

**Arcaṭa on *dr̥ṣṭānta*, *trairūpya*, and *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* in Dharmakīrti's
*sattvānumāna****

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0. Introduction

For scholars invested in the Buddhist logic founded by Dignāga and advanced by Dharmakīrti, the idea of the 'example' (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) has long been one of the most attention-getting subjects. The main reason for this is that there is a drastic change in the whole system of Buddhist logic between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and it is examples that feature centrally in this development.

In particular, others have shown that, in Dharmakīrti's logic, examples lose their substantive logical value as found in Dignāga and instead get another, new role, which in turn is not essential for inference itself.¹ In the end, from the logical point of view, Dharmakīrti's devaluation of examples seems to reduce the traditional Buddhist notion of *trairūpya*, that is, of the threefold characteristic justifying a good reason property, to a mere formality. In Dharmakīrti's writing, this notion escapes such challenging criticism.² However, Dharmakīrti's successors were not so satisfied with this passively *conservative* attitude toward *trairūpya*.³ Some seem to favor discarding it, and some seem to try to give *trairūpya* a new significance that was not seen in Dharmakīrti's thought. A representative of the first strategy is Arcaṭa, whose work I will take up in this paper.

In this paper, I would like to focus on Arcaṭa's treatment of examples and the *trairūpya* theory, specifically in the inference of momentariness based on the inferential reason property 'existence' (*sattva*), i.e., the so-called *sattvānumāna*. According to Arcaṭa, this inference is peculiar in two respects, which I will discuss later on, and its peculiarity seems to nullify the traditional *trairūpya* theory. This is the reason for

*The present article is for the most part based on a paper read at the 17th Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held in Vienna, August 2014. I am very grateful to Mr. Tyler Neill (PhD candidate, Harvard University) for his careful reading of my text and correcting my English. Thanks are also due to Prof. Chizuko Yoshimizu of the University of Tsukuba. She kindly gave me the opportunity to read some important portions of Arcaṭa's *Hetubinduṭīkā*, which I deal with in this paper, at her workshop "Kashmiri Scholars on Buddhist Logic" held in Tsukuba, September 2013, in the presence of many colleagues. Needless to say, any remaining mistakes are my own.

¹ Cf. Oetke 1994, Steinkellner 2004.

² Cf. Steinkellner 2004: 230. It seems not to be Dharmakīrti's original intention to abandon *trairūpya*. Rather, in fact, it is the contrary. What Dharmakīrti wanted to do is to give the ontological basis to *trairūpya*. However, ironically, this activity of Dharmakīrti, in the final logical analysis, turns *trairūpya* into a mere formality.

³ Cf. Bhattacharya 1986: 95.

my concentrating on the *sattvānumāna*. The main purpose of my paper is to clarify the way Arcata argues for the problematic nature of *trairūpya* within the *sattvānumāna*. In my view, these problems with the *trairūpya* theory in the *sattvānumāna* as propounded by Arcata become common to the later Buddhist logicians such as Dharmottara, Ratnakīrti, and Ratnākaraśānti, as they seem bound to deal with them, whether negatively or positively. In this sense, I would say that Arcata is a propounder of problems. Once we understand his awareness of the problem and the flow of his thoughts, we will be able to more easily follow later discussion of the topic up to the end phase of Indian Buddhism. This is my intention.

In the following first two sections, I briefly outline the differing logical values of ‘example’ in Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, basing myself mainly on Katsura 2004 and Steinkellner 2004. Next, I explain Arcata’s handling of examples and the *trairūpya* theory in the *sattvānumāna*. In the last part, I investigate how Arcata’s arguments influenced later Buddhist philosophers to expand upon the same problems.

The text portions of Arcata’s *Hetubinduṭīkā*, which I feature in the present article, were translated into Japanese by Satoru Noriyama in 2005 (Noriyama 2005). I am greatly indebted to Noriyama’s work, however, I do not rely entirely on his translation/interpretation.

1. Dignāga on ‘example’

In Dignāga’s system of logic, similar and dissimilar examples have the function of showing that a relevant inferential reason property (*hetu* or *sādhana*, henceforth: *hetu*) satisfies the second and third *trairūpya* conditions, respectively (henceforth: T2 and T3). In other words, it is by an example that the *hetu*’s positive and negative concomitance (*anvaya-vyatireka*) with its target property (*sādhyadharmā*) is indicated. For Dignāga, an inference without an example can never work, since in such an inference, the *hetu* cannot be established as satisfying T2 and T3 and thus fails its necessary conditions.

For Dignāga, fulfillment of T2 and T3 through an example is equivalent to establishing an inseparable relation (*avinābhāva*) between *hetu* and *sādhyadharmā*, on the very basis of which the *sādhyadharmā* is inferred from the *hetu* in a relevant inferential site (*pakṣadharmīn*, henceforth: *pakṣa*). Therefore, in an inference without an example, the inseparable relation between the two would remain unproved. For this reason, the example is indispensable for any inference. In this manner, if, in a certain inference, 1) the inseparable relation is indicated through an example (= T2 and T3), and 2) the *hetu* is proved to be a property of the *pakṣa* (*pakṣadharmatā*, = T1, the first *trairūpya* condition), then that inference is a complete and sound inference that enables one to prove the *pakṣa*’s possession of the *sādhyadharmā*. This is how, for Dignāga, ‘example’ is a necessary component of a sound inference.

2. Dharmakīrti on ‘example’

On the other hand, in Dharmakīrtian logic, the example does not perform such a crucial inferential

function. Examples are indeed needed, but not always, i.e., only in certain cases.

This difference between these two Buddhist logicians with regard to the value of examples results from the Dharmakīrtian concept of the so-called ‘essential connection’ (*svabhāvapratibandha*). This is conceived as a basis *in reality* for the inseparable relation. According to Dharmakīrti, there can be an inseparable relation between *hetu* and *sādhyadharmā* only when there is an essential connection between the two.

His exploration of this concept is motivated by the problem of epistemic certainty when relying on examples. That is, in the case of similar examples, even if, in a certain site *x*, one observes the *sādhyadharmā*’s existence alongside the *hetu*, this cannot conclusively prove, without fail, the *sādhyadharmā*’s existence in another site *y* which possesses the *hetu*. On the other hand, in the case of dissimilar examples, even if one observes the absence of the *hetu* in a certain site *x* lacking the *sādhyadharmā*, this cannot conclusively prove, without fail, the *hetu*’s non-existence in another site *y* in which the *sādhyadharmā* does not exist. That is, one cannot totally exclude the possibility that their positive and negative concomitance in *x* is merely by accident or perhaps applicable only to *x* and not to *y*.

