

The Peripheral Approach in Chinese Linguistics as an Area of Cultural Interaction Studies

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Introduction: The Peripheral Approach

It often happens that by looking only at the *center* of things, one misses their true nature. In the eye of a hurricane, there is no storm; the wind howls in the *periphery*. Indeed, the ancients often said as much, leaving their wisdom in a Japanese sayings such as “The base of the lighthouse is dark” (it is hard to see what happens under one’s very nose) and “Who looks on from the hill has eight eyes” (an outsider has the best perspective), and Chinese proverbs such as “An involved person’s sight is clouded; an onlooker’s sight is clear” 当局者迷、傍觀者清 and “Standing upon Mount Lushan, one cannot see the shape of the mountain” 不識廬山真面目、只緣身在此山中.

We can consider the relationship between the center and the periphery from many angles, and the “compare-and-contrast” given by Zhu Dexi 朱德熙 (1985) is a concrete example of such an angle.

Guest: What are the characteristics of Chinese grammar? I have not arrived at a clear answer on this issue, and today I’d like to hear your opinion.

Host: Characteristics always become evident through comparison. Without any comparison, there are no characteristics to speak of. So if you ask me what the characteristics of Chinese grammar are, first of all, I must ask you: with what language you are comparing Chinese? (2)

Current academic research is becoming more and more compartmentalized, and as a result, while we can nitpick one miniscule phenomenon after another, we have become unable to produce arguments that survey the whole picture. In studies of Chinese grammar, too, research into the most specific phenomena has intensified; and certainly that is one sort of academic progress. However, at the same time, it has become impossible to construct a systematic grammatical theory that surveys Chinese language as a whole. Without explaining basic facts such as what a sentence is or what the subject and predicate are in the first place, the state of affairs has become an itemized mishmash of how the two 了 are used, what the progressive 在 is, when 的 is or is not necessary, what the difference between a

complement and an inflected modifier is, and on and on (of course, clarification is needed on some of these specific issues). The most essential question, “What is language?” is being neglected. The linguistic view—if I may overstate the case—lacks a worldview. Can we truly call this academic progress and growth?¹⁾

In addition, methods known as “interdisciplinary” and “beyond the field” are also popular as a kind of fad. Although these are actually the most usual of usual methods, we must nonetheless bear in mind that even in this case the interdisciplinary has not always-already been there. The interdisciplinary is predicated upon rigidly fixed specialties, and we should not forget that without them, “interdisciplinary” and “beyond the field” are plants with no roots.

In any event, for the past decade or so we have proposed a “peripheral approach” and moved forward with our research in Chinese linguistics based on that. Below, I will once more express my opinions regarding the validity of linguistic research, particularly grammatical research, under this method.

1 The Validity of Peripheral Sources

1-1 Chinese linguistic studies by Europeans

In China, the establishment of linguistics as an academic field occurred in the modern period. However, this does not mean that the ancient Chinese never came to ponder the question “What is language?” On the contrary—it is certain that from antiquity the Chinese also gave that question deep consideration. As early as the third century BCE, in *Zheng ming pian* 正名篇 (On the Rectification of Names), Xun Zi 荀子 stated the following about “the purpose of language,” “the social normality of language,” “the relationship between the developmental process of human cognition and words,” and so forth:²⁾

The goal of language: to differentiate objects from others, and to communicate the meaning in one's mind

異形離心交喻，異物名實玄紐，貴賤不明，同異不別，如是則志必有不喻之禍，故知者為之分別制名，以指實，上以明貴賤，下以辨同異，貴賤明，同異別，如是則志無不喻之患，事無困廢之禍，此所為有名也。

If, faced with myriad different things, people grasp each thing with their own individual minds, then the correspondence between those things and their names becomes disordered. The distinction between high and low, and the differences and similarities between things, lose their clarity. When this happens, the evil of being unable to understand one another on a spiritual level arises, and the calamity of frustration and weariness at the circumstances comes about. Then, the sage classifies things and establishes their names; based on this, one can indicate an object and the distinctions between high and low, like and unlike are made clear. When the distinctions between high and low, like and unlike are made clear, the aforementioned evil will disappear. This is the reason why names are necessary.

1) In fact, this is true not only of grammarians, but also of other fields. Phonologists think only of phonology, dialectologists only of dialect, and even among grammarians, contemporary grammarians think only of contemporary language and historical grammarians think only of historical grammar. The usual method of handling language from both the synchronic and diachronic perspectives tends to be disparaged.

2) For further information, see Uchida (1995).

名也者，所以期異實也。

A name is that which has the purpose of differentiating the object.

彼名辭也者，志義之使也。

That which is called a concept is a messenger that conveys the meaning in one's mind.

The social normality of language: there is no direct relationship between object and language; it is an agreement that becomes custom (約定俗成)

名無固宜，約之以命，約定俗成，謂之宜，異於約，則謂之不宜，名無固實，約之以命實，約定俗成，謂之實名。In a name, there is no intrinsic meaning, only something that has been named through agreement. When the agreement is fixed and becomes custom, we call that *meaning*, and if one deviates from the agreement, the meaning is missed. Similarly, there is no intrinsic substance or object to a name. It has only been named through agreement. When the agreement is fixed and becomes custom, we call that a true name.

