

Split-Ticket Voting under the Bicameral System

—How Did Japanese Voters Allocate Their Four Tickets?

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Abstract

Considering features of the Japanese bicameral legislature and the electoral systems, this study argues that Japanese voters strategically place the four total votes to which they are entitled, two for the Lower House and two for the Upper House election. The view is that Japanese voters are “balancing votes” by voting for different parties in various elections in an attempt to balance the power between the Lower House and Upper House or between ruling and opposition parties. That is, assume that a group of voters are split-ticket voting within one election when voting for the Lower or Upper House, while other groups are split-ticket voting between elections.

The analysis shows that the Japanese split-ticket voting is essentially “forced” onto the voters; however, the voting is also a result of the voters’ decision to balance their votes, in that voters use their four votes according to circumstances. On the basis of this result, split-ticket voting in the bicameral system must take into account the split-ticket voting between elections as well as the split-ticket voting within one election.

Key words: Split-Ticket Voting, Mixed Member Majoritarian system, Japanese election system

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1. Introduction

In 1994, the new electoral system was introduced to the Japanese House of Representatives (Lower House). Under the new system, 300 members are elected from the single-member districts (SMD) and 180 members are elected by the proportional representation (PR). Because these two operate independently in the selection of the members, this new system is called the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system. Under the Japanese MMM, the voter casts two vote: one for a candidate in SMD and the other for a party list in PR. Thus the new system allows split-ticket voting, which is able to support a different party in the two components of the contest, if they wish.

Japan has also adopted the bicameral system. The Japanese House of Councillors (Upper House) is held significant political power in the policy making process, and all its members are elected by the MMM electoral system, in the same way the House of Representatives (Lower House) members are elected. Therefore, UH electoral system also gives Japanese voters the opportunity of the split ticket voting. They are well aware that the results of the Upper House election bring about a significant change in Japanese politics, because the Upper House is so powerful. In fact, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) could not secure a majority of seats for the elections held in 1977, 1989, and 2007, and subsequently Japanese politics faced major changes. Moreover, the elections for the Lower and Upper Houses are held frequently, and they only take a short period of time during which the political-economic factors such as the socio-economic environment, political party leaders, political party support rates do not change much (Table 1).

Considering such features of the Japanese bicameral legislature and the electoral systems, this paper argues that Japanese voters strategically place the four votes they are entitled to in total, two for the Lower House election (LH election) and two for the Upper House (UH election). The view

Table 1 Date of Japanese LH and UH election

Election	Date	Span(Month)
1996 LH	20-Oct-96	
1998 UH	12-Jul-98	21
2000 LH	25-Jun-00	24
2001 UH	29-Jul-01	13
2003 LH	9-Nov-03	28
2004 UH	11-Jul-04	8
2005 LH	11-Sep-05	14
2007 UH	29-Jul-07	23
2009 LH	30-Aug-09	25

is that Japanese voters are “balancing votes” (Fiorina 2002) by voting for different parties in various elections in an attempt to balance the power between LH and UH or ruling and opposite party. In other words, it is assumed that a group of voters are split-ticket voting within one election when voting for the Lower or Upper House, while another groups are split-ticket voting between the elections.

In Japan, where the secondary House holds significant political power, some voters change the vote between the Lower House and the Upper House, regardless of the fact that there are no changes in party supports and policy preferences. Furthermore, such voters are deliberately balancing votes by accounting for how they affect the power balance. This paper argues these points through the analysis of the Japanese Election Study III (JESIII) panel survey data⁽¹⁾.

The analysis of this paper focuses on the voting behavior in the 2003 Lower House election (LH election) and the 2004 Upper House election (UH election). These two elections were held only eight months apart, and there were no significant differences in their electoral results. Therefore, they are appropriate for analyzing the points this paper focuses on.

