

# Chinese Ships Cast Ashore in Early-modern Japan

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## Introduction

For the Japanese archipelago, it is no small issue whether one views the surrounding waters as a sea route stimulating interchange or as a barrier. Depending on the view one takes, one's image of Japanese history is greatly restricted. Especially in the case of early-modern Japan, with its system of *sakoku*, national seclusion, in comparison with activities of earlier Japanese missions to China during the Tang dynasty (*kentoshi*) and the licensed trading ships to Ming China (*kangosen*) during the Muromachi period, the seas seem much more of a barrier or obstacle. However, the seas themselves were not transformed from seaway in one era to barrier in the next. In actuality, the primary factor in whether the sea functions as an obstacle or a sea route is the society of the archipelago itself. To put it another way, it was the system of "national seclusion" that made the sea not a route for travel, but a barrier to interchange, and the blue sea itself bears no responsibility whatsoever.

It is only reasonable to hold that as long as the sea exists, regardless of whether there is an official policy of national seclusion, it constantly functions as a sea route. Regardless of the policy in place, people did in fact traverse the crests of the waves, both outbound and inbound. From this viewpoint, an increasing number of people ultimately came to feel uncomfortable with the term *sakoku*, and in due course began to switch to the concept of *kaikin*, a term expressing the prohibition of overseas trade. This occurred in the 1980s. This conceptual conversion from *sakoku* to *kaikin* was simultaneously a conversion from Japan-centeredness to discussions of bilateral relationships. *Sakoku* was a phenomenon of Japan alone, but through the concept of *kaikin* both Japan and China became part of the picture.

The sea-as-ocean-route view, which transformed the image of Japan as a closed country, was also brought about by a second factor, that of ships that were set adrift and landed on Japanese shores. The incident involving Adam Kirilovich Laxman, returning Japanese seaman Daikokuya Kodayu, and the *Morrison* Incident, actual events of shipwrecked Japanese being brought back to Japan, indicate that despite the policy of national seclusion Japanese were not prevented from going overseas. Needless to say, the occurrences of shipwrecks and people set adrift at sea were, for the people involved, accidents occurring on only one occasion. However, in the flow of history, these castaways suggest that such events were less pure happenstance than a matter of inevitability. The fact that between 1720 and 1845, there were some ten incidents of ships drifting ashore on Torishima is symbolic of the numbers of cast-

aways and ships drifting across the Pacific like so many scraps of paper in the wind (Haruna Toru, *Sekai o miteshimatta otokotachi*, 1988). These numbers suggest an inevitability that transcends the aspect of accident.

Those who were washed up on Torishima, although they were in the coastal waters of Japan, had no way of returning home other than under their own power. The reason for this was less that there was no system for repatriating them and more that no one lived on the island. From this point, castaways and ships that run aground become connected with issues involved in repatriation, which further develops into issues between separate countries. Just as war between two countries carries with it the humanitarian and diplomatic issue of repatriation of prisoners of war, when ships and their crews drift off course and onto foreign shores, enabling them to return to their homelands is an issue that must be dealt with.

It is hardly possible in an uninhabited location that a systematic means of returning such people home could exist, but even in places with inhabitants, in societies where Japanese were not identified as “Japanese people,” there was no guarantee that they would eventually be repatriated. Rather, they could expect to be either enslaved or killed. However, in a part of the world where the other party could recognize castaways as being Japanese, the path to a return home opened, even if, as in the case of Kodayu, it meant becoming a bargaining chip. However, even after returning home, depending on whether a national prohibition had been infringed on, the returnee would be unable to eventually return to his home village, but would simply be incarcerated. This point, treatment following a return home, was another facet of national seclusion. Not even a national seclusion edict (*sakokurei*) could prevent a ship and its crew from being carried far away to the Aleutian Islands. However, the moment they returned home from Russia, the system of national seclusion struck home. It must have been impossible to verbalize the anguish contained in the term *kaikin*, the ban on travel overseas.

While the seclusion edicts were incapable of preventing Japanese from drifting up on foreign shores, it was also true that the edicts were incapable of preventing foreign nationals from drifting ashore in the Japanese islands. For this reason, research on castaways covers two configurations of issues of castaways: those coming “from Japan” and those coming “to Japan.” Sea routes are bidirectional, so a policy banning travel overseas and a system of national seclusion would need to function properly. However, for that to be realistic, records of Japanese castaways—such as the recently compiled *Hyoryuki shusei*—would need to be paralleled by records of non-Japanese who had drifted onto Japanese shores. Compilations of such record are virtually non-existent.<sup>1)</sup> For that reason, an element of nationalism adheres to research that only takes up the issue of “Japanese” castaways. In 1985, Ooba Osamu put forth a proposal to form a project to overcome this problem by compiling ship by ship the historical records of Chinese ships, those from Japan’s closest neighbor that had drifted into Japanese waters. At present, this series consists of six collections, and through them we can discover the relationship between Chinese ships (and seamen) who drifted ashore and Japan during the Edo period.<sup>2)</sup> These *hyochaku tosen*, literally

