はそのために打撃を被り、今までは支那の友人をもつて任じてゐた米國の如きも、將來における打撃を如何にして防がうかといふことに苦心しはじめるに至つた。最近赤化の中心勢力と呼ばれてゐる國民軍が衰へ、奉直二派が勢力を盛返したといつても、それは矢張り外形上のことであつて、いわゆる「青年支那」の思想に含まれてゐる赤化主義は未だ全く衰へたといふことを得ない有様である。) ²⁶⁾

As this quotation reveals, there was a brief time in the mid- to late-1920s when the foreign press and many others as well believed that certain warlord groups and even the army of the Guomindang 國民黨, which was about to launch the Northern Expedition, was allied with the

“Communists.” That would cease to be the case in April 1927, when the United Front (then in operation in 1926, and possibly another reason for believing the Communists were behind warlord military machinations) came to a cataclysmic end. Otherwise, Naitō’s read on the Communists’ plans strikes this reader ninety years later as spot on. Whatever confusion there may have been about Chinese communism at this stage of its infancy and warlordism, Naitō clearly noted that warlords were as irrelevant to fundamental change in China as the Communists may have been relevant.

It might be tempting to dismiss him as a cranky old anti-Communist or a nationalist Japanese angry at rising anti-Japanese sentiment in China — or both. But, this was not the Cold War era, and the international alliances and divisions were altogether different at that time. Thus, his views about the new movement on the mainland deserve a much closer look. He goes on to note the concern among Chinese youth for a possible future for Communism in China and credits a renovation effort on their part with the phrase that he took for the title of this essay, “Go back to China!” It is not clear about whom he is speaking here, but it is definitely not the Communists; rather, it is those who want to reform and unify their country and who are significantly shying away from Communism. But, there’s a big problem. In addition to the fact that this group had no meaningful base of power and remained unorganized, “they may have hit on the idea of the need to return to China, but they have no hard knowledge of where to start or in what form to build a renewed new China.” (支那に還ることの必要を思ひついても、如何なる點から着手してよいか、如何なる形式で新々支那を形作るべきかといふことについては確實な智識をも持たず。)²⁷⁾

In essence this is a critique Naitō had been leveling at commentators from many different countries for decades, but now with a much more forceful and stark tone than before. In this incarnation, he seems to refer to the fact that, in the wake of the New Culture movement and a decade of Chinese repeatedly trashing their own culture, those wishing to build something rooted fundamentally in knowledge of Chinese historical sources were thoroughly lost at sea. It was, then, the Communists who were continuing to play the ferocious anti-traditional chord, while this vague, unorganized group who, he claimed, went by the name “New New China” was grasping at straws to rebuild something genuinely Chinese — perhaps the motley crew of Chinese liberals. He was just as withering in his critique of contemporary Japanese views of China:

Views concerning the China issue have been undergoing considerable change in recent years in Japan, too. As the further dissemination of knowledge about contemporary China has accompanied proportionately a decline in the depth [of our knowledge], often criticism of China has become entangled with the Chinese authorities and lost its level-headed spirit. All the measures with which the Japanese have actually been involved in changing the state of affairs in China, though, have ended in failure.

（日本においても、近年支那問題に關する議論には大分變化を來たしては居る。最近支那に關する智識が多少普及すると反比例に、その深さは寧ろ減じて來た為に、支那に關する批評についてはかへつて當局の支那人に卷込まれ、冷靜な批評の精神を失ふことが多くなつて來た。しかし支那の變局に對して、日本人が實際に關係したあらゆる方策がすべて失敗に歸して。）²⁸⁾

In short, nobody has gotten it right.