2. The “forced” split-ticket

Both the 2003 Lower House (LH) election and the 2004 Upper House (UH) election resulted in wins for the Democratic Party Japan (DPJ), and defeat for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The DPJ gained more votes and seats especially in the proportional representation section, whereas the LDP lost seats in each of the two elections, and could not by itself maintain a majority of seats. However, the LDP managed to maintain a majority of seats by forming a coalition government with the Clean Government Party (CGP), and a regime change did not occur. In terms of the share of party specific or system specific votes, the DPJ outperformed the LDP in the Lower House Proportional Representation (PR) and the 2004 Upper House electoral district and PR (Table 2). The striking feature of these results are that the CGP did not gain substantial votes in the Single Member District (SMD) nor the Mixed Member District (MMD), but succeeded in winning a large share of votes in PR. This point explains most of the split-ticket voting in Japan.

Hirano (2007) analyzed the 2001 UH election and the 2003 LH election, and argued that in most cases in Japan, the voters were forced to opt for the split-ticket voting. Supporters of the party that do not field a candidate in some constituencies, inevitably, have to vote for a different party in the

(1) The Japanese Election Study III was conducted by Ken'ichi Ikeda, Yoshiaki Kobayashi, and Hiroshi Hirano. The project is supported by the Specially Promoted Research on Science (Ministry of Education). The survey was done before and after the House of Councilors election in July 2001 and 2004, and before and after the House of Representatives Election in June 2003 and 2005.

Table 2 Result of 2003LH and 2004 UH election

	2003 LH		2004 UH	
	SMD	PR	MMD	PR
LDP	43.85	34.96	35.08	30.03
DPJ	36.66	37.39	39.09	37.79
CGP	1.49	14.78	3.85	15.41
JCP	8.13	7.76	9.84	7.8
SDP	2.87	5.12	1.75	5.35
Others	7.0	0.0	10.15	3.62

Single Member District (SMD) and Proportional Representation (PR). In fact, it is shown that the straight ticket voting option is chosen in many cases for the LDP, the DPJ and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) which field candidates in many electoral districts and the split ticket voting is chosen in many cases for other parties. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that the parties which voters support do not field any candidate in most electoral districts, and therefore the Japanese voters are “forced” to choose the split ticket voting.

When examining the Proportional Representation (PR) voting patterns in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH election, it is clear that this tendency of a “forced” split ticket is also observed in the 2004 UH election. (Table 3, Table 4) The columns are the votes for the Proportional Representation (PR), and the rows are the votes for the Single Member District (SMD). Within each box, the upper row (numbers in larger fonts) are the ratio within the total votes, and the lower row (numbers in smaller fonts) are the ratio within the Proportional Representation (PR) votes. For example, Table 3 shows that the LDP’s straight voters were 36.5% within the total voters. The table also shows that 82.6% of those who voted for the LDP in the Proportional Representation (PR) voted for the LDP in the Single Member District (SMD).

When observing the split ticket voting pattern in the 2003 LH election, voting for the CGP in PR and the LDP in SMD was the most popular pattern, comprising 7.01% of the total, and voting for the DPJ in PR and voting for the LDP in SMD was the second most popular pattern, comprising 5.89% of total. Also, it is possible to see that 76.69% of those who voted for for the CGP in PR voted for the LDP in SMD, and 37.31% of those who voted for the Social Democratic Party (SDP) in PR voted for the DPJ in SMD. Moreover, those who voted for the DPJ in PR and the LDP in SMD were 15.51%, while voters who voted for the LDP in PR and the DPJ in SMD were 6.09%.