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1) Recently attention is just beginning to be paid to Koreans. Examples include Ikeuchi Satoshi, *Kinsei Chosenjin Kyochaku Nempyo*, 1996; Kobayashi Shigeru (ed.) *Hyoryu hyochaku kara mita kanto Shinakai no kokusai koryu (kiban kenkyu)* 1997; Uehara Kenzen, *Chosen tsushinshi oyobi Higashi Ajia no horyumin o meguru shomondai (Kaken juten ryoiki)*, 1998.

2) The following are in order of publication:

- 1 The Nanjing ship that landed on Hachijojima, Horeki 3
- 2 *De Tai Chuan*, which drifted ashore at Enshu, Bunsei 9
- 3 *An Ki Chuan*, which ran aground at Tosa, Kansei 1

“Chinese ships washed ashore,” as they were called at that time, rank along with Nagasaki’s Chinese quarter (*tojin yashiki*) and Chinese interpreters (*totsuji*) as another perspective from which to view the Japanese-Chinese relationship.

## 1 Discovery

When the Japanese discovered a ship drifting along their coastal waters, how did they perceive it? According to records concerning Chinese vessels adrift, first reports included references to “strange ships,” “black ships,” and “peculiar shapes.” Observations begin with such descriptions as “does not look like a Japanese ship and its crew appears different” (Horeki 3, Nanjing ship: Hachijojima) and “suspicious ship” (Kansei 12, *Wan Sheng Hao*: Enshu). In early-modern Japan, in the coastal regions along navigation routes, people were used to seeing Japanese vessels, so they could be expected to recognize instantly whether a vessel offshore was Japanese. Consequently, because Chinese vessels did not correspond to Japanese design, it was “a strange ship.”

To be sure, Chinese vessels were largely different from Japanese ships in both shape and size, and as if to confirm this, almost invariably, the materials related to Chinese ships that drifted ashore describe the features of the ship in question as well as the crew aboard. More than anything else, this is evidence that the ship and crew made an intense impression on the people living close to where the ship landed. The ships, because of their extreme backward arched hull and the black band that spread across the hull made such an impression that observers referred to them as *kurobune*, “black ships.” (See Figure 1)

However, although the term “black ship” indicates that the ship was not of Japanese origin, it does not indicate the ship’s identity. Therefore, it becomes important to infer where the boat was from. Here




Figure 1

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4 *Nankinsen*, adrift at Tosa, Bunka 5

5 *Wan Shun Hao*, at Awa Chikuraura, An’ei 9

6 *Wan Sheng Hao*, at Enshu, Kansei 12

Of these, the 4<sup>th</sup> was a ship from south of the Yangtze, while all the others were Nagasaki trading ships.

the location where the ship landed offers significant leads. “Shaped like a Chinese ship” (An’ei 9, *Yuan Shun Hao*: Awa) confirms that the ship is of obvious Chinese mainland origin. Further, while variously criticizing the boat’s features as “peculiar,” it is ultimately decided that the boat is Chinese, and this information meets the standard of major significance. In the case of the *An Li Chuan* of Kansei 1 (1789), Miyachi Tachu hurried to the site at which it ran aground, boarded a small boat and gathered information about the stranded vessel and concluded, “the shape and its crew did not diverge from records of Chinese ships.” This individual is also reported to have studied the Confucian classics and medicine in Osaka.

With this evidence, we can breathe somewhat easier in assuming that we have a convincing report, but in places where such information is unavailable, these peculiar ships became a source of panic. In the Bunsei 9 (1826) case of the *De Tai Chuan*, which landed at Yoshidahama in Enshu, “a mysterious ship” appeared, and when the crew began making a commotion by waving flags and making noises with bells, drums and cannons, it created major confusion and there were warnings saying, “Danger is at hand! It is likely that foreigners are coming to incite rebellion!” When an extraordinary ordinance calling for putting the enemy to flight was issued, anxiety over peculiar ships must have increased still further.

However, in many cases, Chinese ships were soon recognized as such, and while suspicions continued, it was realized that “with mishaps of Chinese ships—as opposed to those of Japanese ships—emergency measures are called for,” so responses continued to the next phase. The commotion mentioned above subsided when a barrel containing narrow bamboo strips with writing on them floated ashore. In this way, negotiations began that enabled both sides to ascertain the other party’s identity. What enabled this was “language.” For example, the local people who responded to the running aground of the drifting vessel from Nanjing took the following responsive measures. “As a result of the discussions, it was decided to send a fishing boat to investigate the situation. It was not possible for the messenger to communicate with the Chinese. Therefore, the messenger used gestures to indicate their intentions. The Chinese came ashore, and after requesting brush and paper, they began to communicate through writing.”

