

**Retrospective on and Prospects for Japanese Policy on Africa  
— Focusing on the Tokyo International Conference  
on African Development (TICAD) Process —**

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Today, the relationships between Africa and Japan, whether they are government-to-government or private sector, are truly wide ranging. This can be surmised by observing the number of embassies that Japan and the nations of Africa have opened in each other's countries. Just by looking at the number of agreements and treaties that have been entered into between the two, one can see that the diplomatic ties have deepened. The people of Africa live in an age of changing nation states and politics, and the political and diplomatic actors have become truly diverse.

What is contemporary Africa seeking by entering into relationships with Japan? How should Japan approach the ever-changing socio-political circumstances in Africa? What common goals should they set for building future relationships? This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the following topics: (1) charting the basic framework of Japanese diplomacy with the nations of Africa; (2) reviewing the changes in Japan's relationships with the nations of Africa during the Cold War Era; (3) examining relations between Africa and Japan in the post-Cold War period, specifically focusing on the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process; and (4) considering what the common challenges are in building sustainable relationships between Africa and Japan in the new century.

Keywords: TICAD, Post-Cold War, NEPAD

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## **1. Basic Framework of African-Japanese Relations**

### **(1) Basic Framework of Newly Emerging African Nations' Relations with Japan**

In the late 1950s and 1960s, many African nations, burning with the desire to build new nation states, became independent. For many, the process of independence continues today. Common challenges for African nations include forming a nation state, breaking away from colonial economies, restoring human dignity, and taking their due place in the international community. It can be said that African-Japanese relations have been formed under the political actions of African nations striving to overcome challenges such as these. In the course of doing so, there are a number of factors that have had an impact on relations between the two.

It goes without saying that the main players are the state governments. Consequently, the basis of African diplomacy has been bilateral, taking place between the various nations within the African continent and countries outside the African continent. The nations of Africa share a common past in that they were colonized. Whether the previous colonial masters were good or bad, they served as a type of 'reference society' as the African countries built independent nation states and formed external relations. In the course of forming these relationships, some African nations did develop bilateral diplomacy individually. However, in the case of former French territories, a special relationship has been maintained, officially known as the Central African Franc (CFA) zone. The 14 nations of Central Africa, which historically have had deep ties with France, have also formed regional cooperative organizations: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC). Similarly, the nations that are former British territories have maintained relationships with the former colonial power Britain and conduct diplomacy in a forum called the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). In addition, regional cooperative organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have been formed.

In contrast, under the Pan Africanism advocated by Kwame

Nkrumah, independent African nations have cooperated on a continental level to build relationships with nations outside of Africa. For example, although there were differences between the radical Casablanca Group and the moderate Monrovia Group, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963, and the concept of 'One Continent, One Destiny' has been maintained to this day. This spirit has also been inherited by the African Union (AU). After independence and during the Cold War Period, the newly emerged nations of Africa adopted a clear stance that they did not belong to either the Eastern socialist camp or the Western liberal camp, joining the non-aligned movement. They also cooperated with each other and conducted diplomacy in international arenas, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), which takes place at the United Nations (UN), to deal with and reform the existing international system. (Gordon and Gordon 2013)

As described above, the political relationships between Africa and Japan were formed bilaterally, with continental organisations as well as with regional cooperatives; through international movements and organisations, and so on.

## **(2) Basic Framework of Post War Japanese Relations with Africa**

In 1952, Japan had regained its sovereignty, but was still carrying the experience of defeat from the war. Thus, Japan's post-WWII diplomacy took the path of pacifism, antinationalism, and passive cooperation with the international environment, using the United States as a model 'reference society'. At the time, Japan's top priorities with regard to foreign policy were sustained economic growth, minimal defence spending, and the alliance with the US. Since the formation of the two-party system in 1955, in which the conservative parties merged, three cooperative principles became clear, advocating liberalism, Asia centrism, and UN centrism. Japan's Africa policy was defined by these interconnected elements, the specific aspects of which were: Japan's economic needs, a Japan-US Security Treaty, and political awareness about Japan's international standing and role. (Iokibe 2006)