In the 2004 UH election, the most popular pattern, comprising 5.8%, was to vote for the CGP in PR and the LDP in SMD, and the next most popular pattern, comprising 3.54%, was to vote for the DPJ in PR and the LDP in SMD. 50.28% of voters who voted for the CGP in PR voted for the LDP in SMD, and 50.28% of voters who voted for the SDP in PR voted for the DPJ in SMD,

Table 3 Split-Ticket Voting in 2003 LH Election

SMD	PR					N
	LDP	DPJ	CGP	SDP	JCP	
LDP	36.51%	5.89%	7.01%	0.62%	0.39%	899
	82.61%	15.51%	76.69%	16.42%	7.95%	
DPJ	2.69%	27.59%	0.90%	1.40%	0.95%	598
	6.09%	72.67%	9.82%	37.31%	19.32%	
CGP	1.23%	0.28%	0.84%	0.00%	0.00%	42
	2.79%	0.74%	9.20%	0.00%	0.00%	
SDP	0.28%	1.35%	0.00%	1.35%	0.17%	56
	0.63%	3.55%	0.00%	35.82%	3.41%	
JCP	0.28%	0.90%	0.06%	0.28%	3.37%	87
	0.63%	2.36%	0.61%	7.46%	68.18%	
NCP	0.90%	0.28%	0.06%	0.00%	0.00%	22
	2.03%	0.74%	0.61%	0.00%	0.00%	
Others	0.22%	0.45%	0.06%	0.11%	0.00%	15
	0.51%	1.18%	0.61%	2.99%	0.00%	
Independent	2.08%	1.23%	0.22%	0.00%	0.06%	64
	4.70%	3.25%	2.45%	0.00%	1.14%	
N	788	677	163	67	88	1783

Table 4 Split-Ticket Voting in 2004 UH Election

SMD	PR					Others	N
	LDP	DPJ	CGP	SDP	JCP		
LDP	29.92%	3.54%	5.84%	0.26%	0.20%	0.26%	610
	82.46%	8.61%	50.28%	6.78%	3.66%	15.38%	
DPJ	3.02%	31.96%	1.51%	1.51%	0.66%	0.26%	593
	8.32%	77.67%	12.99%	38.98%	12.20%	15.38%	
CGP	0.33%	0.07%	2.69%	0.00%	0.07%	0.00%	48
	0.90%	0.16%	23.16%	0.00%	1.22%	0.00%	
SDP	0.13%	0.66%	0.07%	0.79%	0.00%	0.00%	25
	0.36%	1.59%	0.56%	20.34%	0.00%	0.00%	
JCP	0.33%	0.66%	0.39%	0.72%	4.00%	0.46%	100
	0.90%	1.59%	3.39%	18.64%	74.39%	26.92%	
Others	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.07%	1
	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	3.85%	
Independent	2.56%	4.27%	1.12%	0.59%	0.46%	0.66%	147
	7.05%	10.37%	9.60%	15.25%	8.54%	38.46%	
N	553	627	177	59	82	26	1524

showing the same tendency as the 2003 LH election result. However, the ratio of those who voted for the DPJ in PR and the LDP in SMD has slightly decreased from the 2003 LH election period, and in contrast the ratio of those who voted for the LDP in PR and the DPJ in SMD has increased to 8.32%.

Table 5 compiled a restricted data of reasons why the voters who opted for the split-ticket voting chose such options. For the 2003 and 2004 elections, the most popular reason for choosing the split ticket voting was that “There is no candidate from the party I support in my constituency”. The second most popular reason was that “I chose for whom to vote regardless of candidate’s affiliate party”, and the third was that “In the proportional-representation district, there is a candidate I support”. The ratio of so-called “strategic voters” who vote for the candidate who have a reasonable chance of winning was the least popular in both elections.

Table 6 and Table 7 compiled the reasons for why voters decided to vote for particular candidate in both SMD and PR. Data for the straight ticket voters were separated from the data for the split ticket voters.