The relationship between the developmental process of human understanding (both concrete and abstract) and words: simple name (單名), compound name (兼名), general name (共名), particular name (別名) and so forth

單足以喻單，單不足以喻則兼。

If we can fully understand it with a simple name, we use a simple name; if it is not fully understood, we use a compound name.

單與兼，無所相避，則共。

If a simple name and a compound name are of the same class, we use a general name.

萬物雖眾，有時而欲徧(無)舉，故謂之物，物也者大共名也。推而共之，共則有共，至於無共，然後止。

The ten thousand things are many, but on occasion, we want to use a general term. So we call them “things.” “Thing” is the broadest general name. To include the appellations of various individual things we use a general name; to include a plural of general names we use a broader general name, and we stop when there is no more to include.

有時而欲徧舉之，故謂之鳥獸，鳥獸也者大別名也。推而別之，別則有別，至於無別，然後止。

It sometimes happens that we want to point out all the ten thousand things one by one. At these times, we call things “bird” or “beast,” and such a word is a broad particular name. We subdivide an appellation, using a more particular name, and then a still more particular name, until it can be broken down no further.

Aside from Xun Zi, Mozi 墨子 and Gongsun Long 公孫龍, among others, expressed their excellent views on language. Nonetheless, when it comes to what can be called linguistics or grammar as an academic field, until the emergence of Ma Jianzhong's *Mashi wentong* 馬氏文通 (Basic principles for writing clearly and coherently by Mister Ma)³⁾ near the end of Qing (in 1898), systematic grammar studies were ultimately

3) In my recent research, I have mentioned that before *Mashi wentong*, Bi Huazhen's 畢華珍 *Yanxu caotang biji* 衍緒

subordinated to the study of the classics, with interpretation of individual words and even particles (助字)—in the form of annotation (or instructive study) of the classical texts—as the primary goal.

In contrast, the academic field of linguistics had already been firmly established in Europe since the age of ancient Greece and Rome, and in the sixteenth century, linguistic research into the Chinese language was conducted, largely by missionaries. Although they were missionaries, many were excellent linguists, and gave accurate accounts of various characteristics of the Chinese language (that it is monosyllabic, the relationship between vowels and consonants, that it is a language in which vowels are predominant, part of speech inversion, the existence of classifiers, the concrete property of verbs; furthermore, the difference between standard Mandarin (官話) and dialects (方言), the differences between written and spoken language, and so forth). Taking the studies of Chinese grammar as an example, by the mid-eighteenth century specialized textbooks such as these had already been authored:⁴⁾

Martino Martini (alias Wei Kuangguo 衛匡國), *Grammatica Sinica*, 1653

Francisco Varo (alias Wan Jiguo 萬濟國), *Arte de la lenga Mandarina*, 1703

T. S. Bayer, *Museum Sinicum*, 1730

Joseph Henri Marie de Prémare (alias Ma Ruose 馬若瑟), *Notitia Linguae Sinicae*, 1720

Étienne Fourmont, *Linguae Sinarrum Mandarinicae hieroglyphicae Grammatica duplex*, 1742

In the nineteenth century, largely through the work of Protestant missionaries, many works on the studies of the Chinese language, or grammar studies, emerged, such as the following:

- (1) Joshua Marshman, *Clavis Sinica (Elements of Chinese Grammar)* [中國言法], 1814
- (2) Robert Morrison (alias Ma Lixun 馬禮遜), *A Grammar of the Chinese language* 通用漢言之法, 1815
- (3) Abel Rémusat, *Elemens de la Grammaire Chinoise* [漢文啓蒙], 1822
- (4) J. A. Gonçalves (alias Gong Shenfu 公神甫), *Arte China* [漢字文法], 1829
- (5) Stanislas Julien, *Exercices pratiques d'analyse, de syntaxe et de lexigraphie chinoise*, 1842
- (6) Karl Friedrich August Gützlaff (alias Guo Shila 郭實獵), *Notices of Chinese Grammar*, 1842
- (7) M. A. Bazin, *Grammaire Mandarine*, 1856
- (8) Joseph Edkins (alias Ai Yuese 艾約瑟), *A Grammar of the Chinese Colloquial Language, commonly called the Mandarin Dialect*, 1857
- (9) James Summers, *Handbook of the Chinese Language*, 1863
- (10) W. Lobscheid (alias Luo Cunde 羅存德), *Grammar of the Chinese Language*, 1864
- (11) T. P. Crawford (alias Gao Dipi 高第丕), *Mandarin Grammar* [文學書官話], 1869
- (12) S. Julien, *Syntaxe nouvelle de la langue Chinoise*, 1869
- (13) P. Perny, *Grammaire de la langue Chinoise*, 1873
- (14) J. S. McIlvaine, *Grammatical Studies in the Colloquial Language of Northern China*, 1880
- (15) Imbault-Huart, *Cours éclectique de langue Chinoise parlée*, 1887
- (16) Chauncey Goodrich, *How to learn Chinese language*, 1893
- (17) O. F. Winsner, *Some thoughts on the study of Chinese*, 1893

草堂筆記 (Notes from Yanxu cottage, c. 1840) already existed, indicating a systematic theory of grammar based on traditional xushilun 虛実論 (empty/substantive theory). European scholars of the Chinese language such as Bazin and Edkins introduced his theory of grammar in their own works. See Uchida (2005).