It is safe to say that Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that insofar as it is *already* cognized that there is an essential connection between *hetu* and *sādhyadharmā*, an example can serve as an inferential means indicating an inseparable relation between the two.

However, in theory, for one who already possesses knowledge of the essential connection, the example is actually of no use, since one already knows that wherever the *hetu* exists, the *sādhyadharmā* exists. That is, the essential connection must be a *universal* relation between properties and thus never subject to the particularities of the places where the *hetu* exists. It is proved by the essential connection that *everything* which possesses the *hetu* also has the *sādhyadharmā*. Thus, for those who know the essential connection, the only remaining thing necessary and sufficient for making a sound inference of the *sādhyadharmā* is knowledge of T1, that is, knowledge that the *pakṣa* possesses the *hetu* as a property (*pakṣadharmatā*).⁴

Thus, according to Dharmakīrti, it is only in those cases where the person to be convinced of an inference—whether oneself or another—either does not know or does not remember the essential connection that examples are needed. In such cases, a person can recollect or obtain knowledge about the essential connection with the help of the examples. It is only in this limited context that examples are of use.⁵

⁴ Cf. PV 1.27’c-d: *vidūṣāṃ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ* || Cf. Steinkellner 2004: 240.

⁵ Cf. PV 1.27a-c’: *tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi dr̥ṣṭānte tadavedināḥ | khyāpyete...* Cf. Steinkellner 2004:

3. Arcaṭa on ‘example’ in the *sattvānumāna*

3.1. Impossibility of ‘example’ in the traditional Dignāgean framework of inference

In the preceding section, I discussed the role of examples in Dharmakīrtian logic, in which they are no longer essential for inference itself.

However, all these arguments about examples presuppose the very simple fact that finding or presenting an example is actually *possible*. Concerning the *trairūpya* condition, to say that the *hetu* satisfies T2 means that one can actually demonstrate *at least* one example which possesses *hetu* as well as *sādhyadharmā*, and importantly, that example must be an ontologically different thing than the *pakṣa*.

In the *Hetubinduṭīkā* (henceforth: HBT), Arcaṭa argues that in the case of the *sattvānumāna*, an example is *impossible*. The relevant discussion occurs when Arcaṭa comments on the objection (*pūrvapakṣa*) in the *Hetubindu* that, in the *trairūpya* theory, there is a contradiction between T1 and T2, namely that if the *hetu* is a property of the *pakṣa*, then it cannot pertain to other sites other than the *pakṣa*.⁶ The opponent claims that the compound ‘*pakṣadharmah*’ is a genitive-*tatpuruṣa* compound that should be interpreted with the indeclinable particle ‘*eva*’ as ‘*pakṣasya eva dharmah*’. If so, then the possibility for the *hetu* belonging to other entities other than the *pakṣa* should be rejected. However, T2 refers to the *hetu*’s occurrence in other entities, i.e., examples. This is evidently contradictory.⁷ After his word-for-word commentary on this *pūrvapakṣa*,⁸ Arcaṭa argues for the impossibility of an example in the *sattvānumāna*.

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⁶ HB 2*,2-3: *pakṣasya dharmatve tadviśeṣaṇāpekṣasyānyatrānanuvṛtter asādhāraṇateti cet...*

⁷ The relevant opponent is Uddyotakara. For Uddyotakara’s claim, cf. Inami et al. 2005: 41–43 (n.25).

⁸ Cf. HBT 14,21–15,5: *iha vyavachedaphalatvāc chabdaprayogasyāvaśyam evāvadhārayitavyam. śaṣṭhīsamāsāc ca pakṣadharmā ity atra nānyas samāsaḥ sambhavati. tathā ca pakṣasyaiva dharmā ity evam avadhāraṇāt tadamśavyāptir virudhyata iti viruddhalakṣaṇatām udbhāvayann āha – pakṣasya dharmatve tam (tam conjecture HBT : tvam Ms) pakṣam viśeṣaṇam anyato vyavachedakam apekṣata iti. tadviśeṣaṇāpekṣasya dharmasyānyatra pakṣikṛtād anyasmin sapakṣe ’nanuvṛtīḥ. tathā hi yaḥ pakṣeṇa viśeṣyate, sa pakṣasyaiva bhavati, nānyasya. yathā yo devadattasya putraḥ, sa tasyaiva putraḥ, na yajñadattasyāpi. tato ’nyatrānanuvṛtter asādhāraṇatā sādharmaṇatā na syāt. tadamśavyāptivirodha iti yāvat, sādharmaṇatāyāc ca tadamśavyāptiā (°tāyās ca tad° conjecture HBT : °tāyās tv atad° Ms) pratipādanāt. tato yaḍi pakṣadharmah, na tadamśena vyāptiḥ. aha tadamśavyāptiḥ, na pakṣadharmā iti vyāhatam lakṣaṇam iti.*

Kaṛṇakagomin uses this part of the HBT almost literally when he comments on PVSV 2,7–8: *pakṣasya dharmatve tadviśeṣaṇāpekṣasyānyatrānanuvṛtter asādhāraṇateti cet...* (cf. Steinkellner 1981: 287 [n.20]), cf. PVSVṬ 14,23–15,7: *iha vyavachedaphalatvāc chabdaprayogasyāvaśyam evāvadhārayitavyam. śaṣṭhīsamāsāc ca pakṣadharmā iti nānyas samāsas sambhavati. tathā ca pakṣasyaiva dharmā ity evam avadhāraṇāt tadamśavyāptir virudhyata iti viruddhalakṣaṇatām udbhāvayann āha – pakṣasya dharmatve tam pakṣam viśeṣaṇam anyato vyavachedam apekṣata iti. tadviśeṣaṇāpekṣasya dharmasyānyatra pakṣikṛtād anyasmin sapakṣe ’nanuvṛtīḥ. tathā hi yaḥ pakṣeṇa viśeṣyate, sa pakṣasyaiva bhavati, yathā devadattasya putraḥ. tato ’nyatrānanuvṛtter asādhāraṇatā sādharmaṇatā na syāt. tadamśavyāpti-*

