

Simon de Montfort's Administration in Gascony, 1248–1252

The Angevin Empire, established by the marriage between Henry Plantagenet and Eleanor of Aquitaine in the middle of the twelfth century, has been considered to have been dissolved by Philip Augustus' seizure of Normandy between 1202 and 1204. Its legacy, however, did exist at least till the treaty of Paris in 1259, agreed to by Henry III and Louis IX. Were Plantagenet dominions on the continent, such as Gascony, a private property of the house of Plantagenet? Or were they a feudal tenement held by English monarchs from French kings? If the latter was the case, why could the king of Navarre or Aragon claim to dominate Gascony in the first half of the thirteenth century? On the other hand, was there a kind of local lords' community in Gascony, which was independent from the outer or superior authority? Did the Stauffer Emperor claim the overlordship of Gascon lords? Reflecting on these questions, I expect to achieve a clearer image of the power structure of Western Europe in the middle of the thirteenth century in this chapter.

On what ground did Henry III claim his right of lordship or administration of Gascony after 1204, the year of Normandy's loss? Was the military power of the English king mighty enough to overwhelm the turbulence in Gascony? Was the sense of allegiance of Gascon lords and town communities to the Plantagenets the main ground of English domination in southwest France? Why wasn't there any cross-sectional community of local lords and towns independent from external overlords? Why did Gascons have more sense of allegiance to Plantagenet

kings than to Capetian monarchs?

What kind of significance does Henry III's nomination of Simon de Montfort, earl of Leicester, as a seneschal of Gascony have in 1248? Until that year, most of the seneschals before Simon had been king's household members. What kind of administration did Henry III expect his major feudal tenant to conduct? What 'resentments' resulting from Simon's administration gave rise to the rebellion of the Gascons? Why did they oppose the policy of Simon? Why did they feel allegiance to Henry? What kind of administration did they expect from the seneschal? Concerning these questions researchers have so far tried to find an answer in the process of power politics of the Capetians and the Plantagenets¹. The present chapter, however, will reexamine the records of the Gascon lords' complaints against Simon's policy. Reading the images of government from these records will give us a better idea of the complex power structure of the Angevin Empire, French monarchy, and the German Empire in Western Europe in the thirteenth century.

1. Rule of Gascony by Simon de Montfort, 1248–1252

Simon de Montfort received the governorship of Gascony by May 11, 1248, from Henry III. The king granted the earl custody of Gascony for seven years with the condition that Henry should deliver to the seneschal 'at his own expense' fifty knights a year, two thousand marks, and take responsibility for any war that might eventually arise against the neighbouring kings². After reaching Bordeaux around July 30, 1248, Simon started touring the Provinces³. Each of the tours was an apparent success. He had several bandits of petty lords or burgesses arrested without trial, made them hand over their fortresses,

and took heavy ransoms from them before release⁴. A few months before December 1248, Simon had chastised the rebels in Gascony⁵. When he arrived at Westminster during the Christmas festivities, Henry received him joyfully. In early June of the following year he returned to Gascony⁶.

In order to understand certain characteristics of Simon's administration in Gascony, I will analyse several kind of documents, including agreements after the rebellions, complaints submitted by local nobles to the king of England, pacification order from the king, and so on. First I will trace the brief history of rebellion against Simon's policy in Gascony. Second, feudal relation between the king of England and the Gascon nobles and towns will be examined. Thirdly, I will read some documents to analyse what Simon's rule tried to introduce into administration of Gascony. In the conclusion we will see the difference between Henry's rule and Simon's administration.

(1) Turbulence between two parties of burgesses in Bordeaux in 1249

On June 28, 1249, violent dissent broke out in Bordeaux. The two leading burgess families in Bordeaux, *Les Soler* and *Les Colom*, had been fighting each other concerning the leadership of city politics. Simon, immediately after his arrival in Gascony, made these two families keep peace and have representatives of both factions enter his council⁷. The immediate causes are not known. The rebellion broke out abruptly this time. Simon dashed in to the fight. The partisans of the Coloms immediately put themselves under his orders. But the enemy faction, the Desolers, acting in cooperation with the mayor, marched against the Colom party. Rostein del Soler, leader of the Soler party, was repulsed and surrendered to Simon. The earl seized the posses-

sions of Rostein. Several of the insurgents fled to escape these drastic measures of suppression. Simon publicly announced that those who had fled could return in security, if they undertook to present themselves before the judges.

The Soler party sent two delegates to the king of England, complaining of Simon's conduct toward them. Henry appeared to sympathise with their misfortune and ordered on September 5, 1249, that their goods should be restored⁸. But two months later, after hearing the Colom parties' information, Henry changed his mind⁹. He thanked Simon for his loyalty and his diligence. He only put the following advice at the end of his letter to Simon, that 'the punishment be not greater than the offence'¹⁰. So Simon was given a free hand¹¹. After he obtained subsidies from the king, at the end of May, 1250¹², he returned to Gascony¹³. On November 27, the burgesses of Bordeaux, who had been treated harshly the year before, had to resign themselves to 'a treaty' Simon imposed upon them¹⁴. The document will be examined in detail later in this chapter.

(2) A treaty on May 25, 1251 between Simon and the Gascon nobles¹⁵

Beside municipal rebels, there were more powerful and rebellious lords, resentful of Simon's administration in Gascony¹⁶. Early in January 1251, there was a rising of Amanieu d'Albret against the earl. Simon left France and arrived in England demanding troops and money from the king¹⁷. Henry did not refuse help, but he alerted Simon that there were complaints about his administration in Gascony. Simon denied everything. The king delivered money to the seneschal and at the same time sent commissioners of inquiry to search out the cause of the disagreement between Simon and the king's subjects

there¹⁸.

Simon embarked for Gascony at the beginning of March. After he seized Castillon, he received a letter from Amanieu d'Albret in the presence of Bernard de Bouville, vicomte of Bénauges, and the other local lords and burgesses¹⁹. They complained of the earl, but the earl refused the arbitration prepared by them. Simon occupied Castillon and destroyed Lados. So the league of Gascons had to submit to his terms of peace, the *Ultima Compositio*, on May 25, 1251²⁰. I will analyse the contents of the document later.