4) See Uchida (2004).

1-2 The validity of sources in Chinese language studies produced by Europeans (European-language sources)

This is the question of whether European-produced Chinese linguistic studies sources are valid, and if so, why.

The main reasons for the validity of their studies as Chinese linguistic studies can be given as in the following several points:

- (1) Linguistics, or grammatical studies, was firmly established early on in Europe.
- (2) Because they were foreigners, by comparing and contrasting Chinese with their own languages, Europeans were able to objectively describe features of the Chinese language, without missing those phenomena that to native Chinese were blatantly obvious truisms.
- (3) Their writing system consisted of phonograms; they used the alphabet in phonetic annotation to Chinese characters and allowed for a more scientific account of phonemes (compared to the traditional Chinese *fanqie* 反切 method).
- (4) The majority of them were missionaries, and their efforts to spread Christianity ranged far and wide, so that they were even aware of the differences between “the official language” (官話) and “country-speak” (鄉談), or dialects.

In short, it is indeed the case that “an onlooker’s sight is clear.”

In Japan, since the 1950s, the validity of European-language sources has already been repeatedly emphasized by Kōzaka Jun’ichi 香坂順一, Ōta Tatsuo 太田辰夫, Ogaeri Yoshio 魚返善雄, and Ozaki Minoru 尾崎実, among others. For instance, in *Shindai no Beijingo* 清代の北京語 (The Beijing dialect in the Qing era, 1950) and *Beijingo no bunpō tokuten* 北京語の文法特點 (Grammatical peculiarities in the Beijing dialect, 1964), as well as his theoretical study “*Kōrōmu*” *shintan* 『紅樓夢』新探 (A new investigation of “Dream of the Red Chamber,” 1965), Ōta explained the characteristics of the Beijing and Southern dialects by making excellent use of the annotations in Mateer’s *A course of Mandarin lessons* (官話類編) and the Jiujiang Book Group’s edition of *Compass of the Mandarin language* (官話指南). Kōzaka and Ozaki also used the notes in *A course of Mandarin lessons* and other European-language sources such as Wade’s *A progressive course designed to assist the student of colloquial Chinese* (語言自邇集) and Wieger’s *Chinese Characters* (漢語漢文入門) to define the characteristics of modern Chinese. Ogaeri, too, noticed the Chinese linguistic studies of Europeans and Americans early on,⁵⁾ and in addition to calling for a reprint of the *Shengyu guangxun* 聖諭廣訓, which was particularly indicated by Europeans and Americans as a must-read for learning Mandarin, he also made references to so-called “peripheral” sources such as Ryukyū Mandarin (琉球官話).

Meanwhile, in China, outside of Luo Changpei’s 羅常培 phonological research (1930) utilizing sources from early missionaries such as Trigault, little use was made of European-language sources; however, there has been rapid progress over the last several years concentrated at the Beijing Foreign Studies University Research Center for Overseas Sinology. The same is happening in Europe, and it appears that

5) See, for example, Ogaeri’s *America no Shinago kenkyū* アメリカの支那語研究 (Chinese linguistic research in America, 1940) in *Chūgoku bungaku* 中國文學 no. 68. Of course, while works such as Ga Morizō’s 何盛三 *Pekin kanwa bunpō* 北京官話文法 (Beijing standard Mandarin grammar, 1928) also explained European and American studies of Chinese linguistics to a certain degree, we should not forget the achievements of Ishida Mikinosuke 石田幹之助 and his circle.

research using European-language sources is spreading on a global scale.

1-3 The specific content of peripheral sources

Apart from European-language sources, we can also think of works such as the following as “peripheral” sources for Chinese linguistics.

- (1) Korean sources: the *Nogeoldae* 老乞大, *Pact’ongsa* 朴通事, *Huayin qimeng* 華音啓蒙, etc.
- (2) Manchu and Mongolian sources: so-called “close neighbor” sources, along the line of *Qingwen zhiyao* 清文指要
- (3) Ryūkyū Mandarin sources: *Hakusei kanwa* 百姓官話, etc.
- (4) Tang Chinese sources: the category of so-called “lesson-books” (課本) on the interpretation of Tang Chinese, such as *Tōwa sanyō* 唐話纂要 (Essentials of the speech of Tang), or sources from ships that ran ashore
- (5) “Lesson-book” sources in Japanese possession: *Kanwa shinan* 官話指南 (Compass of the Mandarin language), etc.
- (6) Vietnamese sources: concentrated in Ming and Qing—Chữ nôm (Chinese writing), words from Chinese, etc.

Other than these, so-called “travelogues” (those included in the *Zouxiang shijie congshu* 走向世界叢書 [Writings on going out into the world] are excellent examples), Chinese/foreign comparative dictionaries, Chinese translations of the Bible, and so forth are of vital importance, particularly to lexical studies.