In the 2003 SMD, the reasons for why the straight ticket voters decided on a particular candidate, in the following order, were: “support for the party”, “the candidate’s personality”, and “each party’s policy”. The reasons for the split ticket voters, in the following order, were “the candidate’s personality”, “support for the party”, and “benefit for the local area”. In the 2003 PR, the reasons for why the straight ticket voters decided on a particular candidate, in the following order, were: “support for the party”, “party policy”, and the “support for the party”. The reason for the split ticket voters, in the following order, were “party policy”, “support for the party”, and “balance for the seats in the house”. In the 2004 UH election SMD, the straight ticket voter’s reason for deciding on a particular candidate were, in the following order: “support for the party”, “the candidate’s per-

Table 5 The reason to split ticket

	2003	2004
There is no candidate from the party I support in my constituency	41.4	35.6
In my constituency, the candidate from the party I support probably win	7.2	4.3
In my constituency, the candidate from the party I support probably Lose	2.9	2.6
In the proportional-representation district, there is a candidate I support	13.6	12.0
I chose for whom to vote regardless of candidate’s affiliate party	18.0	17.2
I considered the balance of the seats	5.5	10.3
Others	7.0	13.3
DK	2.6	2.1
NA	1.7	2.6
N	345	233.0

Table 6 Reason for vote in 2003 (N=1750)

	SMD		PR	
	Straight	Split	Straight	Split
Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet	6.8%	6.1%	9.4%	7.5%
Support for the party	41.2%	16.1%	47.4%	31.1%
Each party's policy	9.5%	6.8%	16.2%	21.1%
Personality of the candidate	17.9%	29.2%	6.0%	3.6%
Candidate's policy	4.5%	5.7%	2.3%	4.4%
Benefit for the workplace	0.8%	1.9%	0.9%	0.4%
Benefit for the local area	8.3%	13.4%	5.6%	3.6%
Balance of the seats in the House	5.2%	7.6%	7.9%	12.7%
Request (s) to vote for the candidate	2.3%	8.1%	2.3%	11.5%
Other	3.5%	5.1%	1.8%	4.0%

Table 7 Reason for vote in 2004 (N=1469)

	MMD		PR	
	Straight	Split	Straight	Split
Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet	5.7%	3.9%	7.1%	7.6%
Support for the party	53.8%	26.7%	54.8%	32.8%
Each party's policy	7.9%	5.3%	12.6%	12.6%
Personality of the candidate	11.9%	23.0%	4.6%	9.4%
Candidate's policy	4.3%	10.1%	3.2%	3.1%
Benefit for the workplace	0.7%	1.8%	1.5%	1.8%
Benefit for the local area	2.9%	6.4%	2.2%	3.4%
Balance of the seats in the House	6.3%	6.4%	6.8%	8.3%
Request(s) to vote for the candidate	4.2%	10.8%	4.8%	17.1%
Other	2.4%	5.5%	2.3%	3.8%

sonality”, and “each party’s policy”, whereas the reasons for the split ticket voters were, in the following order, “support for the party”, “the candidate’s personality”, and “request(s) to vote for the candidate”. In the 2004 PR, the straight ticket voter listed the reasons, in the following order: “support for the party”, “each party’s policy” and “support for the party leader”, whereas the split ticket voter listed the reasons, in the following order: “support for the party”, “request(s) to vote for the candidate”, and “each party’s policy”.

As these data indicate, the split-ticket voting in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH election were “forced” onto the voters. With regards to the determining reasons for votes, many split ticket voters responded that they were “requested to vote for a particular candidate”, in addition to responding that support for a particular candidate or the evaluation of the candidates became the

determining factors. From this, it is possible to conclude that a large proportion of the voters whose supporting party do not field any candidate in their SMD were requested by the supporters of a particular party to vote for that party, and as a result opted for the split ticket voting.

When overviewing the total picture in this way, it appears that the balancing of votes, the major argument of this paper, has not taken place. However, there is another possibility when focusing the analysis on the voters who were not “forced” to opt for the split ticket voting. Therefore, the analysis of next section limits the samples who voted for the LDP and the DPJ, which fielded candidates in most SMDs, and examines the reasons why such voters opted for either straight ticket voting or the split ticket voting.