The local envoy and the Chinese were unable to communicate with each other, but they used gestures to convey their intentions. When the Chinese landed on shore, they requested brush, ink and paper and began communicating through writing.

Through written communication (*Hitsudan*), the identity of the Chinese ship was ultimately verified, and serious attempts at attaining mutual understanding of intentions commenced. This experience was shared among all of the cases of ships that drifted ashore. In this process, “if spoken language fails to communicate with the Chinese, one can gather the gist of the situation through written exchanges.” (*Goso nikki*).

With the *De Tai Chuan*, the barrel of bamboo strips with writing on them became that first move, but at Awa Chikuraura, it was the message “Chinese documents” written on the tip of a bamboo pole held out to a boat that was out fishing. Upon opening the message and discovering that the contents were in *kambun*, the Japanese sought the assistance of someone who could read classical Chinese and turned to “a nearby temple” for assistance. The Buddhist priest there was able to decipher the message, which said that the vessel was a merchant ship from Nanjing bound for Nagasaki. On November 11 of the previous year, it had set sail from Nanjing but had encountered a violent typhoon, had lost both rudder and sails and ended up adrift. It was made clear that the crew had consumed their three-month supply of provisions, were particularly suffering from a lack of drinking water, and were asking for assistance.

In this case, it was fortunate that there was a priest in a temple close at hand who could decode the

message “Chinese documents,” but in the case of the *An Li Chuan* at Tosa, Miyachi Tachu, who rode out in the fishing boat himself, began the communication by writing, “Hachijojima in Japan’s Izu province is a remote island, lacking in provisions. There is virtually no grain, but if you request it of the local people, you will receive some. The island is more than 100 kilometers from the mainland of Japan. It has been determined that this ship departed from Nagasaki.” (*Jyunkairoku*). However, on Hachijojima, at the outset there was no one who could carry on written communications with the Chinese crew among either the island administrators or the local inhabitants. In this case, the person who was called on with great haste to play a major role in communicating through the written word was, surprisingly enough, a masterless samurai named Wada Touemon who had been banished to the island. Wada had been a member of the Okachi-gumi, followers of Hachiya Minbu, and had been banished to the island for some wrongdoing.

In this manner, they were able to conduct a written exchange, whereby the Japanese side determined who the other party was and what they wanted, and the crew of the Chinese vessel was able to determine their location. In this process of written exchange, there were cases where the Chinese produced one of the permits (Xin Pai) which ships were required to have in order to carry on trade at Nagasaki. Or as in the case of the *Bunka 5 Yu Chang Fa Hao*, where the vessel did not possess such an official document, the identity of the vessel as a coastal merchant ship could be assured.

In such ways, whether there was a person available to communicate through writing was of major significance in deciding on the assistance that would be provided to ships that had drifted ashore. It might be the priest at Chikuraura, the masterless samurai (*ronin*) at Hachijojima or Miyachi Tachu in Tosa, but there was always someone involved. It was certainly no easy task to deal with the Chinese through *kambun* messages. Moreover, people in the locales were not simply awaiting the arrival of such ships. However, regardless of the location, in actual fact someone played the role of interpreting through written language. Alongside the fact that Japan and China shared in common being in a Chinese-character cultural area, it was fortunate that the study of Chinese classics was the standard form of scholarship in early-modern Japan.

## 2 Reception

At Awa Chikuraura, where a Chinese ship was discovered on April 29, An’ei 9 (1780), efforts were subsequently made to go to its rescue, but due to a violent storm, progress was far from easy. In the villages, sacred fires were lit to invoke divine help (*Litsuen mansho*). Further, a seaman identifying himself as Setomura Gennojo proposed tying a rope around himself and swimming out to the Chinese ship in order to evacuate the Chinese crew. Gennojo is reported as saying, “there were 55 Chinese and one Japanese on board and by swimming out to the ship, and many Chinese crew was rescued.” Also in the case of the *Wan Sheng Hao* in December of Kansei 12 (1800), the villagers along the coast off of Enshu vied with one another in their fishing boats to try to pull the troubled ship off of the seabed. From this, one can discern that rescue operations at sea were a customary practice rooted in the coastal villages.