Why? Because for someone who wishes momentariness to pervade *everything* (Dharmakīrti? or Arcaṭa himself?) there are no ontologically distinct examples that can be specified; the *pakṣa* is *everything*.⁹ According to Arcaṭa, it is the property of ‘existence’ that is recruited as an inferential reason for realizing this goal.¹⁰

While insisting on this view, Arcaṭa takes into account a possible objection, namely that, even if the *pakṣa* is everything, an example is nevertheless possible. The reason is that there are some entities in the world, such as a flame, whose momentariness is accepted (*abhyupagamyate*) by some. Therefore, such things can qualify as an example, in particular as a similar case (*sapakṣa*). With the help of these things, the essential connection is evoked or made known, such that the momentariness of *the remainder of everything*—the actual *pakṣa*—thus far not yet accepted, will be proved. Against this Arcaṭa argues that the momentariness of a flame or the like is not based on *perception* (*pratyakṣa*). Since discrete moments are infinitely small, and since momentariness thus cannot be seen, it is therefore not possible to find any momentary entities. Thus, one must accept that in the *sattvānumāna*, finding an example is totally impossible.¹¹ And as a result of this impossibility, Arcaṭa says, the sought-after second characteristic of

virodha iti yāvat, sādharmaṇatayā tadamaśavyāptipratipādanāt. tato yadi pakṣadharmah, na tadamaśavyāptih, atha tadamaśavyāptih, na pakṣadharmā iti vyāhataṃ lakṣaṇam iti.

⁹ HBT 15,17–21: *yadi ca pakṣikṛtād anyatraiva vyāptir ādarśayitavyeti niyamah, tadā sattvaṃ kathaṃ kṣaṇikatāṃ bhāveṣu pratipādayet, yo hi sakalapadārthavyāpinūṃ kṣaṇikatāṃ* (°vyāpinūṃ kṣaṇikatāṃ conjecture HBT : °vyāpinūṃ akṣaṇikatāṃ Ms) *icchatī, taṃ prati kasyacit sapakṣasyaivābhāvāt.* “And if there is a rule that, “Pervasion must be shown only in loci that are different from what has been made into *pakṣa*,” then how could the [reason property] ‘existence’ enable us to know the momentariness of [all] things, since for someone who wishes that momentariness pervades all things there are not really similar cases that can be specified (*kasyacit*)?” This part is translated into Japanese in Noriyama 2005: 71. Also, cf. Shiga 2011: 429 (n.38).

Kaṛṇakagomin also refers to this assertion of Arcaṭa but summarizes as follows: PVSVT 15,10–11: *sarvapaḍārthasya kṣaṇikatve sādhye sattvalakṣaṇasya vā hetoḥ ko drṣṭānte 'nyāyah.* “Or, when the momentariness of all things is to be proved, what on earth does it mean the concomitance of the inferential reason that is characterized as existence with examples?”

¹⁰ According to Kyuma 2007, Jñānaśrīmitra is the first Buddhist philosopher of the view that the *pakṣa* in the *sattvānumāna* is ‘all things,’ ‘the entirety of things.’ However, to me, this seems not to be the case. In my understanding at least, Arcaṭa also thinks that the *pakṣa* in the *sattvānumāna* is everything (*sakalapadārtha*). Of course, as Dharmakīrti’s commentator, Arcaṭa follows Dharmakīrti’s proof-formulation (*prayoga*), in which a specific, individual, single ‘sound’ is posed as the *pakṣa* (cf. HB 5*,19–20: *yat sat, tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā ghatādayaḥ, saṃś ca śabda iti...*), when he comments on it. Cf. fn. 16 below. However, in many digressional parts in the HBT, he seems not always to be basing himself on Dharmakīrti. Prof. Kyuma says that “from the theory of all-inclusive pervasion it does not follow that the subject in the *sattvānumāna* always refers to the entirety of things” (cf. Kyuma 2007: 471–472 [n.18]). However, for Arcaṭa, at least, this is not the case.

¹¹ HBT 15,21–24: *yad api kaiścit jvālādeḥ kṣaṇikatvaṃ abhyupagamyate, tad api na pratyakṣataḥ, kṣaṇavivekasyātisūksmatayānupalakṣaṇāt. anyatraiva ca vyāptir ādarśanīyā, na sādhyadharmīṇy apīti ko 'yam nyāyah.* “Even the momentariness of fire and the like, which is accepted by some, is not based

a good reason property (*hetulakṣaṇa*, = T2) should be considered fictitious (*kālpanika*), which is to say that it does not issue from the power of things, i.e., reality (*vastubalapravṛtta*).¹² Here, ‘fictitious’ means

on perception. This is because, since discrete moments are maximally small, [the momentariness of fire and the like] cannot be seen. And, what kind of a [silly] maxim is this?—“Pervasion must be shown only in loci that are different [from the site] and not in the site too.” [This is a silly maxim in fact.]” For a Japanese translation, cf. Noriyama 2005: 71–72.

On this part Durvekamiśra comments as follows: HBTĀ 260,13–21: *nanu jvālā vahnih, ādiśabdād buddhyādi, kṣaṇikatveneṣṭam iti. tat katham kṣaṇikavādinam (kṣaṇikavādinam emended. : akṣaṇika-vādinam HBTĀ) taṃ prati sapakṣasyābhāva (sapakṣasyābhāva emended. : pakṣasyābhāva conjecture HBTĀ : pakṣasya bhāva Ms) ity āha – yad apīti. na pratyakṣataḥ iti bruvato ’yaṃ bhāvah – yadi pratyakṣeṇa kṣaṇasyopalakṣaṇam syāt, tadā dṛṣṭāntaparyeṣaṇā paryavasānam gacchet. yadā tv anumānataḥ, tadā tad api teṣāṃ anumānam adṛṣṭāntakam katham syād iti sādhanam duḥkham iti. etac ca kasyacit parasya kṣaṇikatvābhyupagāmam abhyupagāmyoktam. na tu sahetunāśavādibhir buddhyāder apy utpatti-kṣaṇa eva bhāvah, na tu dvitīye kṣaṇa iti evamlakṣaṇam kṣaṇikatvam eṣṭavyam. āsutaravināśitvābhiprāveṇa kṣaṇikaśabdapravṛtter iṣṭavāt.* “[Objection:] Flame [means] fire—by the word ‘ādi’ [in the compound ‘jvālādi’] cognition and the like [is enclosed (*pari-√grah*)—[flame (fire), cognition, and the like] is desired as momentary. Therefore, why is it the case that, for him who maintains [all things to be] momentary, there is no similar cases? [Against this] he (i.e., Arcata) said ‘yad api.’ The following is the opinion of him who says ‘not based on perception’: “If observation of moment through perception were possible, then investigation of example should have to come down to the end [for ascertaining that there is no exception, so that one can demonstrate that everything is momentary]. If, on the other hand, [it were] based on inference, then, how would it be allowed that that inference [of momentariness] with reference to these [flame and the like] too is without example? Therefore, it is difficult to prove [momentariness of flame and the like]”. And this is said after having provisionally accepted a certain opponent’s provisional acceptance of the momentariness [i.e., that of flame and the like]. On the other hand, with regard to cognition and like too, the momentariness of such form that it exists only at the moment of origination but does not exist at the second moment should not be accepted by those who advocate that destruction is with a cause. This is because they accept the application of the word ‘momentary’ by intending very quick perishability (*āsutaravināśitva*).”