Moreover, the “center” and the “periphery” within the Chinese language are obviously another matter for consideration. In this case, another perspective from which to grasp the Chinese language should emerge through the relationships between so-called “poetic speech” and “dialects,” “official language” and “country-speak,” or “standard speech” and “dialect,” as well as written/spoken language and classical/contemporary language.

2 Periphery and Center

2-1 The periphery and the center in linguistic research: the relationship of the discrete and the general, or the special and the universal

The relationship of the periphery and the center is connected, in linguistics, with that of the discrete and the general, or the special and the universal. The logical conclusion is that these respective pairs do not exist in mutual opposition, but mutually complement one another—a this *and* that rather than a this *or* that relationship.

Many linguists, however, fall into one of these traps. Those who study a discrete linguistic (for instance, Chinese linguistics, Japanese linguistics, English linguistics) study only that and stop there, while on the other hand, general linguists fancy in a kind of self-flattery that general linguistics is the guiding theory and with it they can solve all the various issues of discrete languages.

As early as 1941, Tokieda Motoki 時枝誠記 pointed out the relationship between discrete/general, or special/universal, in these linguistics studies as follows.

While linguistics cannot be considered the study of generic language (for such a thing does not actually exist) removed from a specific language, Japanese linguistics in itself must be elevated to the academic study of a generic theory of that language that reveals the nature of language. (*Preface*, 4)

The question of what is the nature of [a] language must become, for Japanese linguistics, the most important problem. Moreover, because the ultimate problem of Japanese linguistics is the attempt to grasp the nature of language lurking in the background through the special aspects of the Japanese language, an inquiry into the nature of language should also be the conclusion to Japanese linguistics. (*Ibid.*, 4–5)

The mission of Japanese linguistics—i.e., scientific studies of the Japanese language—is to extract and describe all the linguistic truths that are discovered about the language, and in turn, define the characteristics of the language. However, at the same time, Japanese linguistics must also take part in establishing a system of linguistics via an abstraction of the universal theory, from the many phenomena of Japanese to language in general, and contribute to fleshing out a picture of the true nature of language. (*Attitudes in language studies* [言語研究の態度], 3)

In other words, the study of a discrete language—through the unique qualities of a discrete language—should define the nature of language in general that lies in the background. This is indeed a respectable position, but even in Tokieda's time, stances like the following existed as his opposition; moreover, they were the guiding principles of general linguistics and discrete linguistics, as well as the expected theoretical system.

As a matter of fact, linguistics today is considered to stand apart from Japanese linguistics, as something which supplies a generic foundational theory vis-à-vis Japanese linguistics. Linguistics is the expected theoretical system for Japanese linguistics, a guiding principle. This is the generally accepted relationship of linguistics to Japanese linguistics. (*Ibid.*, 3–4)

This sort of relationship as a constructed factor was also pointed out, as below.

When linguistics was imported into our land, it was bound in a very special relationship with Japanese linguistics. That relationship is considered a phenomenon that appeared along with the myriad of academic fields as Occidental scholarship was imported from the Meiji Restoration onward; however, before the study of the object, the theory of academic methods was imparted, and the object came to be studied according to these methods. Japanese linguistics, rather than making linguistics through study of an individual language its aim, thought of linguistics as the guiding principle through which it would be established. (*Ibid.*, 5)

The following two reasons can be given for becoming acclimated to that abnormal state of affairs in the Meiji-era Japanese linguistics field. The first reason is that the standard of our native linguistics field prior to Meiji is thought to have been abysmal in comparison to the field of linguistics in the West. Though it was a makeshift solution, the immediate situation had to be rectified by borrowing from others. [...] The second reason is that studies of the native language before Meiji were not yet organized into a body of theory. [...] Meiji-era Japanese linguistics had no recourse but to seek out a foothold in the theories of Occidental linguistics. (*Ibid.*, 6–7)

This was really an inevitable phase in the course of Japan's modernization. Fukuzawa Yukichi expounded upon “the argument for disassociation from Asia” (脱亜論) to move forward with moderniza-

tion. Amid that situation, Natsume Sōseki has this to say in *Sanshirō* 三四郎 to that sort of modernization: “Japan is going to perish,” as the title character is told by “that man” who sits beside him on the train.⁶⁾ And we can see that Tokieda’s ideas are also those of “that man.”

Whatever the case, Tokieda made this conclusion regarding the relationship between the special and the universal.

It is generally thought that the theory and methods of linguistics are universal, and the theory and methods of Japanese linguistics are special. However, this can be said only in the most superficial manner, and it is not necessarily a correct assessment. [...] The universal and the special do not exist in mutual opposition. All of the special phenomena simultaneously possess aspects of the universal; this is not unique to the study of Japanese, but rather, can be said about everything. The quest for special phenomena in the Japanese language can simultaneously become the elucidation of universal aspects of language. (*Ibid.*, pages 8–9)

Those who study language, whether they study a discrete language or general linguistics, should look back once again on Tokieda’s relationship between the special and the universal. In particular, many English linguists in Japan would do well to ponder it deeply. Riding on the trends of the times, structural linguistics had its moment in the mainstream; when that was no good it was transformational grammar; when that failed, case grammar; and recently, cognitive linguistics has been the front runner. Relying only on mimicry, they never think to question the fundamental theory or principles. These words by Poe go without saying:

You will see at once that all argument upon this head should be urged, if at all, against the rule itself; and for this end, we must examine the *rationale* of the rule. (“The Mystery of Marie Roget,” 1842)

In China, the situation is very much the same.