While it is true that local villagers proceeded with rescue operations of the Chinese ships, the various villagers also informed their respective feudal lords of the presence of the ships and reports were sent to the bakufu in Edo. As a result, one after another, preparations were made for receiving, rescuing and returning the ships and their crews. At such times, the more feudal lords were involved, the more likely

they were to send their own representatives to the site, coming into contact with representatives of the other lords. The common pattern was for the dispatched officials to include military chiefs, local magistrates, written communication personnel and physicians, and the first of these naturally brought along an armed force. Consequently, even when it was a Chinese vessel, the Japanese did not neglect coastal defensive preparations. In Kansei 12, with the *Weng Sheng Hao*, the Chinese who came ashore were astonished by the completeness of the military preparations that had been made.

In the case of Awa Chikuraura, supervising officials were sent from the Edo government of magistrate Ooka Hyogo on May 9, An'ei 9. The military chief, who also served as local magistrate, was named Kodama Sogo, and he served outstandingly in the role of communicator by writing. As a result, from the stage in which the priest of the local Buddhist temple deciphered "Chinese documents" and began communicating with the Chinese through writing, Kodama took the central role in the progress of negotiations. In the case of the Nanjing ship at Hachijojima, the ship was forwarded to Shimoda, and the ronin, Wada, was replaced by the secretariat official of the Shimoda magistrate, Seki Shurei. Due to these substitutions of communicators, full-scale records of the grounded ships came into existence. The improved skills of these writing communicators set the stage for these records. Examples of them include Kodama's *Jyunkairoku* and Seki's *Hyokakukiji*. Further, in Bunka 9 (1812), in the case of the coastal merchant vessel *Yu Chang Fa Hao*, an instructor of the domain school, Tobe Haruyuki, wrote his account of such communication in *Konanshowa*.

In the case of the *Wan Sheng Hao* in Kansei 12, of the feudal lords of the coastal villages, Yokosuka domain dispatched its superintendent, Endo Gorodayu, and Kakegawa domain dispatched Honma Shunpaku and Tonogi Shurei as writing communicators. Out of the exchanges between Endo and the shipowner Wang Qingchuan come the recorded communications included in *Ninposenhitsugo*. On the other hand, the communications that took place through Honma Shunpaku and Tonogi Shurei have not been passed down, but we do have a separate, vivid depiction of what it was like as they communicated with brush and paper onboard ship. We notice particularly that the youthful Tonogi, wearing a headband to suppress seasickness, earnestly performing his role as communicator. (Figure 2) In later years, his great efforts would be lauded because he was "a genius in terms of writing skills, for whom all of his companions felt envious." One might say that this incident of a Chinese ship running aground turned a single young man into a hero. It is also recorded that Kodama, who wrote *Jyunkairoku*, was praised "as one who brought things to a successful conclusion without the aid of an interpreter, and who possessed the three qualities of wisdom, virtue and courage."

In this fashion, the accidental grounding of Chinese ships, through their reception brought to the fore local men of letters with high levels of skill in communicating through writing in Chinese characters, and the records of these negotiations through writing are remembered together with their accomplishments. The most prominent of these practitioners is probably Noda



Figure 2

Tekiho (Qui Yue) whose *Tokutaisenhitsugo* records his discussions through writing with the seamen of the vessel *De Tai Chuan* which ran aground at Yoshidahama in Enshu in the first month of Bunsei 9 (1826). Noda received a request from the secretary of the local magistrate Hagura Geki, departed from Edo for Shimizu port, and from that point until the return of the vessel to Nagasaki, he carried on communications with ship owner Yang Qi Tang and the secondary owners Zhu Liu Qiao and Liu Sheng Fu, the record of which is *Tokutaisenhitsugo*. The year of publication is unclear, but when it was published it garnered sufficient attention to be found in the collection of the distinguished literary figure Takizawa Bakin.

Meanwhile, in the case of the *An Li Chuan* stranded in Tosa, the role of writing communicator was transferred from the local figure Miyachi Tayu to the domain school instructor, and as a result we have a record of those exchanges. The same boat that had run aground at Haneura was thereafter set adrift by strong winds and finally reached Kishu Oshima, and there Oka Raizo (Shi Ru), instructor of the Tosa domain school, was dispatched as communicator through writing and his record remains as *Gosoroku*. Reading the record of communications between the ship owner Shu Ru Xin and Oka during the journey to Nagasaki together with the escort officials Watanabe Gensuke and Shinohara Yahei, one senses a lively interest in this unique opportunity to converse with a “foreigner.”

Another, more personal record of a rare opportunity in which a Japanese directed interest toward someone from China is that of Ichien Syoan,<sup>3)</sup> a physician aboard the escorting vessel, whose conversations with Zhu are recorded in *Nihotassiroku*. Perhaps he monopolized the conversation because the content, as is seen in the question “At present what kinds of medical books do physicians in your country read?” which would be predominantly a subject of interest to physicians. Moreover, this writer refers to the other party not as Zhu Ru Xin, but as Imina and Qin Shi and in accord with that refers to himself as He Ding. From the record we also see, therefore, an attempt of a Japanese to model himself after a Chinese literati.