For the concept of “very quick perishability” (*āsutaravināśitva*), cf. Halbfass 1992: 215–216. This concept can be ascribed to Śrīdhara.

¹² HBT 15,24–25: *evam hi kālpanikatvam hetulakṣaṇasya pratipannam syāt, na vastubalapravṛttam.* “In this way, it should be indeed avowed that one defining characteristic of a good reason property [i.e., the second *trairūpya* condition] is fictitious, it is not issued from the power of things/the reality.” For a Japanese translation, cf. Noriyama 2005: 72. This part is also translated into English in Kano 2011: 238.

In Abhayadeva Sūrī’s *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, there is a parallel argument. Cf. TBV 322,19–20: *hetoś ca pakṣasapakṣādīpravibhāgāpekṣayā gamakatve kālpanikatvam anumāne ’py aṅgikṛtam syāt, na vastubalapravṛttam.* “And, with reference to the point that an inferential reason is that which makes [a target property] known by depending upon the division between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* etc., [its] fictitiousness should be agreed in an inference too, [an inferential reason’s being that which makes a target property known] is not issued from the power of things/the reality.”

Durvekamiśra comments as follows: HBTĀ 260,20–22: *tatra pratibandhanibandhanasyāvinābhāvasya bādhakapramāṇataḥ siddhāv apy anyatrātraiva (anyatrātraiva emended. : anyatve ’atraiva HBTĀ) vṛttir apekṣaṇīyeti paribhāṣātaḥ kālpanikatvam tasya pratipannam syād ity āśayah. pratipannam svikṛtam abhyupagātam iti yāvāt.* “In this case, even if the inseparable relation, whose [ontological] basis is the [essential] connection, is established on the basis of the defeating source of knowledge in other sites (*anyatra*) [other than the *pakṣa*, i.e., examples], it is here (*atraiva*) [i.e. in the very *pakṣa*] that the

that in the *sattvānumāna*, whose *pakṣa* is everything, the division between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* is only provisional; in reality, everything is momentary, but the condition T2 is not reflective of this reality.

3.2. Uselessness of ‘example’

Thus, if one wants to retain T2 and assert the *hetu*’s satisfaction of it, there is indeed a way to do this. As we have seen, one can *provisionally* divide *everything* into two parts, namely *pakṣa* and ‘others’, (i.e., similar cases) and then somehow find at least one example of a momentary entity from among ‘the others.’ With this accomplished, one might then say that T2 is satisfied. But since perception (*pratyakṣa*) cannot work for finding a momentary thing, one must appeal to an inferential argument (*anumāna*) instead. Arcaṭa has the view that the way to find the needed momentary thing is to use the so-called *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* on anything that is different from the *pakṣa* and which possesses the *hetu*.¹³

The *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* is a source of knowledge that defeats the occurrence of the *hetu* in any site where the opposite of the *sādhyadharmā* (*sādhyaviparyāya*) is present. According to Dharmakīrti, this source of knowledge has the special role of establishing ‘real identity’ (*tādātmya*), one of the two kinds of essential connection he recognizes between *hetu* and *sādhyadharmā*.¹⁴ It should be noted here that it is only in the context of the inference of momentariness that Dharmakīrti mentions the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* by name.¹⁵

Arcaṭa is of the opinion that, since the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* can establish the essential connection between *hetu* and *sādhyadharmā*, it *also* has the ability of proving that absolutely anything at all that possesses the *hetu* as a property also exhibits the *sādhyadharmā* (here, being momentary). Arcaṭa seems

concomitance/occurring [of *hetu*] should be required. Based on this claim it should be avowed that it [i.e., the second *trairūpya* condition] is fictitious. This is the mode of thinking [of Arcaṭa]. ‘Avowed’ just means, ‘assented,’ ‘agreed.’

¹³ This position of Arcaṭa is in clear contrast to that of Ratnakīrti. Cf. section 4 with fn.23 below.

¹⁴ According to Dharmakīrti’s own explanation in the *Vādanyāya*, in this source of knowledge, that which is to be defeated (*bādhya*) is *hetu*, and that which defeats (*bādhaka*) *hetu* is the opposite property of *hetu* (*hetor viparyāya*), and the place this defeating takes place is any site where the opposite of *sādhyadharmā* (*sādhyaviparyāya*) is present. If one can prove that the opposite property of *hetu* occurs in any site where the opposite of *sādhyadharmā* exists, then there is no room there for *hetu* to occur, since the opposite property of *hetu* blocks *hetu* from occurring there. Therefore, *hetu* must be settled down in the sphere of *sādhyadharmā*. This is the logic of the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa*. Cf. Steinkellner 1982, Steinkellner 1991, and Sakai 2012: 138 (n.12).