(3) Inquiry on Simon's administration by the king's commissioners and the trial at Westminster

In December 1251 the representatives of Gascon nobles arrived in England to complain to the king about Simon's administration in Gascony²¹. They denounced Simon as a traitor. On January 4, 1252, Henry, consulting with his council members, decided to send a commission of inquiry to look into Simon's conduct against lords, burgesses and others in Gascony as well as his account rendered to the king. He also demanded that any Gascon delegates be sent to England who wished to complain about the seneschal's administration in the presence of the king²². He actually sent out Henry de Wengham, the king's clerk, and Roscelin de Fos, the Master of the Templars, to Gascony to inquire into Simon's trouble with local people. The earl lost his temper and was greatly angered by the king's merciless treatment²³. Early in 1252 these two commissioners arrived in Gascony and, after the inquiry, sent their report to Henry in March. It says that the earl had obviously treated certain people with a lack of humanity, but that their crimes nevertheless called for punishment²⁴. Later in March Henry ordered both

sides to be present at the court of Westminster for trial, which would start on May 9, 1252. In early April a large delegation of Gascons, lay and clerks, including the Archbishop of Bordeaux, presented themselves before the king, prelates and barons of England²⁵. They accused Simon of misgovernment and oppressive conduct. Henry himself sometimes shouted and lost his temper²⁶. Simon answered to prove his innocence to the king's brother and the earl of Gloucester. As tenants-in-chief they could not tolerate Simon being condemned to a traitor's penalty²⁷. Simon said, 'Sir, king, observe the gist of your letter investing me with government of Gascony for seven years.'²⁸ To which the king made an astonishing reply, 'No, I will not keep my promises; they have no value; since you have yourself betrayed me!' Simon replied that he had worked on behalf of the king and his majesty and the safety of clergy and people²⁹, and produced letters patent of the commune of Bordeaux, which was mentioned above. Simon added that the letter had proved eloquently the zeal, wisdom, just moderation, and long-suffering with which he had governed the country, and chastised the rebels. At the end of the five week debate, the king was convinced by Simon and publicly recognized that the earl's party had established the falsity of their opponents' assertions. The opinion was approved with unanimous acclamation by the members of the council³⁰. But on the following day the king's anger burst out. He, without consulting anyone³¹, imposed a truce, *treuga*, on the earl and the complainants. In the letter of June 13, 1252, the official form of truce was written³². This document will be analysed later in this chapter.

2. Angevin Empire, Capetian kingdom and Gascon nobles

In 1152 Henry Plantagenet married Eleanor, heiress to the duchy of Aquitaine. Through the marriage the Plantagenets bore the title of duke of Aquitaine. Henry III's dominium over Gascony (a part of Aquitaine later) was acquired through his inheritance from his father, John, in 1216. His right of possession, in other words, proprietorship, should be recognised by the surrounding monarchs, and at the same time could stand on the allegiance of the inhabitants of the region.

If a proprietor expects to rule people there, his stable government should depend on the assumption that there are mutual agreements between the ruler and the governed. Concerning Gascony in the thirteenth century, the English king should have established a stable lord-tenant relationship with his Gascon lords and town communities. Gascony had not been a regular residence for Plantagenet king-dukes since the middle of the twelfth century. The king-duke had only a limited number of administrators to govern Gascon lords before 1248, the first year of Simon's seneschalship. Until 1224 separate seneschals were appointed as principal executive officers for each of the constituent parts of the duchy of Aquitaine, ie., Poitou, Gascony, Limousin and Perigord. From 1227 a single seneschal, the Seneschal of Gascony, emerged as the principal officer for all the king-duke's land in the region. In 1242-3 a financial officer was appointed to collect revenues of Gascony and a treasury was established in Bordeaux. The constable of Bordeaux became the financial officer as late as 1254. A controller to assist with supervising the custom revenues was introduced during the reign of Edward I. A council of Gascons to advise the seneschal is known to have operated from at least 1245. But a system of

councils to hear complaints against local officials is first recorded only in 1255. A first sub-seneschal was recorded in 1272³³. In the absence of these institutions, the king-duke probably could not have had direct government of local people before 1248.

On the other hand, among the Gascon lords and towns, there was little sense of cross-sectional community at that period³⁴. Private wars between them prevailed there. To have a peace between them they needed to have an intervention or arbitration by a third party or external overlords.

First, the lord-tenant relationship between the Capetian or Plantagenet kings and Gascon lords will be examined, then the existence of communal relations between the local lords and towns will be checked.

Philip Augustus' claim of overlordship of Aquitaine had been the main cause of the conflicts between the Capetians and the Plantagenets since the loss of Normandy in 1204. The Plantagenet kings had continued to bear the title of duke of Aquitaine, but they did not have a strong feudal tie with local lords. Although the king-duke kept his own demesne there, they could not compel the Gascons to render feudal military service when Henry visited there in 1230 and in 1242³⁵.

Besides these two monarchies the king of Navarre, Aragon and Castile also intervened in the troubles of Gascon lords and burgesses³⁶. So the military situation there was unstable. In order to keep a peace of the region, seneschals of Gascony could not depend on the feudal host but had to use the king's household knights and local mercenaries, which consumed a great deal of English money³⁷. On the contrary, Louis IX of France could muster a feudal army when he came to Gascony on campaign against Henry in 1242³⁸. Besides seigniorial lords, towns

also had troubles among their inhabitants, who were split into several factions. Prelates in Gascony were not necessarily under the authority of the Pope, and were influenced by the lay interest of the region. An unstable public order was detrimental to the peace of the region. Agriculture and the wine trade suffered a lot. *Bastides* were built to protect people from violence, carried out under the initiative of joint overlordship or the communal institutions of local lords³⁹. Peacekeeping here needed either intervention by powerful overlords or local communal institutions. Both the Capetians and the Plantagenets utilized their influence to get hold of each *dominium*.

First, lord-tenant relations between the English king and Gascon lords will be examined. As early as 1229, one of the Gascon lords, Petre de Gavarreto, rendered homage to King Henry⁴⁰. The king recognized that Petre and his ancestors had held certain lands, but he did not identify where the land lay, and did not mention the military obligation of the tenant. So the king's recognition in the document could not mean that he had established a lord-tenant relationship with Petre. Instead he may have intended to record that a Gascon lord had a sense of affiliation to the Angevin king. Whereas, around 1229–30, Henry de Turbleville, seneschal of Gascony, planned to create a list of military retainers by allocating them a part of the king's demesne. However the next seneschal abandoned the plan⁴¹. When Henry himself undertook a military campaign into Gascony in 1242, he summoned the feudal army in vain⁴². A few knights who sided with the king on this occasion had their tenements confiscated by the count of Poitou and escaped to Henry's side later⁴³. The other project in the campaign to employ local mercenaries by Henry resulted in failure⁴⁴.

According to *Rôles Gascons*, which are English king's documents, Gaston de Bearn VII, one of the prominent lords, inherited lands from his ancestor in 1229, but there is no record printed in *Recogniciones Feodorum*⁴⁵. In 1242 when Henry's army progressed into Gascony, Gaston rendered his homage to the king⁴⁶. But there is no mention of the location of his tenement in the record. Gaston's duty was to do suit at Saint Sever court in return for keeping his customary liberty. There is no mention of his military duty. Nonetheless he was summoned to Henry's army on some other occasion⁴⁷, but he did not present himself then and there⁴⁸. That the king mentioned his tenements and liberty in the document may mean a kind of official recognition of what the Gascon lord had already retained⁴⁹.