In response to Ichien Syoan’s request to talk about the current generation of Confucianists, skilled physicians and other great figures of Nanjing, Zhu Ru Xin responds, “I have come abroad as a merchant and am unknowledgeable regarding letters.” In short, even though he may own a ship, he is no scholar, but only a merchant. Ichien then asks, “If you have any newly written works, would you please give them to me?” On another ship, the *Wan Shun Hao*, the author comments that the crew members are sly as all are merchants, “The shipowner Shen Jing Zhan is erudite and quite competent in letters, Gun Ing Yuan is quite expert in writing, and Fang Jin Pu is of high repute as a painter,” thereby acknowledging separate aspects of the Chinese crew members at the same time. Compared with ship owners and boatmen of early-modern Japan in which society was divided into the four classes of *shi-no-ko-sho* (warrior, farmer, artisan, merchant) even among ship crew members there was a considerable difference in their degree of education. Added to that was the Sino-centric consciousness. This admiration for Chinese appears throughout the records of the written conversations between the Japanese and Chinese.

As if in contrast with this, however, the ordinary members of the crew are described as having an extremely poor reputation and this causes trouble in the respective locales. At Awa Chikuraura, for example, despite the fact that the local people have saved their lives and are trying to help them, immediately after landing, groups of Chinese enter the homes of farmers uninvited, enter the rooms without

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3) The truth of this tendency is suggested by the *Yubohitsugo*, the written conversations recorded by Ito Kinen who negotiated with one of the lower officials involved in dealing with the crew of the *Wan Shun Hao* to make a rash attempt at an interview. Ooba designates this piece “a record of a representative curiosity seeker.”

removing their footwear, behave outrageously toward the women and girls, and as a result, the villagers protest vehemently. The ship owner Shen Jing Dan is only able to reply, “These men of this ship are stubborn, useless, footloose boatmen of low social status from Szechwan who broke laws and ignored the rules of normal society.” (*Hyokakukiji*). In Japanese terms, before the voyage the men were draftsmen and roustabouts of low standing.

There were from 60 to 100 of these ruffians impervious to reason onboard the ships, and once that had drifted ashore in an unknown land, not knowing when they would reach Nagasaki, the days stretched to two or three months, so outbreaks of trouble became unavoidable. The crew’s discontent was vented not only at Japanese, but at the Chinese. In *Tokutaisenhitsugo* Noda records, “Since becoming stranded, the outbursts of bitter feelings among the crew members have been considerable, and yet neither the chief mate over the crew, the superintendent or the helmsman does anything serious to halt them. That is what has caused the crew to become high-handed. Is there no way to resolve this problem?” (Translation by Tanaka Kenji) In response to this, the ship owner answers, “Upon our return to China, they will be resolutely dismissed, never again to serve onboard a ship, and I will have them tried before public officials, and returned to where they come from.” When asked what the reason was, the low class crew replied that because they had run aground due to the commands of the captain, they no longer followed the orders of their superiors. In the case of the *Wan Sheng Hao* as well, it was said that while detained at the locale where they had run aground, the lower-class seamen had tried to kill the ship owner and escape, and there had been a major altercation (*Tosenhyochakuzakki*). From the point of view of discipline seen on a Japanese vessel when it runs aground, in the case where the entire crew of a ship places wholehearted reliance in the fateful lot drawn by the captain, such a phenomenon was unbelievable. In the records of these written exchanges, one can see an aspect of the social dynamics of Chinese crews, one that is profoundly interesting.

### 3 Return

The written communications between the stranded Chinese and the Japanese often continued throughout the voyage returning the Chinese to Nagasaki, and that journey was a long one. As an example, the *An Li Chuan* that traveled from Kishu Oshima to Nagasaki lasted from April 17 to June 5, close to 50 days in total. During that time, Japanese officials, Confucian scholars and physicians, including Oka Raizo (Shi Ru) and Ichien Syoan continued their conversations with the ship owner and the co-owners. Meanwhile, *Tokutaisenhitsugo* relates that the author, Noda Kiichi (Hu Pu) boarded the ship on March 7 and that the ship reached Nagasaki on May 7. Japanese and Chinese spent a full two months together on the sea. The Nanjing vessel, which landed at Hachijojima, the furthest place from Nagasaki, took even longer. Departing on May 7, putting in at Izu Shimoda to change ships and departing from there on June 25, they ultimately reached Nagasaki on August 17. During a period of over three months, the seasons changed dramatically from midsummer to the middle of autumn.