Under the circumstances of the Western superpowers’ advance toward China after the Opium Wars, and a “backwards” China, Ma Jianzhong could only imitate Latin grammar in order to describe a systematic grammar of Chinese. Still, since then, many Chinese linguists (though of course, in the so-called Shanghai school 海派, which included the likes of Chen Wangdao 陳望道 and Zhang Shilu 張世祿, there were also those who advocated theories of grammar unique to Chinese) came to describe Chinese linguistics within the framework of Western grammar, and it is only recently that critical reconsiderations of this (by, for instance, Zhu Dexi and Shen Xiaolong 申小龍) have appeared.

However, methods such as Tokieda’s also carry a danger of sinking into a narrow-minded nationalism. This resembles the nationalist positioning that has been a trend among many scholars of historical *kana* orthography. Although I am a scholar of historical *kana* orthography, I have not taken such a position. Ultimately, it depends on whether it is scientific, or whether it stands up to reason. Tokieda himself also pointed this out.

Therefore, the relationship between linguistics and Japanese linguistics is not that the former is a guiding principle upon which the latter rests, but that as a conclusion of studying one discrete language, linguistics becomes the critical object of Japanese linguistics, or indeed, an instructive example—a stone from

6) See Kang Sangjung 姜尚中 (2007).

another mountain. [...] Thinking of it in this manner means to avoid becoming uselessly self-righteous and taking an abysmally narrow-minded attitude to the exclusion of all else. This is the path that Japanese linguistics truly should take, for at the same time it will nourish the scientific spirit in which Occidental linguistics is grounded. (*Ibid.*, 9–10)

In the relationships of discrete/general or special/universal described above, the same holds true if one substitutes the periphery/center pair. That both of these relationships must exist in such a way is my basic position.

2-2 The individual is the general, and specialness is universality: an example of *xushilun* 虛実論 (empty/substantive theory)

Generally, in Indo-European languages, a sentence always has a “subject,” and the subject is usually the active entity (the doer). Thus, it is often explained *a priori* that a sentence consists of a subject and a predicate. Even Chomsky, whose work is lionized as a revolution in linguistics and dominated a whole generation, naturally accepted “S=NP+VP” as the premise on which to begin analysis of a sentence.

However, this is not necessarily the case in Japanese and Chinese. In Japanese, the argument of “abolishment of the subject” has been put forth, and in Chinese too, sentences such as the following cannot be explained by the subject-predicate relationship of the Indo-European languages.

前边来了一个人。(One person came from the front.)

台上坐着主席团。(The executives are sitting on the stage.)

玻璃坏了。(Glass broke.)

房子烧了。(A house burned.)

这里的水可以喝。(One can drink the water here.)

这些给你。(I will give these to you.)

下雨了。(It rained.)

Whether they are called dependent sentences, natural passive or topical sentences, they cannot completely fit into the same category as the Indo-European concept of subject-predicate.

Since this is the case, this “sentence = subject + predicate” rule is a thing of individual languages, and can hardly be said to be the nature, or a general feature, of language. Regarding this, Tokieda said the following.

Something which does not exist in Japanese cannot be called a generality of language. Even if generalities were to exist, if they are not present in Japanese, they are no more than the special qualities of whichever language. (*Ibid.*, page 9)

In the relationship of not only the subject and predicate, but also the verb and object, Indo-European languages differ from Chinese and from Japanese. In contrast to the “arrow/target” relationship in Indo-European languages, the relationship is exceedingly complicated in Chinese.

Against this sort of Indo-European view of a sentence as “subject + predicate,” in Chinese there is

xushilun 虛實論 (empty/substantive theory),⁷⁾ or the traditional division of words into either *xu* 虛 (empty) or *shi* 實 (substantive). With this *xushilun*, the sentence is explained as follows.

構文之道，不過實字虛字兩端，實字其體骨，而虛字其性情也。(Preface to *Zhuzi bianlue* 助字辨略 [Brief notes on particles])

構文之道，不外虛實兩字，實字其體骨，虛字其神情也。(Introduction to *Mashi wentong*)

In other words, the Chinese saw a sentence as that which is formed from *xuzi* 虛字, empty words, and *shizi* 實字, substantive words, and this viewpoint was also held by Edo period Japanese scholars of Chinese literature such as Itō Tōgai, Minagawa Kien, and Ogyū Sorai, as well as scholars of native literature such as Suzuki Akira and Fujitani Nariakira. Of particular note is Suzuki Akira's *Gengo shishu ron* 言語四種論 (On the four categories in language), in which he divided language into *kotoba* 詞 (which “indicate and express things, and thus are words”) and *teniowa* てにをは (“the voice of one’s intention which is attached to those words”). He further broke down *kotoba* into *karada no kotoba* 体の詞 (body-words, or nouns), *arikata no kotoba* 形状の詞 (condition-words, or adjectives), and *shiwaza no kotoba* 作用の詞 (action-words, or verbs).