Another example of a similar case is found in the record concerning Amanieu d'Albret. In 1242 he vowed with other Gascon lords to the king that he would labour to assist the count of Toulouse who was against the Capetian king⁵⁰. Henry summoned him together with other Gascon lords in the following year in return for his recognition of their vested liberty⁵¹. Amanieu may have been received well by Henry and hostile to the French king. However in the record of the recognition there is no mention of a lord-tenant relationship, tenement location, or military service either. As a matter of fact Amanieu may have had help from the king to arbitrate between him and Gaston de Bearn over a territorial dispute, and Henry in fact gave him help⁵². Judging from the cases of these two prominent lords there seems to exist no stable lord-tenant relationship between the English king and Gascon lords.

Next we should inquire whether there was feudal relation between French kings and Gascon lords. But there seems to be

no formulary record so far printed which defines the relationship between them. The treaty of Paris in 1259 defined that Henry should retain Gascony as duke of Aquitaine, a feudal tenant of the French king. After that year the French king became the overlord of Gascony through the English king-duke⁵³.

Gascony was hard to govern in the first half of the thirteenth century. A few years after Henry inherited England from his father, John, his seneschal of Gascony, Geoffrey Neville, wrote to the council of the young king that it was almost impossible to control the restless and ambitious local lords, nor could he defend Poitou and Gascony from the French king⁵⁴. Henry himself did not enter the duchy until 1230⁵⁵. The treaty of Le Goulet of 1200 enabled the French king to order the confiscation of John's French fiefs with the general consent of his barons. Poitou, northern Saintonge and the port of La Rochelle were captured by Louis VIII's expedition in 1224. Poitevin lords became ready to accept and even serve the French king⁵⁶. Alphonse VIII of Castile also put forward a claim to Gascony as part of the dowry of his wife Eleanor, daughter of Eleanor of Aquitaine⁵⁷. Aragon and Navarre both spanned the Pyrenees, and Castile made frequent claims to Gascon lands. The kingdom of Navarre fell into the hands of the French house of Blois and ultimately passed to the French king himself. The county of Toulouse was to become still another centre of French power and influence, menacing the duchy of Gascony on its relatively unprotected eastern frontier⁵⁸. Five year terms between Louis IX and Henry III after the latter's Gascon Campaign in 1242-3 undermined the claims of Henry. As a matter of fact the Plantagenets had lost all real control in Poitou and Saintonge except for Oléron⁵⁹.

After the treaty of Paris in 1259 Louis IX placed Henry in the position of his tenant, but only by this pact was the French king unable to control Gascony. On the other hand, Edward, who had been granted Gascony by Henry III before 1254, made a territorial survey of Gascony on his way back from crusade in 1273–4, to try to ensure a feudal relationship with his Gascon subjects. His effort led the Gascons to feel an affiliation to the English rather than the French king. As a matter of fact this effect was created first by the treaty which Simon, as a seneschal, pressed on local towns and lords in 1250–51. The treaty introduced an unprecedented provision that the seneschal as *viceroi* had the power to make Gascons obey the English kings' authority. It was a corporate arrangement rather than an individual contract.

Before Simon became seneschal of Gascony it seems that the English king and his seneschal had not established an effective control of private wars among local lords and burgesses. Powicke once wrote, 'we do not hear much in Gascony, as we hear in Brittany and also in Poitou, of a law or body of custom common to the whole duchy⁶⁰,' and, 'we do not find in Gascony the systematic knight service and division into administrative areas dependent upon royal castles.' But he also wrote, 'Its disorderly habits of life were not subversive of the variety of local custom which maintained its sense of unity.' 'Its barons and burgesses preferred the rule of a distant king or any other.' Moreover he wrote, 'Gascon administration, in short, should be regarded, as a whole, as a problem of government, not as the domination by an alien.⁶¹' He stressed the recalcitrant tendency of local lords and burgesses, but on the other hand his theory depended on the sense of unity among Gascons, of which he

did not show us any evidence.

Malcolm Vale explained the matters in the following way. 'The turbulent and independently minded inhabitants of south-west France interposed their own preoccupations and concerns between Capetian and Plantagenet claims to exercise sovereignty over Aquitaine.' 'Gascon society itself had certain characteristics (such as a tradition of private war, considerable urban faction and the sudden growth of new settlements) which arguably contributed to Anglo-French tensions.'⁶² He continued, 'An unlimited use of the *droit de guerre* and the *port d'arms*', was regarded as the nobles' right of Gascons. 'There was little doubt in contemporary minds that the nobility's assumed right to wage war among them contributed substantially to the turbulence of Gascon society.'⁶³ He stressed Gascon nobles' assumption of independence. Their conflicts could be arbitrated by a third party, but they hated to be subject to the superior authority. Vale showed us many examples of private wars among them⁶⁴. The sense of unity among Gascon nobles which Powicke assumed seems to lack any concrete evidence⁶⁵. He admitted that there had been several factions among the burgesses of Bordeaux in conflict with each other. We may conclude that Gascon nobles and burgesses were not trying to unite to keep the peace, but to exploit private wars for their own interest. Feudal ties between lords, and communal ties among the lords or burgesses had not functioned well to maintain the peace and order in Gascony before Simon came as the seneschal in 1248.

3. Simon's administration in Gascony, 1248–1252

By reading documents concerning three occasions of troubles between Simon and the Gascons, we may analyse the

constitutional significance of his method of administration.

(1) *Forma Pacis in 1250*

The first document is a treaty, *Forma Pacis*, which was said to be imposed upon the burgesses of Bordeaux after the rebellion against the seneschal on June 28, 1249⁶⁶. It was consented by the leading burgesses under the mandate of the seneschal, and on January 21, 1251, confirmed by king Henry III. Bémont summarized its contents as follows⁶⁷. i. Certain of those exiled from Bordeaux could return if they provided sufficient security and written promises of submission. ii. No man, under penalty of banishment, was to bear arms or raise troops against the earl or the mayor and the *jurats* of Bordeaux, to make illicit assemblies or to take part in secret societies. iii. Two hundred burgesses were to swear to these terms; and every year the entire commune was to take the same oath. iv. The earl had the power to modify this peace by his own authority, while respecting the rights of the mayor, the *jurats*, and the commune.