3. Balance voting

Why did voters who were not forced to take the split ticket voting option decided to choose the split ticket voting? Also, how did voters manage to use the two votes for the LH election and the two votes for the UH election according to the circumstances? This section limits the samples who voted for the LDP or the DPJ in both SMDs and PR in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH election⁽²⁾.

Initially, a cross tally was conducted for the options of the straight ticket voting and the split ticket voting in the 2003 LH election and the 2004 UH election (Table 8).

Those who opted for the straight ticket voting for both elections were 84.2%, and those who opted for the split ticket voting in one of the elections or both were 15.8%. It should be noted that the samples include those who opted for straight voting for the LDP in the 2003 LH election, and for the DPJ in the 2004 UH election (or the reverse pattern). Such samples were 49, and their ratio was 8.1%. Following this, those who voted in the same party for all of the four votes comprised 76.1%, and those who voted for a different party for one of the four votes comprised 23.9%.

Table 8 Straight-Split in 2003 and 2004

2003	2004		N
	Straight	Split	
Straight	84.2%	5.0%	537
Split	9.3%	1.5%	65
N	563	39	602

(2) The sample is 602. In later analysis, the sample size will be smaller because there are many samples that do not respond to the specific questions used for the analysis.

Next, Table 9 illustrates the patterns of how the voters allocated the four votes ⁽³⁾.

With regards to the allocation pattern, there are 16 patterns altogether, because there are two options (the LDP or the DPJ) and four opportunities for voting. The patterns are calculated using the following formula: $2^4=16$. The compositions of these are the following. Those who voted for the LDP for all of the four votes (the LDP straight) comprise 43.7%, and those who voted for the DPJ for all of the four votes comprise 32.4%. Those who voted for a different party for one or two votes (split ticket voter) comprise 23.9%. Also, because the LDLD pattern and the DLDL pattern are identical voting patterns in the two elections, the voters who changed the voting pattern (called the “voters with change of pattern”) comprise 22.8%.

Therefore, the reasons for deciding the party to vote for, was compiled for each of the 3 (4) voting patterns (Table 10).

The DPJ straight voters consider the party support, the party policy and the balance of seats as important factors, whereas the LDP straight voters consider the party support, evaluation of the party leader and the candidate important. The proportion of the party support emphasis by the split ticket voters is relatively low, and they tend to consider the candidate important in SMDs, and the party’s policy and the balance of seats important in PR.

Table 11, Table 12 and Table 13 illustrates the perceptions of the “voters with change of pattern” regarding the election results or the regime patterns. Table 11 shows the degree of satisfaction with the 2003 LH election results. It is presumed that the voting patterns changed due to dissatisfactions with the 2003 LH election results, but such a tendency is not found. Instead, the voters who were dissatisfied were the DPJ straight voters.

Table 12 illustrates voters’ ideas about the most desirable regime patterns. In contrast to the the LDP’s straight voters or the DPJ’s straight voters wishing for the the LDP centered regime or the DPJ centered regime respectively, it is clear that the “voters with change of pattern” did not refuse neither the LDP nor the DPJ.

Table 13 illustrates voters’ ideas about the balance of the seats between the Lower House and the Upper House. Half or more than half of the the LDP straight voters responded that it is desir-

Table 9 Pattern of voting

LLLL	43.7
LLLD	2.3
LLDL	1.7
LDLL	1.2
DLLL	2.3
LLDD	6.1
LDLD	1.0
LDDL	.3
DDLL	2.0
DLLD	.0
DLDL	.2
DDDL	.7
DDLD	.3
DLDD	1.5
LDDD	4.3
DDDD	32.4
N	602

(3) From left, the votes for SMDs in the 2003 LH, PR in 2003 LH, MMD in the 2004 UH, PR in the 2004 UH are shown.