On the classification of the four categories in language

Words are classified into four categories. The first comprises the ten thousand things that have names, or body-words. The second is *teniowa*, or particles, which manipulate other words. The third is the condition-words, and the fourth is the action-words. These latter two are combined and generally called function-words, or performance-words, or active words. (front of second leaf)

Compared to the *teniowa*, the words of the other three categories indicate certain things. The *teniowa* indicate nothing. Whereas the three categories are truly words, the *teniowa* are naught but sound. The three categories indicate and express things, and thus are words; and the *teniowa* are the voice of one’s intention which is attached to those words. The words are like the beads of a necklace; and the *teniowa*, the string. The words are like tools; and the *teniowa*, the handles that allow us to manipulate them. (front of eighth leaf)

This analysis of language by Suzuki is based on the Chinese *xushilun*, and ultimately, Tokieda continued its legacy with *shijiron* 詞辭論 (*shi/ji* theory). According to Tokieda, language is divided into *shi* 詞 (objective expressions) and *ji* 辭 (subjective expressions), and a sentence is formed when “*shi* wrap up *ji*.” Therefore, “subject” and “predicate” are not mutually opposing concepts; in fact, both are simply “objective expressions,” and what incorporates them together is *ji* or “subjective expressions.”⁸⁾ The idea

7) Originally, this began with the Southern Song theory of words (*cilun* 詞論). An empty character 虛字 is one that expresses the feeling of the speaker (for example: 凡其句中所用虛字，皆以托精神而傳語氣 [Xuzi shuo 虛字說]), and a substantive character 實字 is one that expresses the substance (the target meaning). In former times, the *xuzi* were also called *ci* 辭 (以名舉實，以辭抒意 [Mozi 墨子]) or *ci* 詞 (詞，意內而言外也 [Shuowen jiezi 說文解字]). For more on this, see Uchida (1981). In the *Wen xin diao long* 文心雕龍 (The literary mind and the carving of dragons) and other works they are also indicated with the words *mao* 貌 and *qing* 情.

8) On the relationship between subject and predicate, Tokieda wrote: “We should understand that the subject expressed in a sentence is not expressed as something opposite the predicate, but it brings out the things hidden or wrapped up in the predicate” (Ibid., 371). Regarding Chinese, as well, Tōdō Akiyasu wrote in “Chūgoku bunpō no kenkyū” 中国文法の研究 (Studies in Chinese Grammar): “In the Chinese language, the subject is thought of as a component that accompanies the predicate. Thinking this way, it can also be said that, in a broad sense, the subject modifies

is that “language is a mode of human expression, like music or painting, and has a process structure of object—perception—expression,” and this is based on a linguistic view of “language as human subjective activity in itself.” This is clearly delineated from structural linguistics and other such fields, where we find ideas like the “constructivist view of language” and the “language-as-tool theory” exemplified by Stalin.

Incidentally, if we turn to Chinese language studies by Europeans, it becomes clear that the traditional Chinese *xushilun* was skillfully incorporated, as below.

(1) Prémare, *Notitia Linguae Sinicae* (translated into English by Bridgman), Canton, 1847

The Chinese language, whether spoken or written, is composed of certain parts. These are called Parts of Speech. Each sentence or phrase, to be entire, requires a verb, without which it could have no meaning; and a noun, to designate who is the actor and what is done. It has prepositions, an adverb, and also many other particles, which are used rather for perspicuity and embellishment, than because they are absolutely necessary to the sense. The Chinese grammarians divide the characters which constitute the language into two classes, called hu tsz 虛字 (虛字=筆者), and shih tsz 實字 (實字=同上), i.e. (literally) vacant or empty and solid characters.

The solid characters are those which are essential to language, and are subdivided into hwoh tsz 活字 (活字=同上), and sz tsz 死字, living and dead characters, i.e. verbs and nouns. (27)

(2) Morrison, *Grammar of the Chinese Language* (通用漢言之法), Serampore, 1815

The verb is by the Chinese called sang tsee 生字, ‘a living word’, in contradiction from the Noun, which they call see tsee 死字, ‘a dead word’. (113)

The verb is also denominated tung tsee 動字, ‘a moving word’, and the Noun tsing tsee 靜字, ‘a quiescent word.’ (113)

(3) Morrison, *Chinese Miscellany*, London, 1825

The Chinese usually divide their words into three classes only, viz. “dead words,” by which they mean the names and qualities of things; secondly, “living words,” by which they mean those which denote action or suffering; and, lastly, words which they denominate “auxiliaries of speech.” (28)

(4) Edkins, *A Grammar of the Chinese Colloquial Language, commonly called the Mandarin Dialect*, 1857

If a common sentence be examined it is usually found to contain word of two kinds, viz. some that have a sense of their own independent of their use in any particular sentence, and others that are employed only for grammatical purposes, to express relations between words, to connect sentences and clauses, and to complete the sentence, so that it may be clear in meaning and elegant in form. 天晚了都是睡覺去了。In this sentence tu and liau mean nothing when viewed apart from the context. They are employed as subordinate words or particles, under the control of certain grammatical laws. We thus obtain the first and most obvious subdivision of words, and it is that commonly used by the Chinese. They call

the predicate” (139).

significant words, 實字 *shih tsi*, full characters, while the auxiliary words or those which are non-significant, they term 虛字 *hu tsi*, empty characters, particles.