Bémont did not comment on the constitutional significance of the peace treaty. Powicke did not mention it, either. John Maddicott mentioned briefly the rebellion and Simon's method of administration as follows. 'His contract with the king had bound him to recover the king's rights, liberties and possessions; but it is clear, too, that Montfort sought his own ends as well as Henry's.'⁶⁸ Frank Marsh wrote, 'Simon had evidently made up his mind to trust the Anglo-commercial party at Bordeaux and the affiliated factors at Bazas and La Réole.'⁶⁹ In other words he stressed that Simon had trusted the wine trade party to make a profit for England. Labarge criticized Simon because he used violent measures, 'to bring peace between the opposing parties in a civil war requires a Solomon and in this

case the Desolars felt that the earl had unfairly favoured the Coloms and treated their own faction with unjustified severity.⁷⁰ Eleanor Lodge wrote, 'the king's faith in Simon had been shaken by the many urgent complaints and accusations which were sent month after month from Gascon lords and Gascon towns.'⁷¹ So far previous studies on this revolt criticized Simon's violent way of ruling the Gascons.

What was the constitutional meaning of Simon's suppression of local rebellion? Was his military victory used to maintain the profit of the wine trade for the English king? In order to make sure of the constitutional significance of his administration we should examine the treaty, *Forma Pacis*, in detail. Although Bémont wrote, 'Simon imposed the treaty to the burgesses'⁷², as far as the wording of *Forma Pacis* is concerned, his interpretation cannot be affirmed. To be more accurate, what Simon demanded was that the mayor, *jurats* and leading burgesses should make a new agreement concerning the peace-keeping of their community. Simon required that the old problems which had been the cause of troubles should be solved, and that the new form of peace would be provided by 'the prudent counsel'. *Forma Pacis* did not mention the earl as a commander nor a legislator. It says that the peace was provided by the commune of Bordeaux⁷³. All the burgesses were required to swear compliance to the form annually. The form does not refer to the Simon's violent suppression as the ultimate power against the discord between burgesses at all. The whole of the community of Bordeaux was required to swear to turn against those who would infringe the peace. That the earl would hold his ultimate authority of peace-keeping was agreed by the whole community. At the same time we should not neglect the following phrase.

'The earl should keep the plenipotentiary authority to redress the form notwithstanding the jurisdiction and liberty of the mayor, *jurats* and the commune.' The liberty of the burgesses appears to be withheld from the earl's intervention.

Commenting on the *Forma Pacis* of 1250, Maddicott seems to consider that Simon utilized the title of seneschal to profit himself by requesting money from the king⁷⁴. He did not present the evidence that relates Simon's use of military power to reconcile the hostile parties of burgesses with Simon's personal desire of earning money from his office of seneschal. Did Simon appropriate the money given from the king for his own use? Maddicott has not shown any evidence. The burgesses' agreement to the *Forma* may mean the temporary compromise which was made by those who accepted Simon's order. At least the form of peace tells us that there had been troubles between parties of burgesses. Before this form was provided, those parties could not agree with each other and in fact the discord had developed into violent conflicts. On such occasions the seneschals before Simon did not succeed in arbitrating disputes. Had the king of England, as duke of Aquitaine, granted any city charter to Bordeaux before 1249 and confiscated the liberty from the community in case of burgesses' conflicts? I have not found any evidence. The fact that no city charter of Bordeaux had been supplied before 1249 by Henry III suggests that the city community before Simon's coming had not had self-administration in fact. If this was the case, the conclusion of *Forma Pacis* under Simon's initiative could have considerable historical significance. The form also suggests the burgesses' orientation of affiliation was toward the king of England rather than the French king⁷⁵.

**(2) Final Composition between the earl and barons of
Gascony in 1251**

In 1250, a while after the Bordeaux's turbulence was settled temporarily, another movement of resistance surfaced against Simon's rule led by Gaston de Bearn in Fronsac and in Bazas by Amanieu d'Albret. In order to suppress the rebellion the earl, asking for money and knights from the king, brought military power from England. The pope also gave Simon moral support. Some of the Gascon barons, knights, other nobles, citizens and burgesses of Bordeaux and La Réole formed a league and, avoiding battle against Simon, tried to settle the matter with a conditional surrender. As Simon refused their conditions and destroyed the castle of Lodes, the league decided to submit to the terms, *Ultima Compositio*, on May 25, 1251⁷⁶. Bémont summarized the terms into four items⁷⁷. i. The king's commissaries were to receive from all those willing to abide by the present peace the formal assurance that they would appear in court and submit to the sentence given by the tribunal. ii. The tribunal was to be composed of two commissaries and four judges chosen by them in each of the four courts of Gascony: it was to take cognizance of all disputes that had arisen between the earl and his opponents, since the earl had had charge of the province; it was to judge according to the customs peculiar to each court, and according to the statutes of the cities and the towns. iii. The commissaries were empowered to permit entry and domicile within Gascony, except in the cities of Bordeaux and La Réole; the judges were to decide if prisoners actually in the hands of the earl were to have the benefit of the peace. iv. The bishops of Agen and Bazas promised to excommunicate all who might violate it.

Bémont explained that some of the regulation of the terms were realized later⁷⁸. He praised Simon's success in calming down the turbulent rebels in Gascony, because the earl established the situation where the king-duke was the ultimate ruler of Gascony. His theory is based on the analysis of the king's letter to Simon rather than on the complaint of the Gascons⁷⁹. On the other hand, Powicke concluded that Simon's real aim would be gaining a free hand to rule Gascony with aid from the king⁸⁰. But the following case reveals to us that the initiative of government in Gascony had not been in Simon's hands. After the turbulence in Bordeaux, Simon captured Gaston de Bearn, one of the leaders of the rebels, and sent him to Henry in London. But the king set him free without judgment⁸¹. If Simon was trying to get the initiative of government in Gascony, he would not have sent Gaston to the king. Gaston rendered homage to Henry in 1242, but not to Simon. The earl had not been authorized to do justice to him. Maddicott regarded Simon's victory over the Gascons as the result of king's aid. Simon is considered to be a greedy militarist⁸². Neither Marsh nor Lodge nor Labarge referred to the significance of this document⁸³.

The *Ultima compositio* made between the earl and the Gascon league was announced officially to the general public in the name of Simon, Gaston, Amanieu and William Arnaud de Tontoulon⁸⁴. These barons agreed to announce that they would stand for the statute and accept the judgment by the king's commissaries. Only in the two clauses was Simon placed in the higher position than the others. The first clause was that he would be entitled to substitute a jury of sixteen men selected from four local courts. The second was to make another substitution when there would be a vacancy in arbitrating committees

composed of a judge, royal commissaries and other participants. In other cases of substitution Simon was not entitled to have any privilege. Moreover the ultimate authority to execute the judgment would not rest with him but in the king's commissaries. The authority of judgment would be held by local judges. By reading these clauses we could not conclude that Simon had acquired a free hand to rule Gascony. We should not conclude that he was prepared to use military power to oppress the complaints, either, for one of the clauses tells us that the judgment should be made according to the local customs and statutes of the towns. As a matter of fact this composition seems to have formed an agreement concerning the governance between the seneschal and the leading barons and citizens of Gascony, and also committed the agreement into writing in order to create statutes and institutions of judgment under surveillance of the seneschal.