Later, in his essay “Shina ni kaere,” Naitō takes a few wild last swings at the danger he sees on the horizon. While the world appears to be ready to accept China’s autonomy, as the Washington and Paris Peace Conferences effectively indicated was to be the new move toward self-determination, radical elements in China were moving in an anti-Japanese direction, and:

At the same time the influence of Russia’s [the Soviet state’s] organizations of laborers and peasants has become marked. Socialist and communist viewpoints in Japan have been extensively imported [to China], indicating a shift toward destroying the entire old structure of China and fashioning a new one. This has led to the sudden development of Communism.

(それと同時にロシアの勞農組織の影響が著るしくなり、日本における社會主義、共產主義の議論が盛んに輸入されるところから、あらゆる支那の舊組織を破壊して新組織を作り出さうといふ傾きになり、赤化主義が急激な發展を來した。)²⁹⁾

As if to make the terminology more complicated that need be, Naitō actually used both terms for “Communism” in this short passage; and the term *rōnō* 勞農 (especially when preceded by “Russia”) was fairly transparent code for the Soviet Union and the Bolsheviks.

His point here, which is clearly implied by the title, is that the Chinese need to examine their past to ascertain strengths and weaknesses on which to build a program of reform that will last beyond the immediate present. That required a solid knowledge of Chinese history, and he had

no faith that the political actors on the scene in China had such. Wealth and power make for a nice mantra, but without due consideration of Chinese culture, it will all be a waste of time and perhaps a tragic one. England made a mad rush for wealth and power, which the Industrial Revolution provided, but all that effort and all the concomitant results have left England with a poorly developed culture, he claimed. This is a fairly specious argument, especially as Naitō knew no European languages, and thus was ignorant of the greatest writers in the English language (Dickens, Eliot, Austen, et al.).

“Communism” in China, Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Varieties

The question, then: Is Naitō’s understanding of *sekka* linked to his earlier discussion of *kyōsanshugi*, or are the two just coincidentally related by our English translation of both as “communism?” Put another way, does he ever attempt to use *sekka* to explain why the Taipings failed, as he earlier used *kyōsanshugi*, or is there ever for that matter a clear differentiation of the two technical terms? It is hard to say for certain. Some years ago, I posited that *kyōsanshugi* might indicate (small “c”) communism — namely, a newish theory on the radical redistribution of property, of which Naitō saw earlier resonances in the Taiping movement and well before there were any (capital “C”) Communist parties in the world. Later, when he was criticizing the ignorance of the student movement in contemporary China, he switched to *sekka*, at a time when there were a handful of Communist parties, including a small one in China. Later still, however, he began using the terms almost interchangeably, although the distinction still basically holds. It does seem clear that,

during the Taishō period of politics and society, *sekka* bore a derogatory connotation, similar to the use of “red” later, at the height of the Cold War. It should also be noted that *aka* アカ (lit., “red”; usually written in *katakana* but occasionally the graph 赤) would soon enter the lists in a determinedly negative sense. (This two-syllable term can easily be confused with an identical expression, short for “akademikku” (academic), and not always used in a positive sense.)

Bigger question: Does the kind of extraordinary knowledge of the depth and breadth of Chinese history and culture as possessed by someone like Naitō Konan help in correctly addressing a contemporary issue, such as the rise of Communism in China? Do the textually-based, Sinological methods Naitō used give us greater clarity when applied to contemporary concerns? I would like to say, definitively, yes, but I remain doubtful—or, at least, open to doubts. Why?

Naitō was clearly wrong about an eventual failure of the Communists, though by the time of his death in 1934, the CCP was on its last legs and about to launch the greatest escape from the jaws of death in world history (better known as the Long March). The Communists not only came to power after epic battles with the armies of Japan and the Guomindang. It then followed its 1949 establishment of a Communist government by implementing land policies theoretically not that dissimilar from those of the Taipings a century earlier. Were they successful? Does this prove Naitō wrong and Mao and his colleagues right? One need not jump to conclusions in answering these questions.