Words may also be viewed as expressive of actions (verbs) and things (nouns). These two kinds of words are called 活字 *hwoh tsi*, living characters, and 死字 *si tsi*, dead characters. (99)

These authors referred to *shizi* as “solid characters” (Prémare) or “full characters” (Edkins) and *xuzi* as “vacant or empty characters” (Prémare) or simply “empty characters” (Edkins). They also divided *shizi* into *huozi* 活字, “living characters” (Prémare) or “living words” (Morrison), and *sizi* 死字 “dead characters” (Prémare) or “dead words” (Morrison). From this we can understand how they incorporated “the Chinese view of things” into their own linguistic studies. Excerpts such as Edkins’ explanation regarding *xuzi*—“In this sentence *tu* and *liau* mean nothing when viewed apart from context”—are legitimately derived from the way the ancient Chinese thought of *xuzi*: characters that *mean nothing* (不為義).⁹⁾ This is simultaneously proof that they grappled with the Chinese language face-to-face and a continuation of the “adaptivism” in Jesuit mission work, as well as the emergence of a view of translation as “respecting the other’s culture” or “immersing oneself in the other’s culture.”¹⁰⁾

Nonetheless, we must consider one additional reason for the fact that they adopted the *xushilun*, which could be termed the traditional Chinese view of language: namely, that there was already a foundational structure into which it could be incorporated. This was thanks to the existence of the *Port-Royal Grammar* in Europe.

General and Rational Grammar: The Port-Royal Grammar was highly regarded as a standard grammar of Latin of Europe in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries, and also greatly influenced English grammar in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. The most essential excerpts are contained in the following several lines:

Grammar is the art of speaking. Speaking is to explain our thoughts by signs, which men have invented for that purpose. (1)

’Tis the general doctrine of philosophers, that there are three operations of the mind: *Perception*, *Judgment*, and *Reasoning*. (22)

Hence it is plain, that the third operation of the mind is only an extension of the second. (23)

For men seldom mean to express their bare perceptions of things, but generally to convey their judgments concerning them. (23)

The judgment, which we form of things, as when I say, *the earth is round*, is called a *proposition*; and therefore every proposition necessarily includes two terms, one called the *subject*, which is the thing of which the affirmation is; as *the earth*; and the other is called the *attribute*, which is the thing that is affirmed of the subject, as *round*: and moreover the connection between these two terms, namely the substantive verb, *is*. (23)

Now ’tis easy to see, that the two terms belong properly to the first operation of the mind, because that is what we conceive, and is the object of our thoughts; and the connection belongs to the second, being properly the action of the mind, and the mode or manner of thinking. (24)

9) The Tang-period scholar Kong Yingda 孔穎達 gave the following definition for *ci* 辭 (that is, *xuzi*): 漢有游女, 不可求思, 正義曰, 以泳思, 方思之等, 皆不取思為義, 故辭也 (周南·漢廣) In short, the word 思 in 有游女, 不可求思, as well as the 思 in 泳思 and 方思, are all called *ci* 辭 because they are meaningless (不為義). In fact, it can also be said that Suzuki Akira’s view mentioned above—that the *teniowa* “indicate nothing”—is closely akin to this.

10) On views of translation by missionaries, self-aware self-immersion, and “cultural translation,” see Uchida (2001).

Hence it follows, that men having occasion for signs to express what passes in the mind, the most general distinction of words must be this, that some signify the objects, and others the form or manner of our thoughts[...]. (24)

In such a way, the *Port-Royal Grammar*, based on an epistemology in which the operations of the human mind are largely classified as one of two things (technically there are three, but the third is an extension of the second operation, and for the most part the second and third operations can be combined into one), words are roughly divided into two categories: words that express “the object of our thoughts” and words that express “the form or manner of our thoughts.” What we call the subject and predicate of a sentence both belong to the former, as they are both “objects of perception,” while the word that connects them, or the copula, is the “form or manner of thought” which unifies the whole sentence. The “object of thought” is an objective expression, while the “form or manner of thought” can only be a subjective expression (words which express the feelings of the speaker). Looking at it this way, we can say that this view of language is quite the same as the Chinese *xushilun* and Tokieda’s *shijiron*. What is more, it must be said that this, and precisely this, is the “universality of language”—here we have a prime example of the “individual” as the “general,” and “specialness” as simultaneous “universality.”

When Chomsky reevaluated the *Port-Royal Grammar*,¹¹⁾ his assessment was that the *Port-Royal Grammar* was a precursor to the deep structure theory he advocated.

One of the largest reasons behind the birth of Chomsky’s transformational grammar, hailed as a revolution in linguistics, was that structural linguistics, which until then gave precedence to the form of language to the exclusion of meaning or content, was unable to solve the problem of the polysemy (or “ambiguity”) of language—that is, the problem that a sentence or phrase might have multiple distinct meanings while being identical in form.