If the significance of *Ultima Compositio* could be understood as written above, its judicial agreement clause may have been intended to establish a new system of judicial procedure under the English king's authority in Gascony. There had not been any fixed judicial system before Simon came to Gascony. Though Gaston de Bearn, for example, had revolted against the English king several times, and Amanieu d'Albret had damaged local inhabitants, they had not been judged or punished by the king with any fixed judicial procedure. The king-duke so far seems to have not tried to keep peace there with his own army or local officials. Henry's real purpose to appoint Simon as seneschal must have been the pacification of the turbulent barons and burgesses. As a matter of fact Simon used his military capability to solve the problem in a short period, but his method caused

another complaint of the ejected parties from Bordeaux, Bazas and La Réole. Though having been under pressure from Simon, these Gascon nobles and burgesses were forced to agree to have a new judicial procedure as the fixed way of settling troubles. The composition was a pact between the seneschal and the league of Gascon complainants, barons, knights, burgesses and town representatives⁸⁵. It was not a feudal contract between two individuals. Henry had not had a collective contract with the Gascon inhabitants, nor any compact between political superiors and inferiors before this composition. It also provided that executing the judgment should rest in the hands of the king's commissionaires rather than in those of local judges⁸⁶.

**(3) The complaint against Simon heard at Westminster,
May-June, 1252**

The debates on Simon's Gascon administration were opened in the refectory of Westminster Abbey before the king's court in the king's presence, on May 9, 1252⁸⁷. A great number of Gascons, clerks and laymen, launched a vehement and slanderous attack upon the earl. The king himself employed reproachful language towards the earl. Having said enough to prove his innocence, Simon replied by recalling all he had done since his arrival in the country, and his moderation in war as in peace. Violent protest denounced him as a traitor, a brutal and faithless tyrant. The petition rendered by the burgesses of La Réole to the king listed eight issues of complaint⁸⁸. For example, Simon's army ejected, arrested or imprisoned not a few burgesses. He tallaged citizens. Some of the ejected escaped to the kingdom of Navarre, or were seized to be thrown into the French prison. However in the petition there is no particular mention of the issues of the trouble which had been punished by the seneschal.

The letter from Raimundus, *vicomte* de Soule, complains that he was arrested and put on trial by the seneschal⁸⁹. He claimed that so far no *vicomte* had ever been put on trial, and that the earl had his land seized till he faced trial. He also complained that the earl had one of his household members seize his town and an earl's bailiff occupied and burned it. The damage amounted to two thousand marks. The *vicomte* was ready to face trial but it should not be at the seneschal's court but at a local court according to the Gascon customs, although Raimundus insisted that he was prepared to be subject to the king of England as long as the matter concerned the holding from him.

If his letter concerns a real case, Gascon lords including Raimundus had not been tried by the seneschal in his court before. The king of England did not exercise his judicial right over Gascon subjects. Simon's conduct concerning Raimundus could be the first example of judgment by the king's officials.

Through an example of Gascon complaints against Simon's conduct, some specific features of his administration may be examined⁹⁰. One of them concerns the case of Arnaud de Blanquefort⁹¹. He complained as follows. When the *vicomte* of Fronsac started a war against Simon, the earl ordered Arnaud to concede his castle, Bourg, temporarily. As the term was ending, he asked to return the castle, together with recompense for other damages he suffered from a new fort built by the earl during the war. Moreover the earl occupied the lands of Arnaud's subjects and took rents of the lands. He stated that he himself held lands from the king and had been a king's liege man. Simon sent a letter denying the pleading to the English court from Bordeaux⁹². 'We, Simon, earl of Leicester, had re-

ceived Bourg castle from Arnaud de Blanquefort under his entrustment. After the term ended the castle had been returned. We received nothing from the *vicomte* of Fronsac during the term. Except for the customary duty of the Blanquefort we had not taken any hostage from knights or burgesses. On this matter Theobaldus de Jenciaco, our knight, swore on my honour what should be observed to the *vicomte*. Witness; archbishop of Bordeaux, the community of Bordeaux, Amanieu d'Albret, Peter of Bordeaux.' Some time later the following letter of complaint was rendered to the court by Arnaud. 'Concerning the land of Ayquelini Ardrous, Simon took two hundred pounds from Galfridus de la Landa who had held it from the king of France. Simon, in return for the money, granted him the land of Bernardus Aytinenti (sic). Concerning the land of Gaillard Desoler transferred from Arnaud de Blanquefort, Simon took two hundred marks. Concerning the land of Arnaldus de Sarporas who held it from Arnaud de Blanquefort, Simon took one hundred marks. Simon took twenty marks concerning the land which was held by Brunus in Caussat. Arnaud claimed that all the money abovementioned should be returned. The total sum, excluding rent from Cuzac, should be one thousand pounds eighty marks sterling of Bordeaux, except the land in Dagatassat.'

Arnaud's complaint concerned Simon's taking of castles, lands and rents from him and his followers. Judging from the nature of his complaint he seems to have regarded those items not as tenement but as his own property or *allodium*⁹³. He himself insisted that he was a subject of the English king, but at the same time he claimed that he had lent one of his castles to the seneschal without mentioning his feudal duty as tenant to his lord. In fact the reader of the latter half of the letter may

observe the tenurial complexity between the king and Gascon nobles including burgesses, i.e. Gaillard de Soler, and the French king. The seneschal is accused of having taken money from the subjects of the French king. If the seneschal had granted lands of an English king's tenant, without permission, to a French king's tenant in return for money, he would be punished for breaking feudal law. But in his complaint Arnaud did not argue whether the land was a tenement held of the king of England. His claim to be a liegeman of Henry is not supported by any document in the pleading. It looks like he took it for granted that he had not had any feudal contract with the English king.

If a tenant of the king in Gascony had refused to do his feudal obligation to his lord, the latter's countermeasure should be enforcement of fulfilment of obligation by seizing land and property. This is what Simon had done against Arnaud de Blanquefort⁹⁴. In their report to the king, March 1252, the two commissaries of the king recognized that Simon's measure toward the Gascon subjects was in fact an act of administration by seneschal⁹⁵. Simon, as *viceroi*, may have tried to enforce feudal ties between Henry and Gascon lords, by documenting the fact of confiscating tenements through delivery of lands and payment of money⁹⁶.