If the answers to these last questions are “yes,” then there would seemingly have been no need for the wholesale reform movement launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping 鄧小平 (1904-1997). As we all know,

the reforms have utterly undone most of the “communistic” policies of the Mao period — except, of course, the stranglehold of the CCP over politics in China — and turned China into the world’s largest capitalist country. But, the failure of the commune system, historically unprecedented mass starvations, and a whole host of horrifying policies might, in the minds of some, indicate that Naitō just may have been onto something. Perhaps his incomparable knowledge of Chinese history, society, and culture enabled him to foresee that the radical changes effected over the years from the late 1940s through the late 1970s were, indeed, ephemeral, if also just as disastrous in the resultant human carnage. China has now lived longer (1978-present) with post-Communist rural policies than it did under state-imposed land redistribution policies, and it is prospering on the whole like no other country in the world.

I do believe it incontrovertible that Naitō’s sense of history provided him with at least something of a map to understand the present and a tentative guide to the future. Far from Naitō’s own innovation, this is a hallmark of traditional Chinese historical studies: the past as a mirror for reflection on things to come. It is also a fundamental tenet of the New Sinology, and that alone should make us attentive to what Naitō had to say nearly a century ago.

Notes

- 1) I treat this issue on some depth in: *Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934)* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984).
- 2) Naitō Konan 内藤湖南, “Shinkoku no rikken seiji” 清國の立憲政治 (Constitutional government in China), *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun* 大阪毎日新聞 (June 25, 1912), in *Naitō Konan zenshū* 内藤湖南全集 (Collected works of Naitō Konan] (hereafter, *NKZ*), ed. Naitō Kenkichi 内藤乾吉 and Kanda Kiichirō 神田喜一郎 (Tokyo:

- Chikuma shobō, 1972), 5:429.
- 3) *NKZ*, 5:430-31.
 - 4) See Ono Kazuko, *Chinese Women in a Century of Revolution*, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 207. (Kathryn Bernhardt translated this specific chapter.)
 - 5) See Paul Cohen, *Between Tradition and Modernity: Wang T'ao and Reform in Late Ch'ing China* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1988), pp. 32-34.
 - 6) *NKZ*, 5:430.
 - 7) “Kyōsanshugi” 共産主義 (Communism), in *Nihon kokugo dai jiten* (Tokyo: Shōgakusan, 2006), 4:435-36.
 - 8) See Mitamura Taisuke 三田村泰助, *Naitō Konan* 内藤湖南 (Tokyo: Chūō kōron, 1972). It may be worth mentioning, though not overstressing, that in his youth Naitō (writing under the pen name “Gayūsei” 臥遊生) published an essay entitled “Shakaishugi o tore” 社會主義を取れ (Adopt socialism!), *Ajia* 亞細亞 54 (August 29, 1892), in *NKZ*, 1:624-32. The essay was in the mold of state socialism — namely, the best way to protect the poor was to build a strong state. On Kawakami, see Gail Lee Bernstein, *Japanese Marxist: A Portrait of Kawakami Hajime, 1879-1946* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).
 - 9) Ōmura Izumi 大村泉, “Kōtoku Shūsui Sakai Toshihiko yaku *Kyōsantō sengen* no seiritsu denshō to Chūgokugo yaku e no eikyō” 幸徳秋水・堺利彦訳「共産党宣言」の成立・伝承と中国語訳への影響 (The formation and transmission of the translation of the *Communist Manifesto* by Kōtoku Shūsui and Sakai Toshihiko and its influence on the Chinese translation), *Ōhara shakai mondai kenkyū zasshi* 大原社会問題研究雑誌 603 (January 2009): 1-13; Tamaoka Atsushi 玉岡敦, “*Kyōsantō sengen* hōyaku shi ni okeru Kōtoku Shūsui Sakai Toshihiko yaku (1904, 1906 nen) no ichi” 「共産党宣言」邦訳史における幸徳秋水・堺利彦訳(1904, 1906年)の位置 (The place of the translation by Kōtoku Shūsui and Sakai Toshihiko, 1904 and 1906, in the Japanese translation history of the *Communist Manifesto*), *Ōhara shakai mondai kenkyū zasshi* 大原社会問題研究雑誌 603 (January 2009): 14-26; and Tamaoka Atsushi, “*Kyōsantō sengen* hōyaku shi” 「共産党宣言」邦訳史 (The Japanese translation history of the *Communist Manifesto*), see: <https://jshet.net/docs/conference/75th/tamaoka.pdf> (accessed July 2017). Mention should be made of the most extraordinarily detailed analysis of Japanese vocabulary