Given the length of time they were on the seas, it is reasonable to say that the only thing the parties concerned could do was to talk with one another.<sup>4)</sup> And doing so meant writing back and forth repeatedly. At the end of *Tokutaisenhitsugo* are comments that “dialogue should depend on the brush” (*wen da*

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4) In the case of the co-captain of the *Wan Shun Hao* drew scenic landscapes from Chikura to Nagasaki. This was published in Edo in Kansei 2 as *Hyokyaku kishozu*.



*xu ping bi*) and “communications is to be found in this volume” (*yan tan zai ci shu*), which reflect the extended experience of traveling together. As a result, the subjects developed freely in many directions.<sup>5)</sup>

The Japanese side, while enjoying this communication through the written word, also felt a sense of responsibility to deliver the Chinese safely to Nagasaki. While escorting more than 70 Chinese and carrying on communication with them, the Tosa domain school instructor Oka Raizo, in the journal recording the escorting of the Chinese, makes special mention of the important task of the escort: “To successfully deliver 500 people, without incident, without argument, is nearly impossible.” The reason is that their escorting the Chinese to Nagasaki was a duty impressed upon them by the bakufu. At the beginning of *De Tai Chan Bi Yu*, Noda Kiichi exclaims to Liu Sheng Fu, “Our government has acknowledged that their vessel has run aground and out of particular compassion has given strict orders that we are to ensure that it safely reaches Nagasaki.”

In returning the Chinese to Nagasaki, how exactly were the crew and cargo conveyed? Naturally, treatment differed depending on whether the Chinese vessel had been shipwrecked, had run aground and was rendered no longer seaworthy, or was still seaworthy and could be used as it is. Let us first examine the situation in which the ship had to be scrapped.

This was the situation with the Nanjing ship at Hachijojima, the *Wan Shun Hao* at Chikuraura and the *Wan Sheng Hao* on the Enshu coast. The Nanjing ship, with a crew of 71, had suffered serious damage, and it was scrapped at the site with the permission of the owner. Under instructions from the bakufu, the crew and cargo were transferred first to Shimoda. On May 29, 11 ships carrying provisions left Shimoda, and after arriving at Hachijojima, loaded the Chinese and their cargo in installments on these ships, which then returned in succession to Shimoda. At Shimoda, the crew and cargo were delivered to two ships, the *Wago Maru* and *Osugi Maru*, which then set forth from Shimoda for Nagasaki on July 6.

On this occasion, the cargo vessels that traveled from Shimoda to Hachijojima were Miyakejima Heizaburo boats and Nijijima Tazaemon boats, cargo vessels with maximum loads of between 150 and 300 *koku* in volume. From the names Miyakejima, Nijijima and Oshima, we can infer that they were most likely local cargo vessels connecting the Izu and Ogasawara islands with the mainland. Because they were small in terms of the maximum loads they could carry, it was deemed necessary that eleven such vessels were needed to transfer the crew of 71 and the cargo. The ration of one to eleven vessels is indicative of just how large the Chinese vessel was, in comparison with the local cargo vessels. In a further comparison, the two ships *Wago Maru* and *Osugi Maru* were sufficient in size to convey crew and cargo from Shimoda to Nagasaki. According to the *Jyunkairoku*, the *Wago Maru* and *Osugi Maru* were provided, respectively, with four Miyakejima and other boats and five Nijijima and other boats. From this standard, the cargo vessels can be estimated as being in the 1,000 *koku* class. Unfortunately, in the case of the Nanjing ship, we do not know how such large vessels were secured or how they were sent to Shimoda.

Next, in the case of the Chikuraura *Wan Shun Hao*, the ship broke up in a storm and only the mast and rudder remained intact. In this case as well, the crew of 78 and their cargo were transferred by four vessels from Chikuraura to Tateyama in Awa, then transferred to three ships—*Wago Maru*, *Tora Maru* and *Hiyoshi Maru*—bound for Nagasaki. At Chikura, the seas were shallow and a large ship could not

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5) It is interesting enough to just decipher these written conversations, but with the exception of Tanaka Kenji’s translation of *Tokutaisenhitsugo*, all the rest are published as they are, in *kambun*. As a result, for one who is not skilled at reading and comprehending *kambun*, that is a daunting task.

moor, so connections were made through Tateyama, and Tomaya Kyubei contracted for the three ships. According to *Nankinsen Genjun-go hyochaku ikken*, Tomaya Kyubei appeared to be either a commission agent for shipping from Nagasaki to Edo or perhaps a purveyor of cargo shipping to the government. When he arrived at the site, he contracted for the disassembly of the *Wan Shun Hao* and also contracted for the three previously mentioned escort vessels, all Echigo vessels. Further, according to *Xun Hai Lu*, of the two ships hired to carry the Chinese, the charge for the two ships of 2,000 *koku* was 500 *ryo* in money, while the one ship of 1,800 *koku* capacity was 160 *ryo*. The three were clearly large vessels of the 2,000 *koku* class.