¹⁵ Cf. HB 4*₃–7: *anvayānīścaḥ* ‘*pi svabhāvahetau sādhanadharmaṣya vastutas tadbhāvataḥ sādhanadharma-mātrānubandhasiddhiḥ. sā sādhyaviparyāye hetor bādhakapramāṇavyūrttiḥ, yathā yat sat, tat kṣaṇikam eva, akṣaṇikatve ṛthakriyāvirodhāt tallakṣaṇam vastutvaṃ hīyate; VN 2,1–4: atra vyūpti-sādhanam viparyāye bādhakapramāṇopadarśanam. yadi na sarvaṃ sat kṛtakaṃ vā pratikṣaṇavināśi syāt, akṣaṇikaṣya kramayagupadyābhyām arthakriyāyogād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇato nivṛttam ity asad eva syāt.*

to believe that it is only by this procedure that one can assert that the *hetu* satisfies T2.¹⁶

However, Arcaṭa views this activity of finding an example as *nonsensical*. This is because, given that one cannot directly perceive momentariness, there is no difference at all between the *pakṣa* and the example.¹⁷ Therefore, it should be the case that the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* that is used to come up

¹⁶ It is in this sense that Arcaṭa mentions applying the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* to the example in his literal commentary on the HB. The following is a passage of the HBṬ where Arcaṭa elucidates Dharmakīrti's intention of presenting the example 'a pot and the like' in his proof-formulation of the *sattvānumāna* (cf. HB 5*,19–20: *yat sat, tat sarvaṃ kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭādayaḥ, saṃś ca śabda iti*); HBṬ 62,9–12: *yathā ghaṭādayaḥ iti. yasya sattvakṣaṇikatvayoh pratibandhaprasādhakam pramāṇam ghaṭātau pravṛttam, tam prati tatra smṛtisamādhānārtham drṣṭāntavacanam, na sādhyasiddhyartham, drṣṭāntamātrataḥ sādhyasiddher abhāvāt.* "As to Dharmakīrti's statement: *yathā ghaṭādayaḥ*: To a person for whom a source of knowledge that demonstrates the [essential] connection between 'existence' and 'momentariness' has functioned in a pot and the like the statement of an example is for the sake of restoring his memory [of the essential connection], not for the sake of proving a target property, since it is not the case that a target property is proved solely on the basis of examples." For an English translation, cf. Kano 2011: 237. In my understanding, behind this passage lies Arcaṭa's thought that, because of the non-perceptibility of momentariness, one must apply the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* to the example, otherwise it cannot exhibit its momentariness as the *sādhyadharmā*. It is not until one applies the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* to the example and thereby cognizes it as having that *sādhyadharmā* that it evokes the memory of the essential connection.

The following is a concrete way of finding an example via the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa*: First, in a pot as *provisional* example—'provisional' means that its possession of the *sādhyadharmā* is not yet known at this point—one sees the existence of the *hetu*, which is 'existence.' Second, one applies the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* to this pot in the following manner: "If this pot possessed the opposite property of the *sādhyadharmā* (*sādhyaviparyāya*), namely, 'non-momentariness,' then it would possess the opposite property of the *hetu* (*hetor viparyāya*), i.e., 'non-existence.' However, I now actually see that it possesses 'existence' as a property." By this procedure one knows that the pot is momentary—its 'provisional' possession of the *sādhyadharmā* now becomes 'real' or 'proved'—and one eventually recognizes that it is only because of this pot's possessing *hetu* that the *sādhyadharmā* can exist in this pot. Only such a kind of concomitance/coexistence of the *sādhyadharmā* with the *hetu* can convey the essential connection to those who do not remember or do not know it.

In his *Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*, Ratnakīrti regards such a strategy of using the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* on anything different from the *pakṣa*, e.g., 'a pot and the like,' as representing the *bahirvyāpti* position. Cf. CAPV 130,27–29: *bahirvyāptipakṣe ghaṭe drṣṭāntadharmiṇi viparyāyabādhakapramāṇa-balāt sattvaṃ kṣaṇikatvaniyatam avadhārya sattvāt pakṣe kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ...* For a Japanese translation, cf. Moriyama 2011: 61–62.

¹⁷ With reference to this point, we must recall Dignāga's view about the difference between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa*. Katsura 2003 reports that Dignāga differentiates *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* based on whether it is epistemologically already known (*vidīta*) or not known (*avidīta*) by both proponent and opponent that it possesses a target property. In this regards, Prof. Katsura refers to Jinendrabuddhi's definition of *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa*, cf. Katsura 2003: 25: *yatra sa vidītaḥ sa sapakṣa ity ucyate | yatrāvidītaḥ sa pakṣa iti*. Prof. Katsura explains that, as to the ontological fact that both *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa* possess a target property, there is no difference (*abheda*) between the two, but, as to whether its possessing a target property is epistemologically known or not known, there is a difference (*bheda*). In our case of the inference of momentariness, there cannot be this kind of distinction between *pakṣa* and *sapakṣa*, since its *sādhyā* cannot be known epistemologically.

with an example could also be used to prove that the *pakṣa* itself is momentary. Why then would one not simply apply this inferential argument directly to the *pakṣa* itself, so as to prove directly the *pakṣa*'s momentariness? Thus, Arcaṭa concludes, the search for a non-redundant 'example' is impossible and nonsensical in the *sattvānumāna*.¹⁸

To sum up Arcaṭa's view: it turns out that under the two special conditions that apply in the case of the *sattvānumāna*—namely that 1) the *pakṣa* includes everything, and that 2) the *sādhyadharmā* is by nature non-perceivable—T2 cannot be satisfied, and searching for an example is completely nonsensical. Of course, T2 can be satisfied in inferences other than this one. In those, the example is useful for proving that the *pakṣa* possesses the *sādhyadharmā*, but only in the sense that it can help evoke or communicate the essential connection.¹⁹

¹⁸ HBT 15,25–16,1: *tasmāt svasādhyapratibandhād dhetus tena vyāptaḥ sidhyati. sa ca viparyaya bādhakapramāṇavṛtīyā sādhyadharmiṇy api sidhyatīti na kiñcid anyatrānuvṛtyapekṣayā*. "Therefore, it is on the basis of the [essential] connection with its own target property that the reason property is proven to be pervaded by it [i.e., its own target property.] And, [just like it is in examples], in the *pakṣa* too this [essential connection] is proven on the basis of functioning of a source of knowledge that defeats [the occurrence of the reason property] in loci where the opposite [of the target property is present]. Thus, one can gain nothing by depending upon [inferential reason property's] concomitance/occurrence with/in loci that are different [from the *pakṣa*, i.e., with/in examples]." This part is translated into Japanese and English in Noriyama 2005: 72 and Kano 2011: 238, respectively.

Cf. PVSVT 15,10–13: *tasmāt svasādhyapratibandhād dhetus tena vyāptaḥ sidhyati. sa ca viparyaya bādhakapramāṇavṛtīyā sādhyadharmiṇy api sidhyatīti na kiñcid anyatrānuvṛtyapekṣayā*.