(4) The truce, *treuga*, Henry imposed on both Simon and the Gascons, June 13, 1252

After the king heard the complaints of the Gascons and the report of his commissaries, he ordered the earl and all the complainants to accept the following provisions of peace on June 13, 1252 at Windsor⁹⁷. 'The castle of Bourg should be returned to Arnaud de Blanquefort according to the accord made between him and Simon. The conservators and executors of the peace

treaty would inquire into this issue. All the prisoners in the days of Simon's rule should be delivered. The earl should respond to the king about the ransoms and other money he had received as seneschal. The king or his eldest son would come to Gascony and complete jurisdiction(*sic*) and give peace according to the customs of Gascony. Anyone who had opposed the earl's government should be tried at the court of conservators before the king who would arrive there. The prisoners of the Piis family taken at Bordeaux on June 28, 1249, were to be sent to the king for trial.'

Three days later, on June 16, the king nominated two executors of the peace treaty⁹⁸. Henry imposed the treaty, *treuga*, upon Simon, Gaston, Amanieu, the burgesses of Bazas and La Réole. There was no sign of agreement between the seneschal and the Gascons in the treaty. Henry mentioned in the document the temporary treaty in March between the seneschal and the governed who had complained. But as late as May both sides were still openly hostile, so they probably had not agreed. The king answered only to the complaint of the Gascons and promised to protect their vested liberty about lands and jurisdiction. He turned a deaf ear to what Simon asserted in the court. So this was neither a reconciliation nor compromise. The truce did not specify the exact day when the king or his son would actually arrive to govern Gascony. If the prisoners arrested by Simon were delivered by the king's order, Simon's administration would collapse and the situation would return to the former chaos. As we have read in the peace compositions in 1250 and 1251, Simon as a seneschal had tried to put the chaotic situation in order and reconcile local conflicts, and he did supervise the peace with the authority of the king's deputy. But in June 1252,

Henry changed his mind and later removed Simon from his office.

The king of England as a proprietor of Gascony, had ordered the Gascons to keep the truce, but he neither sent his army to enforce the truce there nor appointed his commanders for peace-keeping. In fact immediately after the treaty of June was issued, the Gascons rebelled again, requiring Henry to remove Simon from his office⁹⁹. The rebellion was suppressed by Simon's army again¹⁰⁰. On August 27, 1252, Henry commanded the barons and good men of Gascony not to obey the earl in any way or consider him as seneschal¹⁰¹. As a result the title of seneschal was removed from the earl, by whom they had been overawed for several years. By the truce the king acknowledged the Gascons their liberties that they had kept before Simon's seneschalship. Some of them revolted immediately against Simon. The revival of anarchy may endorse the fact that Simon's former administration had validly kept the peace. Henry's indulgence toward the Gascons was ineffective. Although Henry had fired Simon from the office, when another rebellion occurred the following March, he asked for Simon's help. Henry did nothing to govern Gascony, while he kept the dignity of the duke of Aquitaine. Any ruler or government could not be regarded as established in administrating a society, unless offences or offenders were punished effectively.

Documents concerning Simon's trial in 1252 have not so far been studied in the context of evaluation of the administration of Gascony by the English king. Bémont mentioned that there was no direct evidence to clarify justifiability of the assertion of Simon and the Gascons¹⁰². Powicke regarded that both Simon and the Gascons were tried at the king's court as litigants of equal

status. He also insisted that Simon stressed the necessity of suppression by the army as the seneschal's duty¹⁰³. Maddicott insisted that Simon's real intention of seneschalship was government by force to enrich himself with the king's money¹⁰⁴. Powicke cited an example of Hastings as a similar role of an administrator of the British Empire in the nineteenth century who governed India¹⁰⁵. Neither Powicke nor Maddicott esteemed a sense of affiliation or allegiance to the English king by local people of Gascony in the middle of the thirteenth century. Both of them focused their analysis on the use of military force by Simon or on the appeasements by other administrators. We may need to consider the direction of allegiance of the Gascons to the English or French king, given that the Angevin legacy in France was contested till 1453 by both.

As has been seen, the documents concerning Simon's trial in 1252, reveal that no agreement was procured between Simon and Gascon lords. The reason why Simon was removed from his office is not because his administrative acts had been judged to be guilty by the king's justices. Henry exploited the Gascons' complaints to remove Simon from the office and ordered him to cease fighting against the Gascons. Then the earl realized that he had been forced to act contrary to the tenor with which the king had appointed him to the office¹⁰⁶. When he was commanded to deliver castles to the king, he became aware of the change in the king's mind¹⁰⁷. He may have regarded the duty of seneschal as protection of Angevin interests on the continent.

Before 1248 feudal relations between the Plantagenet king- duke and Gascon nobles had not been satisfactorily established as far as peace keeping of the society was concerned. Local nobles and burgesses had conflicted with each other¹⁰⁸. They

failed in constructing a communal relation among rivalry polities. Private wars had prevailed for years as a practical way of settlement of troubles. The situation needed some powerful authority to intervene between the disputing parties. The kings of Navarre, Aragon and Castile had stepped in the struggle for supremacy in Gascony, though the Plantagenets kept the proprietor's right and the Capetians claimed overlordship to Gascony. As we have noticed from the document of complaint the local lords seems to have had a sense of more affiliation to the Plantagenets than to the Capetians¹⁰⁹. The English king once sent a letter complaining to the French king about the latter's intervention in Gascony¹¹⁰.

Simon himself, as a husband of Henry's sister, Eleanor, seems to have striven to maintain the interest of the Plantagenets in Gascony¹¹¹. Concerning this issue both Simon and Henry shared the interest. When the earl replied to the king's question, he complained about the accusation, because he had provided justice to Gascons and the justice in order to keep the interest which had been left from the days of king's brother's administration in the 1220s¹¹². Simon seems to have been conscious about the interest of the Plantagenets, because he said that he had been sent to Gascony as *viceroi*. As mentioned above strict regulation of peace-keeping in Gascon society by the seneschal were essential for realising the administrator's authority. If the king demanded his seneschal to moderate the regulation, it was not easy to follow the instruction for the administrator and *viceroi*, because relaxation would lead to the loss of the interest and authority of the sovereign.

While Simon was tried at Westminster about his administrative conduct in Gascony in May–June, 1252, the English

magnates, including the king's brother, kept supporting the earl consistently. The king should not intervene into his barons' vested privileges. As a matter of fact, Simon had lead his household knights and mercenaries to pacify troubles in Gascony, and paid for them himself, asking the king for payment later¹¹³. In this practice Henry should have realized the need to keep the principle of feudal contract with his English barons. At the same time Simon, as an administrator, tried to make the feudal relation between the English king and Gascon nobles clearer than before.