Table 10 Reason for vote (3 categories)

		2003 SMD	2003 PR	2004 MMD	2004 PR
LDP straight	Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet	13.3	16.0	9.5	10.6
	Support for the party	46.0	52.5	64.3	65.8
	Each party's policy	1.9	7.2	1.9	4.9
	Personality of the candidate	18.6	6.8	10.3	3.0
	Candidate's policy	2.3	1.1	1.1	1.5
	Benefit for the workplace	.8	.4	.8	1.1
	Benefit for the local area	11.8	9.5	4.2	3.8
	Balance of the seats in the House	.4	1.9	1.1	.4
	Request(s) to vote for the candidate	1.9	3.0	4.2	6.1
	Other	2.3		.8	.4
	DK		1.5	1.5	2.3
	NA	.8		.4	
	Total		100.0	100.0	100.0
		2003 SMD	2003 PR	2004 MMD	2004 PR
DPJ straight	Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet	3.6	5.1	1.0	2.6
	Support for the party	43.6	42.6	54.9	56.9
	Each party's policy	14.4	24.1	11.3	11.3
	Personality of the candidate	13.3	5.6	11.3	4.1
	Candidate's policy	6.7	2.6	3.1	3.6
	Benefit for the workplace			.5	1.5
	Benefit for the local area	1.5	1.0	1.0	
	Balance of the seats in the House	11.8	14.9	12.3	13.8
	Request(s) to vote for the candidate	.5		1.5	1.5
	Other	4.1	3.6	2.1	3.1
	DK	.5	.5	1.0	1.0
	NA				.5
	Total		100.0	100.0	100.0
		2003 SMD	2003 PR	2004 MMD	2004 PR
split	Support for the Prime Minister and/or the Cabinet	5.6	9.7	5.6	8.3
	Support for the party	24.3	38.2	38.9	44.4
	Each party's policy	6.9	17.4	5.6	12.5
	Personality of the candidate	32.6	2.8	16.7	4.2
	Candidate's policy	1.4	3.5	5.6	4.2
	Benefit for the workplace	3.5	2.8	1.4	2.1
	Benefit for the local area	15.3	5.6	5.6	.7
	Balance of the seats in the House	2.1	11.1	12.5	10.4
	Request(s) to vote for the candidate	2.1	2.8	2.8	4.9
	Other	3.5	3.5	2.1	2.1
	DK	.7	1.4	2.8	4.2
	NA	2.1	1.4	.7	2.1
	Total		100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 11 Satisfaction with the result of House of Representatives Election (N=580)

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Can't say	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
LDP	7.5%	42.9%	33.1%	14.6%	2.0%
DPJ	3.1%	34.2%	23.8%	31.6%	7.3%
change	3.8%	37.6%	36.1%	18.8%	3.8%

Table 12 Opinion on the form of coalition (N=498)

	Single LDP government	Coalition government with LDP excluding DPJ	Coalition government including LDP and DPJ	Coalition government excluding LDP	other
LDP	38.8%	37.5%	20.1%	2.7%	0.9%
DPJ	2.4%	4.2%	43.0%	39.4%	10.9%
change	18.3%	16.5%	52.3%	10.1%	2.8%

Table 13 Do you think the balance of seats between the parties should be relatively the same between the House of Councilors and the House of Representatives? (N=553)

	They should be the same	They should be different	Can't say either way
LDP	53.3%	29.3%	17.4%
DPJ	42.1%	36.1%	21.9%
change	35.9%	39.8%	24.2%

able to have the same balance. On the other hand, almost 40% of the “voters with change of patterns” responded that it is more desirable if the balance were different. A relatively high proportion of the DPJ straight voters also responded that it is more preferable if the balances were different.