Tomaya is also mentioned in the *Hyokakukiji*: “Tomaya Kyubei was at that time a wealthy merchant from Osaka who arrived on the site, took a contract for the sail westward and contracted for three large ships at Tateyama.” Curiously enough, the *Wago Maru* is the same name as that of the vessel that escorted the crew and cargo of the Nanjing vessel which foundered at Hachijojima, so there is a large probability that Tomaya did the contracting in that case as well.

Tomaya also puts in an appearance in the Enshu *Wan Sheng Hao* incident. This time the Chinese crew and cargo were transferred by river from the receiving site, sent to Fukude harbor and then transferred by fishing boats to the *Kagura Maru* and five other boats. Via Shimoda, they headed to Toba, where once again they changed ships. Awaiting them at Toba were three vessels arranged for by the official purveyor of shipping to the Shogunate, Tomaya Kyubei: the *Sumiichi Maru* (Aki-Hiroshima vessel, 1,500 *koku*), the *Tenjin Maru* (Settsu, 1,400 *koku*) and the *Genkou Maru* (Ise-Shiroko, 1,500 *koku*). The first five boats were local harbor craft from Fukude, Kakezuka and Yokosuka, and should be called cargo vessels from other areas, but for the Shimoda-Toba link, these vessels were commandeered as official boats. However, beyond Toba, once again it was official cargo vessels over 1,000 *koku* which shouldered the responsibility. Moreover, this was a scheduled procedure, with Tomaya’s subordinate informing the bakufu officials at the site that preparations at Toba were complete.

Tomaya, originally from Ebisujima in Osaka, became in 1742 (Kanpo 2) regular commissioner of rice barges for the government (*Osaka-shi shi*). Designated by the bakufu to transport the annual rice tax from the bakufu-controlled domains scattered around the country, Tomaya served a pivotal role with the bakufu. Employing his ability to provide cargo ships, the bakufu transferred the Chinese from Kanto through Tokai to Nagasaki. Naturally enough, the journey that lay before them depended on arrangements officially supported by the government.

If the *De Tai Chuan*, which carried a crew of 50, had been wrecked, it would have required an unprecedented number of cargo vessels, but fortunately the boat was able to pull off of Yoshidaura and by way of Shimizu head for Nagasaki. The Japanese ship *Tentoku Maru* escorted it, but details regarding that are unclear (*Tsukou ichiran zokushu*).

In contrast, in the case of the *An Xin Chuan* which ran adrift at Tosa in Kansei 1 (1789), the Tosa domain returned the ship from Kishu Oshima to Nagasaki. On this occasion, the *An Li Chuan* crew of 70 and its cargo were divided up and transported by three vessels—the *Ritoku Maru*, *Gongen Maru* and *Kiko Maru*—and they escorted the vessel to Nagasaki. Regarding this, Oka Raizo comments, “maneuvering the Chinese ship was extremely difficult.” Because the cargo and crew of the Chinese ship had been transferred to the other boats, the hull of the ship floated, “but steering it was difficult, and when ballast was put aboard, it had to then be removed,” causing the Japanese skipper trouble. In navigating the Inland Sea, where there is shallow and deep water and currents are of various speeds, the expertise and experience of the Japanese skipper was of considerable importance.

According to Oka, of the three boats that Tosa provided, the *Ritoku Maru* and *Gongen Maru*, which

carried the Chinese and the cargo, were “borrowed from other countries.” (The remaining *Kiko Maru* was a Japanese ship.) At the early stage in February, the Kitayama customs official Motoi Soshiro proceeded to Osaka, made an agreement to borrow two Hizen Saga Hashitsuura Senbei boats and made arrangement for them to be dispatched to Oshima. In addition, Motoi purchased Japanese sails and yards to hoist on the Chinese ship. The *Ritoku Maru* and *Gongen Maru* reached Nagasaki on June 10 and were subsequently dismissed from service, and the requisitioning fees came to 36 *kan*. Regarding this, Oka comments, “it was extremely inconvenient to borrow and dispatch ships of other countries, and as cargo increased, so did the crew and expenses,” indicating his disagreement with the plan to lease foreign ships. He concludes, “the borrowing of ships from foreign countries could not be helped,” (*Gosoroku*), but that is his own judgment. In the background of the two boats, the hand of Tomaya, the purveyor may also have played a role.