Conclusion

Two points could be concluded from documents of agreement between Simon and Gascon nobles that have been analysed above. First, an attempt to establish the authority and function of the seneschal of Gascony as an arbitrator of disputes was tried by the form of peace which Simon imposed upon two parties of burgesses of Bordeaux in 1250, and also by the composition which Simon imposed upon the league of several leading Gascon barons and burgesses in 1251. Second, it was provided that any offence against *Ultima Compositio* should be judged by the king's commissionaires, and that any offender against the judgement must be punished by the authority of the king. Then a third point could be concluded from the Gascons' complaints which has been analysed above. We may assume that Simon tried to redress the unfavourable state of feudal relations between the English king and Gascon lords by imposing obligations as tenants upon the latter¹¹⁴. Their considerable dissatisfaction was the fact that Simon infringed their vested interest and liberty concerning territories, castles and other

profitable rights. Simon's receiving homage from them was also hated. They grumbled that when they had not obeyed Simon's pacification scheme, he made them render homage and hostages until they would pay ransom. So they regarded their land holding to be their own property. The seneschals before Simon had not worked out any effective measures to enforce them to do military duty to the king. Simon received homage as *viceroi*, i.e., on behalf of the king. But his bravery and prowess failed in gaining the spirit of allegiance to the sovereign king from the Gascons. So his administration collapsed.

While Simon's method was the imposition of feudal contract upon the local people, Henry's way was rather different. He nullified most of the Simon's administrative achievement by issuing the truce of June 13, 1252. For example it recovered the old liberty of Gascon lords and burgesses as if it were their *al-lodium*. It provided that the reconciliation of those concerned should be given the highest priority in the judgment concerning local conflicts, and that the judgment should be postponed till mutual agreement could be achieved. The customary arbitrating procedure should be adapted rather than the king's law or order. Feudal court procedure was never mentioned in the treaty. Henry promised indulgence to various ranks of Gascons. He may have try to appease them to win their allegiance. But as a matter of fact he did not keep his promise because he did not immediately advance to Gascony to start his administration. Gascons rebelled again soon.

King Henry III seems to have been convinced that his own scheme of government in his grand plan of European policy after Emperor Friedrich II died in 1250, might work. He accepted Innocentius IV's proposal of a Sicilian crusade to get its crown

for his second son, and tried to enthrone his brother as Emperor. Stubbs explained these events as the diplomatic policy of the English Kingdom in the context of the nation's history. Seen from another view point there may have been three different power structures, Empire, Angevin Empire and Capetian Monarchy in thirteenth century western Europe. A better account of diplomatic events might be given if we avoid explaining them in the context of the development of an embryonic nation state. The core of each power structure, the king or dynasty, may have tried to grasp control over people in remote lands, but success or failure could be decided probably by the people's strength of allegiance to the core. This paper has read the documents of local people's complaints from such a point of view.

Notes

- 1 Powicke, F.M., *King Henry III and the Lord Edward*, Oxford, 1947, p.233.
- 2 Bémont, Ch., *Simon de Montfort*, 1930, translated by E.F. Jacob into English, pp.75–6; Biblio. Nationale, Paris, Clairembault 1188; Bémont, *Simon de Montfort*, Paris, 1884, p.342; *C(lose) R(olls)*, 1247–51, p.43; *R(oyal) L(etters)*, Henry III, Rolls Series, ii, 1866, p.379; *C(alendar of P(atent) R(olls)*, 1247–58, p.26.
- 3 Bémont, English ed., p.76, *CPR*, p.23.
- 4 Bémont, *op. cit.*, p.78.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p.82; Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, Rolls Series, v, p.48.
- 6 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.48.
- 7 Bémont, p.77.
- 8 Bémont, French ed., pp.279–85, esp., 284; *CR.*, 1247–51, p.231.
- 9 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.291.
- 10 *Monumenta Franciscana*, *Adae de Marisco Epistulae*, RS, ed., by Brewer, 1858, p.298; Bémont, French ed., pp.287, 300.
- 11 Bémont, English ed., p.89; *CR*, p.248.
- 12 Bémont, *op. cit.*, p.88; *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.117.

- 13 Bémont, *op. cit.*, pp.88, 89; *CPR*, 1247–58, pp.67, 73, 321; *RL*, ii, p.382; *CR*, 1247–51, 241.
- 14 Bémont, *op. cit.*, p.90.
- 15 *Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, t.iii, par J. de Laborde, 1873, no.3909.
- 16 *CR*, 1247–51, p.401; *RL*, ii, p.68; *CPR*, 1247–58, p.68.
- 17 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.208.
- 18 Bémont, French ed., p.314; *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.209; *CR*, p.401; Bémont, Eng. ed., p.92; *CPR*, p.85.
- 19 Bémont, French ed., pp.268–72; Eng. ed., p.92; *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.210.
- 20 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.256; Ellis, J., Gaston de Bearn, Oxford, PhD thesis, 1952, p.123; Bémont, French ed., pp.272–3.
- 21 *Chron. Maj.*, v, pp.266–70, 276; Bémont, French ed., p.339; Ellis, *op. cit.*, p.127, appendix, pp.15–6.
- 22 *CR.*, 1251–53, p.207.
- 23 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.277.
- 24 Bémont, Eng. ed., p.102; Ellis, *op. cit.*, p.135; *RL*, ii, pp.76–81.
- 25 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.288.
- 26 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.259.
- 27 Bémont, Engl., p.106.
- 28 *Adae de Marisco Epistulae*, *RS*, pp.124–5; *Letters of Adam Marsh*, Lawrence ed., Oxford, 2006, pp.80–1.
- 29 *Adam Marsh*, *RS*, p.124.
- 30 *Chron.*, *Maj.*, v, pp.290–1; Ellis, *op. cit.*, p.139; *Adae de Marisco*, p.127; *Letters of Adam Marsh*, pp.80–1.
- 31 *Ibid.*, p.126. Matthew Paris mentioned no reason why Henry changed his mind.
- 32 *Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae, etc.*, Hague ed., i, p.168.
- 33 Studd, R., ‘England and Gascony, 1216–1337’, in Saul, N., *England in Europe, 1066–1453*, London, 1994, pp.104–6.
- 34 *Ibid.*, p.105.
- 35 Stacey, R., *Politics, Policy, and Finance under Henry III*, Oxford, 1987, pp.175, 185–6, 192.
- 36 Labarge, M.W., *Gascony England's first colony, 1204–1453*, London, 1980, pp.17–19.
- 37 Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp.177–9.
- 38 *Ibid.*, pp.185–6.