¹⁹ Kaṇakagomin explains: In the *sattvānumāna*, it is indeed useless to depend on *hetu*'s concomitance with loci that are different from *pakṣa*, however, in inferences based on the inferential reason of effect (*kāryahetu*) and that of specific essential feature (*svabhāvahetuviśeṣa*), *hetu*'s concomitance with other sites is of service for evoking the source of knowledge (i.e., perception) that demonstrates the essential connection that was grasped before. Cf. PVSVT 15,18–21: *yat tūcyate kāryahetvapekṣayā svabhāvahetuviśeṣāpekṣayā itad āsāṅkitam, tat tu kṣaṇikatvānumāne sattvāpekṣayā. tasya hi vipakṣabādhakapramāṇavṛtīyāiva gamakatvād iti ... tasmāt pūrvagrūhapratibandhasādhyadharmānumānasmṛtaye hetor anyatra vṛttir apekṣaṇīyā*. "That [matter] which has been doubted (*etad āsāṅkitam*) [namely the matter that, given the first *trainūpya* condition, *hetu* would not be concomitant (*ananvaya/ananuvṛtī*) with sites that are different from *pakṣa*] is said with regard to the inferential reason of effect [and] the inferential reason of specific essential feature, but this [matter is not said] with regard to [the inferential reason property] 'existence' in the case of the inference of momentariness. This is because it [i.e., 'existence'] becomes that which makes [*sādhyā*, i.e., momentariness] known solely by the functioning of a source of knowledge that defeats dissimilar cases... . Therefore, [in other inferences other than the inference of momentariness based on the inferential reason property 'existence,'] *hetu*'s concomitance with other sites [other than *pakṣa*] should be required for evoking the source of knowledge (i.e., perception) that demonstrates the [essential] connection that was grasped before."

This assertion of Kaṇakagomin, in terms of content, corresponds well to Arcaṭa's position as reported by Anantavīrya in his *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā*. Cf. SVinT 350,11f (cited in Shiga 2011:429 [n.38]): *yat punar uktam arcaṭena – sattvasya vipakṣād vyāvṛtteḥ kṣaṇikatvena vyāptisiddhiḥ, na bahirdṛṣṭāntabalena. dṛṣṭāntavacanam tu kāryahetvapekṣayā svabhāvaviśeṣāpekṣayā ca*.

4. Influence of Arcaṭa's arguments on later philosophers

4.1. Concerning the second *trairūpya* condition

In Dignāgean logic, the example is an imperative element of a sound inference, in that it can validate the *hetu* itself. In Dharmakīrtian logic, although it loses its integral function due to the concept of 'essential connection,' it still retains a certain usefulness. However, if Arcaṭa is right, these previous views concerning the significance or role of examples can no longer be held in the case of the *sattvānumāna*. That is, because of the two peculiarities of the *sattvānumāna* (*pakṣa* = everything, imperceptible *sādhyadharmā*), the only way to find a valid example for it is to first provisionally divide the *pakṣa* and then use the *viparyaya bādhakapramāna*. However, because it also seems possible to use this source of knowledge for directly proving that the *pakṣa* possesses the *sādhyadharmā*, one is left to wonder whether these examples are left with any real *significance*. Arcaṭa believes that, in the *sattvānumāna*, an example's *raison d'être* is zero. It seems to me that Buddhist philosophers coming after Arcaṭa who do not agree with his conclusion must solve this problem in some other way.

For example, Ratnakīrti's activity of proving the momentariness of an example via the combination of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* seems to be one answer.²⁰ In his *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, he presents a pot (*ghaṭa*) as his example for the *sattvānumāna*.²¹ His opponent criticizes this, saying that a pot cannot be a similar case, because its momentariness, just like the momentariness of the *pakṣa*,²² is not yet proved. The opponent argues that the pot's momentariness cannot be proved 1) by perception, since perception cannot ascertain momentariness; nor 2) by the *sattvānumāna* itself, since the *sattvānumāna* used for proving a pot's momentariness requires another, further example for itself, and thus there is a fallacy of infinite regress; nor 3) by another inference other than the *sattvānumāna*, since, if another inference were possible, this could itself be used for proving the momentariness of the *pakṣa*, and there would therefore be no need for the *sattvānumāna*.²³ To rebut this, Ratnakīrti proposes the twofold reasoning, i.e., the combination of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, as a new method of proving the momentariness of a pot as his example. By doing so, he insists on the necessity of examples serving as the place where

²⁰ Cf. fn. 23 below.

²¹ KBhS 676 (=KBhS^W 40,5): *ṣaṭ sat tat kṣaṇikam, ṣaṭhā ghaṭaḥ, santaś cāmī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā itī...*

²² The *pakṣa* in Ratnakīrti's formulation (*pratyoga*) is 'these things about which there is a dispute' (*amī vivādāspadībhūtāḥ padārthā*). Cf. fn. 21 above.

²³ Cf. KBhS 6720–26 (=KBhS^W 42,6–9, 43,3–4): *nanu katham asya (=ghaṭasya) sapakṣatvam, pakṣavad atrāpi kṣaṇabhaṅgāsiddheḥ. 1) na hy asya pratyakṣataḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ, tathātvēnāniścaṣyāt. 2) nāpi sattvānumānataḥ, punarnidarśanāntarāpekṣāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt. 3) na cānyad anumānam asti. sambhave vā tenaiva pakṣe 'pi kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddher alaṃ sattvānumāneneti cet. ucyate –anumāntaram eva prasaṅgaprasaṅgaviparyayātmakam ghaṭasya kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhakam pramāṇāntaram asti.* For an English translation and analysis, cf. Woo 1999: 146–147.

pervasion between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’ is established. In my view, behind Ratnakīrti’s activities we can see his intention to give a different answer to the problem Arcaṭa posed²⁴ and to overcome Arcaṭa’s conclusion about the insignificance of the second *trairūpya* condition.²⁵

4.2. Concerning the first *trairūpya* condition

It seems that it is the above-discussed attitude of Arcaṭa toward examples, or T2, and his admitting the application of the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* directly to a *pakṣa* that leads him to be designated an *antarvyāptivādin*.²⁶ An anonymous opponent appearing in Durvekamiśra’s commentary on the HBT designates the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* used for the *sattvānumāna* as ‘the source of knowledge that demonstrates the pervasion that is inclusive’ (*antarvyāptiprasādhakapramāṇa*). This means: the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* establishes the essential connection between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness,’ and the property ‘existence’ is special, in that it pertains to *everything*—which is why the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* proves the momentariness not only of examples but also of the *pakṣa*—and therefore, the *pakṣa* is automatically included in the sphere that ‘existence’ covers. In this way, the pervasion