An example is “light house keeper.”

This phrase could refer to either “the keeper of a lighthouse” or “a slim-figured housekeeper.” On the polysemy of such phrases, Chomsky said “the surface structure is the same, but the deep structure is different.” If it indicates the keeper of a lighthouse, the deep structure is broken down into “light house” and “keeper;” if it indicates “a slim-figured housekeeper,” the deep structure is broken down into “light” and “house keeper.” By comprehending these differences in the deep structure, polysemy is resolved.

However, where exactly is the deep structure? What we call language can be no more than the surface structure that was expressed. However, linguistic expression has a process structure of “perception—object—expression,” and it is impossible to conceive of perception separately from its object. Even when we call it “polysemy,” in the realm of language as it is actually used, that is, according to the speaker, there is always only one meaning. Ultimately, the listener, with only the surface structure for clues, considers the object and traces the speaker’s perception as a vicarious experience. During that process, it may be the case that the listener perceives something different than the speaker’s intended object. This is how a misunderstanding arises.

The deep structure named by Chomsky is actually the most abstract “perception” behind language. The problem is that this separated perception from the object, and took this perception as the pre-existing entity, using it to develop a concrete sentence (the surface structure). Such a view can end up defining the lexica included in dictionaries as “language” itself, and it can lead to a view that defines

11) On the nature of the Port-Royal Grammar and Chomsky’s reevaluation, as well as fundamental criticism of Chomsky’s transformational grammar, see Miyashita Shinji 宮下真二 (1980).

“language” as the linguistic norms (grammar) that transmit language. As Tokieda says, the lexica in dictionaries are “formed from abstractions of concrete words, much like an illustration of cherry blossoms that appears in a natural history text; they cannot be any more than models of concrete particular things, and are not in and of themselves concrete language” (*ibid.*, 13). In other words, even if we use “dog” from the same lexicon, as *language*, the “dog” of which I speak and the “dog” of which another person speaks might be different.

However that may be, the correct solution to polysemy in language must be something like this.

The fact that a single word is polysemic is a synthesis of the various usages of that word; in one sentence with a concrete linguistic environment, one word, after all, has one meaning. (Zhang Yufu 張魚甫, 1980)

3 The future of cultural interaction studies —cultural translation—concluding remarks

In cultural interaction, or contact between different cultures, of course, interaction through “things” occurs, but in many cases, interaction occurs through the medium of language. And there, it is always translation that becomes an issue.

So, what is “translation”?

Superficially, we can think of it as “replacing” *a* lexical item in *A* language with *b* lexical item in *B* language.

However, when we arrive at the linguistic view that “language is a mode of human expression, like music or painting” and has the “object—perception—expression” progress structure, it follows that the existence of the “human” is crucial as the foundation of linguistic expression.

Moreover, language does not have a direct relationship with the object in the first place, and the “sensibility aspect” in linguistic interaction is overlooked. Linguistic exchange occurs in a “über-sensibility aspect.” The über-sensibility aspect might also be called the “common perception,” or the “norms” or “concurrence of perception,” of an ethnic group. That common perception is a reflection of “culture”—the group’s history, ways of thinking, and so forth—and that culture is there in the background of language.

With this outlook, “translation” becomes something more than simply lexical replacement.

If one replaces *a* lexical item in *A* language with *b* lexical item in *B* language, there is also the question of what is equivalency. For instance, in “犬 = dog,” obviously it is not “equal” in pronunciation or in the shape of the written characters; so, what exactly makes them “equal things”? In pursuit of “equal things,” translators feel the birth pangs of an endeavor, for “linguistic translation” is nothing other than “cultural translation.” It was surely because of this point that the missionaries were so attentive to the target language when they translated the Bible, their paramount text. When communicating between different cultures, such troubles are bound to arise.

In cultural interaction studies, we should always seek to bear in mind this “cultural translation.”

In the body of this paper, I have mentioned the state of Chinese linguistics and the “peripheral approach” as an area of cultural interaction studies, as well as the relationships of individual/general and special/universal, and the issue of “cultural translation,” among other things; but countless topics in cultural interaction studies remain to be addressed. Speaking from my own niche, I can think of questions of conceptual formations (such as “the state” [国家]), education and publishing, questions of printing, and how these are oriented in cultural interaction studies. As each of these should be discussed in a

separate article, I wish to close with these words, both as a message to younger scholars and as a tenet of my own.

To adopt any essentialist argument in academia is to make a wager. This is because here, the true value of the scholar's intelligence vividly emerges, and the great truth that "human beings cannot comprehend objects outside the scope of their own logical abilities" pierces through all. For the scholar, this is a frightening wager. Those who cower from it steep themselves in the contemporary academic doctrine without even examining it fully, and try to gain spiritual peace; but such attitudes lacking in subjectivity do not follow the true path of scholarship. (Suzuki Satoru 鈴木覺, "Toward the nirvana of form and function: A systematic theory of English grammar" 形式と機能の彼岸を衝く体系的英文法論, *Hon'yaku no sekai*, June 1982)

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