When one perceives the rescue and return of the foundered Chinese ships as fundamentally a function carried out by the bakufu to ensure that the journey escorting the Chinese ship to Nagasaki was carried out with all considerations for safety, setting aside the Tosa vessels momentarily, was there actually no other choice than to lease two foreign vessels to accomplish the mission? The unexpected incidents of the drifting ashore of Chinese ships also bring to the fore the fundamental structure of the bakufu system of transportation of rice tax by cargo ships.

## Conclusion

A section of *Nankinsen Genjyungo* says that Awa Chikura is approximately 4,000 *ri* from Nagasaki, and when it comes to seeing Chinese people, the only opportunity the local people would have for doing so would be in pictures. Into such locations come living, stranded Chinese, so it must have been a dramatic event for the local area. It is said that young and old people of high and low social classes rushed to Chikura from neighboring provinces to see the Chinese who came ashore there, turning the remote village into a bustling place. There was an extraordinary ship and unusual people, visitors could hear about another country, and everyone was eager to see the sight. At Enshu Fukude harbor as well, with the sudden stranding of the *Wan Sheng Hao*, the annual first of the year Yokosuka Sansha festival was carried out on a smaller scale than usual.

As incidents, the stranding of Chinese ships were one time events, but they became major subjects of conversation in the regions centering around the landing sites. As a result, various forms of materials regarding the stranded vessels and crews came into existence, and they have been handed down to the present. As a consequence, the history of Japanese-Chinese relations was established in a different form from that in Nagasaki, where ships from China arrived virtually every year. Herein lies the intrigue of gathering and analyzing materials dealing with the stranded Chinese ships.

However, these one-time, accidental occurrences are interrelated when we consider the events that occurred in the respective locales.

Seki Shurei was a 28-year-old secretarial clerk in the office of the Shimoda magistrate when the Nanjing ship became stranded at Hachijojima in Horeki 3 (1753), and he carried out the task of communicating through writing, composing *Jyunkairoku* in the process. When Kodama Sogo wrote his account of the landing of the *Wan Shun Hao* at Awa Chikura in An’ei 9 (1780), the afore-mentioned Seki wrote the preface for his friend. “The spoken language meant nothing to me, but because we were both from countries that use characters, we were able to communicate in writing,” he wrote in a passage that

depicts himself 17 years earlier, and that shows how interest in the Chinese ships was passed down from Seki to Kodama.

The running aground of the *De Tai Chuan* at Enshu Yoshida in Bunsei 9 (1826), of all the Chinese vessels that landed, would seem to have left the greatest impact. The Edo literary luminary, Takizawa Bakin, borrowed a copy of Noda Kiichi's *Tokutaisenhitsugo* to make a duplicate copy, and mentioned in his work, *Uenshosetsu*. The Edo scholar of Chinese studies, Matsuzaki Kodo, was greatly interested in it, and in his journals one finds references to it, including mention of *Liu Sheng Fu*, one of the co-owners who he has annotated as "son of Liu Ran Yi." This latter figure is one of the ship owners of the *Wan Sheng Hao* which was grounded at Enshu Fukude harbor in Kansei 12 (1800). Father and son left their names in the histories of the local areas and in Edo through their involvement in two separate incidents.

In this way, on the Japanese side there was an association between the strandings of various vessels, but there were also connections on the Chinese side. According to Oka Raizo's *Gosoroku*, during the written conversations onboard the *Ritoku Maru*, ship owner Zhu Ru Xin said, in referring to the stranded ship at Awa Chikura nine years earlier, "the Japanese accepted it and escorted it to Nagasaki." The story of the incident in An'ei 9 was apparently handed down on the Chinese side as well. The passage "though they were foreigners, they were not cast aside, but were treated as if they were kinsmen, which is something to be extremely grateful for." This was Zhu's expression of gratitude to the villages along the Japan coast for rescuing the Chinese boat and returning it to Nagasaki. Oka had also heard such expressions of gratitude, through interpreters, from the owners of seven Nanjing ships at Nagasaki. The memory of these incidents of stranded ships was part of the collective memory onboard Chinese ships.<sup>6)</sup>

In this manner, incidents of stranded ships became another element of Sino-Japanese relations in early-modern Japan (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Monument to the Chinese stranded ship in 1780 in Chikura, Awa

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6) In the background of those times, the skippers who dispatched Chinese ships were limited to the authorized merchants of the Wan family and twelve merchant houses. Moreover, the owner and co-owners of these ships often made the voyage back and forth between Nagasaki and China. Refer to Matsuura Akira, *Nagasaki boeki ni okeru zaito nishu ni tsuite*, Shakai Keizai-shi Gaku (Socio-Economic History Society) 45-1, 1979.