²⁴ However, Ratnakīrti does not seem to perfectly solve the problem that the combination of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyāya* used to prove the momentariness of a pot as ‘example’ can be also used for proving momentariness of *pakṣa*, which undesirably results in the uselessness of the *sattvānumāna*. It is remarkable that Ratnakīrti does admit this undesirable consequence to some extent. He says: if one does not grow weary of applying the combination of two reasonings to each and every thing, for him it is this combination that proves the momentariness of *pakṣa*, not the *sattvānumāna*; However, if one is afraid of such laborious effort in each case, he only once applies the combination of *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyāya* to one thing, which means he establishes the pervasion. And then he thereby proves the momentariness of other things on the very basis of the *sattvānumāna*. Ratnakīrti’s point is that the latter case is less effortful than the former. However, it is not the case that he negates the former option. Cf. KBhS 69,28–70,6 (=KBhS^w 50,15–18, 51,6–12): *tad evaṃ prasaṅgaprasaṅgaviparyāyahetudvayabalato ghate dr̥ṣṭānte kṣaṇabhaṅgaḥ siddhaḥ. tat katham sattvād anyad anumānam dr̥ṣṭānte kṣaṇabhaṅga-sādhakam nāstīty ucyate. na caivam sattvahetor vaiyarthyam, dr̥ṣṭāntamātra eva prasaṅgaprasaṅgaviparyāyābhyām kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasāadhanāt. nanv ābhyām eva pakṣe ’pi kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhir astv iti cet, astu, ko doṣaḥ. yo hi pratipattā prativastu yad yadā yajjananavṛvavahārayogyam, tat tadā taj janayātīy-ādikam upanyasitum analasaḥ, tasya tata eva kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhiḥ. yas tu prativastu tannyaṅyopanyāsa-prayāsabhīruḥ, sa khalv ekatra dharmiṇi yad yadā yajjananavṛvavahārayogyam tat tadā taj janayātīyādi-nyāyena sattvamātram asthairyavyāptam avadhārya sattvād evānyatra kṣaṇikatvam avagachayātīi katham apramatto vaiyarthyam asyācakṣīta.* For an English translation and analysis, cf. Woo 1999: 161–162.

²⁵ Dharmottara, a pupil of Arcaṭa, also wrestles with this difficult task. He essentially bases himself on Arcaṭa’s mode of thinking that what proves the momentariness of not only examples but also of the *pakṣa* is the same *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa*. However, he sees significance for ‘example’ in some way. I investigate this issue in my paper: “Dharmottara on the *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa* and *trairūpya* in Dharmakīrti’s *sattvānumāna*” (to be published in the Proceedings of the Fifth International Dharmakīrti Conference).

²⁶ Prof. Ono in his paper published in 2004 pays attention to the fact that Yamāri rejects the view that Arcaṭa is an *antarvyāptivādin*. Prof. Ono thinks Yamāri’s rejection suggests the fact that, at the time of Yamāri (around the first half of the 11th century), someone in fact regarded Arcaṭa as *antarvyāptivādin*. Cf. Ono 2004: 472–473.

established by the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* is necessarily inclusive of the *pakṣa*. This means that once the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* functions, the momentariness of the *pakṣa* is established immediately, which amounts to the completion of the proof. For realizing this proof of the momentariness of the *pakṣa*, the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa* alone is sufficient. Asserting this view, the opponent criticizes Arcaṭa, saying that he should give up not only on the usefulness of any example but also on the usefulness of the primal inferential reason property (*maulaḥetu*) itself, namely the first *trairūpya* condition.²⁷

This argument suggests that, at least at the time of Durvekamiśra, Arcaṭa was actually regarded as an advocate of the so-called ‘*antarvyāpti* theory.’ Of course, Durvekamiśra, as a fellow *Buddhist* representative of Arcaṭa, defends the usefulness of the primary reason property ‘existence,’ although Arcaṭa himself does not discuss this matter in the HBT.²⁸ That is, interestingly enough, Arcaṭa is silent about this issue. It is interesting to ponder whether his silence is intentional or not. It seems quite reasonable for later philosophers, whether Buddhist or non-Buddhist, to take Arcaṭa as an advocate of the *antarvyāpti* theory given that they think this is an *intentional* silence.

5. Concluding remark

As a concluding remark I would like to emphasize again the fact that Arcaṭa sees two peculiarities in the *sattvānumāna*: 1) its *pakṣa* being everything, and 2) its *sādhya* being by nature non-perceivable. As discussed, these two points result in the impossibility of finding an actually useful example. In my view, Buddhist philosophers who came after Arcaṭa and were well aware of the Buddhist tradition had to wrestle with this undesirable consequence that Arcaṭa avowed *boldly enough*. As to the second peculiarity, I would like also to emphasize that it is the basis on which Ratnākaraśānti in his *Antarvyāptisamarthana* strictly distinguishes the *sattvānumāna* from other inferences (e.g., an inference of fire from smoke), and that it is thus the reason why he puts forward his theory of *antarvyāpti*.²⁹ In this

²⁷ Cf. HBTĀ 261,16–17: *syād etat – antarvyāptiprasādhakād eva pramāṇād vivādādhyāsitasya dharmiṇas taddharmatvajñānān maulasya hetoḥ katham ativyaktam api vaiyarthyam bhadanta-dharmākaradattena na lakṣitam iti.* “[Objector:] It may be the case that: “On the basis of a source of knowledge that can in fact demonstrates that pervasion is inclusive [of the *pakṣa*], the property possessor about which there is a dispute [namely, the *pakṣa*] is known to have that [i.e., momentariness] as a property. So, why does Venerable [Buddhist] Dharmākaradatta [i.e., Arcaṭa] not indicate that the primary reason property [i.e., ‘existence’] is useless even though its uselessness is obvious?””

Dharmākaradatta is Arcaṭa’s Buddhist name. For this alias of Arcaṭa, cf. HBT Introduction: xi.

²⁸ In this context, Durvekamiśra reports that there is a theoretical difference between Arcaṭa and his pupil Dharmottara in their ways of insisting on the significance of the first *trairūpya* condition. Although I cannot adequately address this issue in this paper, Durvekamiśra’s report is valuable material from which we can learn about the difference in their attitudes toward the *trairūpya* theory in the case of the *sattvānumāna*. I will investigate this issue at the next opportunity.