Based on these basic compilations of data as the precondition, a multinomial logistic analysis was conducted. The analyses are twofold. In Analysis 1, the dependent variables are “the LDP straight voter”, “the DPJ straight voter” and “split ticket voter” respectively. In Analysis 2, the dependent variables are “the LDP straight voter”, “the DPJ straight voter”, and “voters with change of pattern” respectively. The basic category in both analyses is the “the LDP straight voter”. An identical independent variable is used for both analyses. Firstly, with regard to the party support, it is suggested that the independent voters opt for the split ticket voting. The attitudes towards the seats gained by the LDP and the DPJ in the 2003 LH election are also likely to be influential. In any case, any voter who thinks that “the party gained too many (or too few) seats” is likely to change their voting pattern. The most important factor for this paper is the reason for deciding which party

to vote for. The more the voter emphasizes the “balance of seats in the House”, the more likely that such a voter opts for the split ticket vote or changes the voting pattern⁽⁴⁾.

The change of voting pattern depends on the voters’ shift in attitudes between elections. It is presumed that the changes in party support and changes in individual policy preference bring about the split ticket or the change of pattern. In addition, a change in the voter’s individual living standards also influences the changes in voting patterns. Gender and age are used as the control variables.

The result of Analysis 1 is shown in Table 14, and the result of Analysis 2 is shown in Table 15. Table 14 illustrates that the split ticket voting is chosen by the DPJ supporters or voters who emphasize the importance of candidates or the balance of seats, or those who consider that the seats gained by the DPJ in the 2003 LH election were too few or appropriate. The table also illustrates that the split ticket voting is chosen by voters who changed the party to support. Table 15 illustrates that the “voters with the change of pattern” are the DPJ supporters, or voters who emphasize the importance of balancing seats, or those who consider that the seats gained by the DPJ in the 2003 LH election were too few or appropriate. The table also illustrates that the “voters with the change of pattern” are the voters who changed the party to support. The changes in individual policy preference or the perceptions on the seats gained by the LDP had no impact. Furthermore, the voter being an independent voter did connect with the split ticket voting.

In addition, it is clear from Table 14 that in comparison with with the LDP straight voters, the DPJ straight voters are the DPJ supporters and voters who decides on the voting candidate by considering the balance of seats, who considers that the LDP gained too much seats and the DPJ gained too few seats in the 2003 LH election, and who also changed the policy preference regarding the constitutional amendment. Table 15 illustrates that it is also possible for indpenednet voters to become straight voters.

The balancing votes, mainly by relying on the balancing of seats as the reason for determining votes, significantly influenced both the split ticket voting and the change of voting patterns. Thus considering the balance of political power between the Lower House and Upper House by voters is one of the major explanatory factors for split ticket voting in Japan.

(4) With regard to the “party” which became the reason for deterring the vote, if the voter selected “support for the party leader”, “support for the party”, or “each party’s policy” once or more, the dummy variable is “1”, and in all other cases the dummy variable is “0”. With regard to the “candidate” which became the reason for deterring the vote, if the voter selected “personality of the candidate” or “candidate’s policy once or more, the dummy variable is “1” and in all other cases the dummy variable is “0”.

Table 14 multinomial logistic Regression analysis -1

			B	Sig	S.E.	
Split	gender	male	-.787	.095	.471	
		age	20-29	1.079	.290	1.019
			30-39	1.073	.100	.653
			40-49	1.787	.030	.824
			50-59	1.557	.010	.608
	party support	independent	.520	.499	.770	
		DPJ	3.650	.001	1.147	
		change	1.524	.021	.661	
	Reason of vote	party	.073	.908	.638	
		candidate	.871	.047	.439	
		balance	2.481	.001	.745	
	LDP seat share 2003	more	-.301	.718	.834	
		just enough	-.017	.982	.760	
	DPJ seat share 2003	more	4.448	.000	.919	
		enough	2.255	.003	.753	
packet book	worsen	-.203	.662	.466		
	keep intact	-.279	.734	.822		
changed policy preference	economic	.511	.249	.443		
	welfare	.499	.260	.443		
	constitution	.703	.104	.432		
	self-defence	-.384	.378	.435		
	constant	-4.752	.000	1.349		
DPJ	gender	male	-.734	.201	.574	
		age	20-29	.567	.668	1.319
			30-39	1.029	.215	.831
			40-49	2.484	.008	.941
			50-59	1.639	.023	.719
	party support	independent	2.149	.009	.824	
		DPJ	6.105	.000	1.192	
		change	.587	.414	.718	
	Reason of vote	party	.095	.900	.757	
		candidate	.852	.123	.552	
		balance	2.403	.004	.834	
	LDP seat share 2003	more	-2.440	.022	1.062	
		enough	-1.231	.116	.782	
	DPJ seat share 2003	more	4.536	.000	1.126	
		enough	1.509	.130	.998	
packet book	worsen	-.006	.991	.568		
	keep intact	-.746	.472	1.036		
changed policy preference	economic	.652	.224	.537		
	welfare	-.134	.801	.530		
	constitution	1.329	.012	.529		
	self-defence	-.202	.705	.533		
	constant	-4.745	.003	1.620		