- used in the various *Communist Manifesto* translations since 1906: Miyajima Tatsuo 宮島達夫, “*Kyōsantō sengen no yakugo*” [「共産党宣言」の訳語 (Translated terminology in the *Communist Manifesto*)], in *Gengo no kenkyū* 言語の研究 (Studies in language], ed. Gengogaku kenkyūkai 言語学研究会 (Tokyo: Mugi shobō, 1979), pp. 425–517.
- 10) These details and more may be found in Tamaoka, “*Kyōsantō sengen hōyaku shi*,” pp. 142–44. In his longer article, Tamaoka actually compares these early translations with the German original and Moore’s English translation: “*Kyōsantō sengen hōyaku shi*,” pp. 15–25.
 - 11) I have addressed this in *Maiden Voyage: The Senzaimaru and the Creation of Modern Sino-Japanese Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 102–17 and elsewhere. There is a great deal more that could be said about this interesting topic.
 - 12) Not to be confused at all with the same term used in the Sui and Tang and translated by Hucker as “township militia.” See Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 234 (no. 2364). Hucker identifies it as a Sui institution; Baidu 百度 (<http://baike.baidu.com/view/651232.htm>) states its time frame as “Sui–Tang.”
 - 13) Described most famously by Philip A. Kuhn in his *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
 - 14) Dictated in October and December 1913 and published by Bunkaidō shoten 文會堂書店 in March 1914; in *NKZ*, 5:291–408.
 - 15) *NKZ*, 5:296.
 - 16) “Shina no chūkokuisha” 支那の忠告者 (Chinese advisers), *Ōsaka mainichi shinbun* (January 1, 1921), in *NKZ*, 5:143.
 - 17) Wasaki Kōtarō 和崎光太郎, “Taishō jiyū kyōiku to ‘sekka shisō’: Kawai kundō jiken to sono shūhen” 大正自由教育と「赤化思想」: 川井訓導事件とその周辺 (Liberal education in the Taishō era and “Communist thought”: The Kawai training incident and its surrounding circumstances], *Shinano* 信濃 59.10 (October 2007): 753–70.
 - 18) *NKZ*, 5:483–543. In early 1978 I interviewed the late Professor Ikeda Makoto 池田誠 (1922–2008) who had published a number of fine studies of Naitō’s writings. He confessed to me that he simply could not make complete sense of *Shin Shina ron*.

- 19) *NKZ*, 5:493.
- 20) *NKZ*, 5:499–501, 531 (quotation, p. 499).
- 21) “*Sekka*,” in *Nihon kokugo dai jiten*, 7:1365.
- 22) *Qu Qiubai wenji* 瞿秋白文集 (Writings of Qu Qiubai] (dated February 26, 1925), see: <http://50.22.193.73/thread-233164-1-1.html> (accessed March 2017); and *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典 (Great dictionary of Chinese] (Shanghai: Hanyu da cidian chubanshe, 1994), 9:1158.
- 23) *NKZ*, 5:540–41).
- 24) In *NKZ*, 8:171–81. It was reprinted as part of his collection *Tōyō bunka shi kenkyū* 東洋文化史研究 (Studies in the cultural history of East Asia] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1936).
- 25) In *NKZ*, 8:171.
- 26) *NKZ*, 8:171.
- 27) *NKZ*, 8:172.
- 28) *NKZ*, 8:172–73.
- 29) *NKZ*, 8:177.