- 39 Studd, *op. cit.*, p.101.
- 40 *Recognitiones Feodorum in Aquitania, Recueil d'Actes reallifs à L'Administration des Rois D'Angleterre en Gueienne au XIII siècle*, Paris, ed., Ch. Bémont, 1914, no.447.
- 41 Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp.174, 177; *CPR*, 1225–32, p.507; *CPR*, 1232–47, pp.6, 194–5, 318.
- 42 Stacey, *op. cit.*, pp.193–4; *CR*, 1237–42, pp.523–7.
- 43 Stacey, *op. cit.*, p.194; Guy de Rochford (Villars); *CPR*, 1232–47, pp.310, 395; *Cal. Liberate Rolls*, 1240–5, p.229, 232, 275, 300; *Charter Rolls* 1226–57, pp.323, 329, 363, 390, 411, 462, 473.
- 44 Stacey, *op. cit.*, p.194; *CPR*, 1232–47, p.308.
- 45 Ellis, *op. cit.*, p.25. cf. note 40.
- 46 *Rôlls Gascons*, t.1, par F. Michel, 1885, nos.721, Dec. 25, 1242.
- 47 *Ibid.*, nos.158, 159, 160, 163.
- 48 Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp.95–7; *Rôlls Gascons*, i, no.181
- 49 *CPR*, 1232–47, p.401; Powicke, *King Henry III*, p.214.
- 50 *R(ôlls) G(ascons)*, no.407.
- 51 *Ibid.*, no.1587.
- 52 *Ibid.*, no.1093.
- 53 *Joinville*, Penguin classics, 1963, p.334; *CPR*, 1232–47, p.401.
- 54 Labarge, *Gascony*, 1980, p.14.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p.11.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p.7.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p.14.
- 58 *Ibid.*, p.15.
- 59 *Ibid.*, p.17.
- 60 Powicke, *King Henry III and the Lord Edward*, p.210.
- 61 *Ibid.*, pp.211–4.
- 62 Vale, *The Angevin Legacy and the Hundred Years War*, Blackwell, 1989, pp.6–7.
- 63 *Ibid.*, p.112.
- 64 Vale, M., *op. cit.*, p.112.
- 65 Powicke, *op. cit.*, p.213.
- 66 *Layettes du Trésors des Chartes*, t.iii, 1873, no.3909.
- 67 Bémont, Engl. ed., p.90.
- 68 Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort*, Cambridge, 1994, p.111–2.

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- 69 Marsh, F.B., *English Rule in Gascony, 1199–1259*, Michigan, 1912, p.128.
- 70 Labarge, *op.cit.*, pp.19–20.
- 71 Lodge, E.C., *Gascony under English Rule*, London, 1926, pp.39–40.
- 72 Bémont, *op. cit.*, p.90.
- 73 ‘Huic ordinationi nihilominus maior et jurati totaque communi a Burdegalensis, pro utilitate rei publice, consenserunt.’
- 74 Maddicott, *op. cit.*, p.113.
- 75 Cf. Renouard, Yves, *Histoire Médiévale, d’Aquitaine*, 2005, VIII, ‘La date des Etablissements de Bordeaux’.
- 76 Bémont, French ed., pp.272–5.
- 77 Bemont, Engl., p.94.
- 78 *Ibid.*, pp.95–6.
- 79 Bémont, French ed., p.336 (Biblio. Nationale, Ms. Lat., 9016, n.6)
- 80 Powicke, *King Henry III*, p.227.
- 81 *Chron. Maj.*, v, pp.103–4.
- 82 Maddicott, *op. cit.*, pp.113–4.
- 83 Marsh, *op. cit.*, p.128; *Foedera*, i, p.461; Lodge, *op. cit.*, p.39.
- 84 Bémont, French ed., pp.272–3.
- 85 Bémont, French ed., p.274.
- 86 ‘per hanc ordinationem domino regi Anglie nec aliqui de Wasconia in aliis causis ab his presentibus aut futuris prejudicium generetur’
- 87 Bémont, Engl., pp.104–7.
- 88 *RL.*, ii, pp.72–4.
- 89 *Ibid.*, pp.74–6.
- 90 Bémont, French ed., pp.307, 312–4, 339.
- 91 BL, Add. Ch., 11240; Bémont, French ed., pp.307–9.
- 92 *Ibid.*, p.308. ‘nos, Simon de Montforti comes Leycestrie, recepimus in commendam a nobile viro domino Arnaldo de Blancheforth castrum de Burgo, cum burgo et pertinenciis dicti castri, tenenda et possidenda a nobis vel mandato nostro’.
- 93 ‘comes Leycestrie ... comodaret sibi et regi *castrum suum* de Burgo’.
- 94 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.102.
- 95 *Ch. Maj.*, v, p.289; Bémont, Engl. ed., pp.101–2.
- 96 Bémont, French ed., p.308. ‘supradicta tenet dictus Arnaldus a domino rege, et inde ligius et miles suus’.

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- 97 *Foedera*, Hague, i, 168; Bémont, Engl., p.110.
- 98 *CPR*, 1247-58, p.159.
- 99 *Cal. of Charter Rolls*, vol. 1, p.385; Bémont, Engl. ed., pp.112, 113, n.3, 114; French ed., p.343; *CPR*, 1247-58, pp.161, 244; *Chron. Maj.*, v, pp.315, 334. For the next seneschals, John de Grey, (Aug. 24, 1252) and Richard de Grey, (Oct. 3), *CPR*, 1247-58, pp.241, 244; *CR*, 1251-53, p.388; *Chron. Maj.*, v, pp.388, 407, 415-6; Ellis, p.164; *Rôlls Gascons*, i, no.3540.
- 100 Ellis, op. cit., pp.150-1, 156-9.
- 101 *CPR*, 1247-58, p.161.
- 102 Bémont, Engl. ed., pp.101-9.
- 103 Powicke, *op. cit.*, pp.229-30.
- 104 Maddicott, *op. cit.*, pp.116, 119.
- 105 Powicke, *op. cit.*, p.209.
- 106 Ellis, op. cit., pp.130-1.
- 107 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.290.
- 108 For example, conflict between Gaston de Bearn and Amanieu d'Albret. Cf. Ellis, pp.130-1.
- 109 *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.295.
- 110 *CR*, 1251-3, p.187.
- 111 *Ibid.*, p.278.
- 112 *Ibid.*, p.296.
- 113 *Chron. Maj.*, v, pp.210, 327; Bémont, Engl. ed., p.112; *CR*, 1251-53, pp.203-7.
- 114 Henry had offered money-fief to his Gascon subjects to keep their allegiance to the English Crown. English magnates complained about his patronage policy. *Chron. Maj.*, v, p.48.