Table 15 multinomial logistic Regression analysis -2

			B	Sig.	S.E.	
Split	gender	male	-.882	.064	.477	
		age	20-29	1.090	.287	1.024
			30-39	1.006	.131	.667
			40-49	1.763	.032	.822
			50-59	1.381	.026	.622
	party support	independent	.591	.444	.772	
		DPJ	3.700	.001	1.158	
		change	1.480	.027	.671	
	Reason of vote	party	-.036	.955	.637	
		candidate	.790	.075	.443	
		balance	2.418	.001	.742	
	LDP seat share 2003	more	-.298	.724	.843	
		enough	-.066	.932	.771	
	DPJ seat share 2003	more	4.389	.000	.912	
		enough	2.224	.003	.749	
	packet book	worsen	-.176	.708	.469	
		keep intact	-.317	.710	.852	
changed policy preference	economic	.480	.281	.446		
	welfare	.415	.352	.446		
	constitution	.813	.065	.441		
	self-defence	-.462	.296	.442		
	constant	-4.453	.001	1.356		
DPJ	gender	male	-.793	.173	.582	
		age	20-29	.507	.704	1.337
			30-39	.918	.279	.848
			40-49	2.435	.010	.944
			50-59	1.424	.051	.731
	party support	independent	2.245	.007	.831	
		DPJ	6.262	.000	1.208	
		change	.484	.507	.730	
	Reason of vote	party	.100	.896	.764	
		candidate	.932	.098	.563	
		balance	2.517	.003	.834	
	LDP seat share 2003	more	-2.466	.020	1.061	
		enough	-1.315	.096	.791	
	DPJ seat share 2003	more	4.567	.000	1.130	
		enough	1.528	.129	1.005	
	packet book	worsen	.119	.835	.573	
		keep intact	-.828	.438	1.067	
changed policy preference	economic	.535	.323	.542		
	welfare	-.158	.768	.535		
	constitution	1.368	.011	.539		
	self-defence	-.305	.573	.541		
	constant	-4.628	.005	1.638		

Nagelkerke-Rsq: .751

N=304

4. Conclusion

In Japan, where the secondary House is powerful, voters demand a balance of power and choose their voting behavior according to such a perception. Because of this, the voting behavior in the LH election is inevitably affected to a certain degree by the UH elections, and the voting behavior in the UH election is inevitably affected by the LH elections respectively. Moreover, Japan adopted the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) electoral system for both the Lower House and the Upper House. Due to the adoption of MMM, the split ticket voting in Japanese elections offer the option of how to use the four votes, not the option of how to use only two votes.

The analysis of this paper clarified that the Japanese split ticket voting are basically “forced” onto the voters, but on the other hand the split ticket voting is also a result of the voters’ balancing of votes, from the perspective that voters use four votes according to circumstances. According to this result, the split ticket voting in the bicameral system must take into account the split ticket voting between elections, not only the split ticket voting within one election.

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