²⁹ Cf. AVS 64,2–10: *dr̥ṣṭānte gr̥hyate vyāptir dharmayos tatra dr̥ṣṭayoh | hetumātrasya dr̥ṣṭasya vyāptih pakṣe tu gamyate || sā ca sarvopasaṃhārāt sāmānyam avalambate | tasya dharmiṇi vṛttis tu pratīyētānumānataḥ ||*

point, I see a strong and direct link between Arcaṭa and Ratnākaraśānti.

Abbreviations and Literature

PV 1 The First Chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (*svārthānumāna*)(Dharmakīrti): see PVSV.

pratyakṣadr̥ṣṭayor vahnidhūmayoh kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhau tayor vyāptisiddhir iti pratyakṣasiddhe vahnau yuktaṃ anumānavaiphalyaṃ. naivaṃ vyāptisiddheḥ prāk pramāṇāntarasiddhaṃ dharmiṇi kṣaṇikatvaṃ. sādhanadharmam eva tu kevalam anupaśyanto viparyaye bādhakapramāṇabalāt tasya kṣaṇikatvena vyāptiṃ pratīmah. tat kutah sādhanavaiphalyaṃ. “As long as two properties are perceived there [i.e., in an example], pervasion [between these two properties] is grasped in that example. When only an inferential reason property alone is perceived [without its target property], however, its pervasion is understood in a site of inference. And, this [pervasion] depends upon the universals by encompassing all [individual cases]. However, its [i.e., a target property’s] occurrence in the site [of inference] should be understood through inference. When causal relation is established between fire and smoke that have been seen by perception, pervasion between these two is proved. For this reason, it is tenable that inference is useless with regard to fire that has already been established by perception. Unlike above, it is not before pervasion [between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness’] is proved that the momentariness is established in a site of inference by another source of knowledge. Rather, when we are just seeing a proving property only, we understand its pervasion by momentariness by virtue of a source of knowledge that defeats [the occurrence of the proving property] in loci where the opposite [of the target property is present]. Therefore, for what reason is a proof useless?” Also, cf. AVS 82,10–15: *vahnidhūmayos tu nādr̥ṣṭayoh kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhiḥ. tat-siddhau na viparyaye bādhakavṛttir iti dvayadarśanavyapekṣā vahnidhūmayor vyāptisiddhiḥ. sattva-kṣaṇikatvayos tu naivam, yathokanyāyena vyāptyasiddheḥ. tasmāt sattvamātrasya tatra dharmiṇi siddhasya bādhakavaśād vyāptiḥ siddhyatīty eṣitavyam.* “As long as fire and smoke are not perceived, the causal relation [between the two] is not established. If it is established, [then] it is not [necessary] for [a source of knowledge that] defeats [the occurrence of a reason property] in any site where the opposite [of a target property is present] to function. Therefore, establishment of pervasion between fire and smoke is subject to perception of the two [i.e., fire and smoke]. However, this is not the case in the case of [pervasion] between ‘existence’ and ‘momentariness,’ since [their] pervasion cannot be established by the above-mentioned manner [i.e., by perception]. Therefore, it should be understood that pervasion of mere ‘existence’ [namely, existence without momentariness], which has been established in the relevant site [of inference], is proved by the force of the defeating [source of knowledge].” For an English translation, cf. Kajiyama 1999: 115–116, 123.

Ratnākaraśānti differentiates the *sattvānumāna* from other inferences such as an inference of fire from smoke. This difference derives from whether its target property is perceptible. In the *sattvānumāna*, since its target property is not perceptible, it is not possible to grasp the essential connection between *hetu* and *sādhyadharmā* by perceiving the *sādhyadharmā* in an example, as fire might be perceived in the example kitchen. To put it differently, in the case of the inference of momentariness, grasping the essential connection amounts to proving the momentariness itself. It is not until the essential connection is established that momentariness is known. In this sense, ‘example’ does not serve for establishing the essential connection. In this point, Ratnākaraśānti sees a demand for the *viparyaye bādhakapramāṇa*. When this *pramāṇa* establishes the essential connection, at the very same time the existence of a target property in a site of inference is understood. This is his ‘*antarvyāpti*-theory.’

- PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti* (Dharmakīrti): R. Gnoli (ed.), *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with Autocommentary*. Roma 1960.
- PVSVṬ *Pramāṇasavṛttiṭīkā* (Kaṛṇakagomin): R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), *Kaṛṇakagomin's Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikasavṛtti of Dharmakīrti*. Kyoto 1982.
- HB *Hetubindu* (Dharmakīrti): E. Steinkellner (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit Text*. Wien 1967.
- HBṬ *Hetubinduṭīkā* (Arcaṭa): S. Sanghavi and Jinavijayaji (ed.), *Hetubinduṭīkā of Bhaṭṭa Arcaṭa with Sub-Commentary Entitled Āloka of Durveka Miśra*. Baroda 1949.
- HBṬĀ *Hetubinduṭīkāloka* (Durvekamiśra): see HBṬ.
- VN *Vādanīyāya* (Dharmakīrti): M. T. Much (ed.), *Dharmakīrti's Vādanīyāya. Teil I. Sanskrit-Text*. Wien 1991.
- AVS *Antarvyāptisamarthana* (Ratnākaraśānti): see Kajiyama 1999.
- CAPV *Citrādvaitaparakāśavāda* (Ratnakīrti): A. Thakur (ed.), *Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvaliḥ (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti)*. Patna 1975, 129–144.
- KBhS *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (Ratnakīrti): A. Thakur (ed.), *Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvaliḥ (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti)*. Patna 1975, 67–95.
- KBhS^W *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (Ratnakīrti): see Woo 1999.
- TBV *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* (Abhayadevasūri): S. Sanghavi and B. Dośi (ed.), *Sammatitarka-Prakaranam by Siddhasena Divākara with Abhayadevasūrī's Commentary, Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*. 2 vols., Kyoto 1984.
- SVinṬ *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* (Anantavīrya): Mahendra Kumar Jain (ed.), *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā of Śrī Anantavīryāchārya. The Commentary on Siddhiviniścaya and its Vṛtti of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅkadeva*. 2 vols., Varanasi 1959.
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This paper is the product of research which was financially supported in part by the Kansai University Subsidy for Supporting Young Scholars, 2014: “Philological Study of the Sanskrit Manuscripts of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, chapter 2”

<Key words> Arcaṭa, *sattvānumāna*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *trairūpya*, *viparyāye bādhakapramāṇa*

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