The fact that Japan emerged as an industrial nation after WWII and showed a strong interest in increasing exports and securing sources of raw materials hastened the establishment of diplomatic relations with

African nations. However, the expansion of trade relations between Japan and Africa was hindered by the influence of the former colonial powers over the African nations and the invocation of trade restrictions in Article 35 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In order to resolve such issues, the Japanese government made an effort to build friendly relations with Africa, largely through the use of development assistance. As Japan accumulated payment surpluses and the Japanese economy grew rapidly, Japan was able to start assistance programs, and contributed to the formation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1961. (Engel and Olsen 2005)

The Japan-US Security Treaty was another reason Japan became involved in Africa. Japan's role of supplementing and reinforcing US strategic interests became an important element of its foreign policy. As a result, Japan's Africa policy during the Cold War took the form of following US initiatives in Africa. (Morikawa 1997)

The final element that defined Japan's relationship with Africa was the fact that Japan, as an industrial nation, sought a commensurate role and standing in international society. Since joining the UN in December 1956, Japan had tried to use international organisations to resolve issues in a manner commensurate with its economic standing. In doing so, Japan made efforts to gain favour with African nations in order to gain recognition at the UN and other international forums. (Alger, Lyons and Trent 1995)

## **2. Chronology of African-Japanese Relations during the Cold War Period**

### **(1) Africa under the Development Plans and Japan Pursuing Trade and Investment Opportunities (1960 to 1973)**

With the establishment of diplomatic relations with African nations, Japan expected to be able to expand trade and investment opportunities. For the African nations, there was the hope that securing markets for agricultural produce and raw materials, and the income that would be obtained as a result, would promote industrialisation and economic growth.

In the 1960s, Japan's industrial production grew in leaps and bounds and the market share of Japanese goods in international markets also increased. The Japanese government was seeking the possibility of securing sources of raw materials for industrial use from Africa as well. In 1965, imports of Zambian copper ore increased, and in 1967, Japan entered into a copper ore development agreement with Zaire, and with Uganda as well. Japan invested large amounts of money in the extraction industry, particularly in South Africa under the apartheid regime, in order to obtain strategic mineral resources such as coal, chrome, manganese, vanadium, and platinum.

There were two aspects to Japan's strategy for the newly independent African nations: to establish friendly relationships with Kenya and Tanzania—non-aligned nations who were influential on the pro-West side—and to strengthen ties with mineral resource supplier nations including Gabon, Nigeria, Zaire, and Zambia. When an African nation became independent, Japan quickly established diplomatic relations and, after negotiations, entered into long-term agreements for the supply of raw materials. These friendly relations were useful in opening up new markets for Japanese products in African nations, which were striving to stimulate economic growth. Although the value of exports of industrial goods to Africa continued to rise, the value of imports from Africa remained small, creating a trade imbalance. African nations, increasingly concerned about a blowout in the trade deficit, invoked Article 35 of GATT, which stipulates the non-application of the agreement between particular nations. Trade missions were dispatched from Japan to Africa to address the trade imbalance. (MOF 1963, 1972)

## **(2) Japan's Pursuit of Resource Security and Africa's Criticism of Japan (1974 to 1979)**

The oil shock of October 1973 had a serious impact on the world economy, and Africa was no exception. Economic growth rates fell and per capita income also stagnated. The cost of energy and raw materials went up, sparking inflation while simultaneously triggering recession. Demand for African-produced petroleum also ebbed and there was no growth in exports. African nations tried to pull through the current deficit using borrowings of private sector money and aid from foreign countries.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government changed its national security objectives to secure a stable supply of resources. Cheap petroleum was the wellhead of economic growth and fundamental to the Japanese economy. The cutback of oil supplies by Arab nations triggered the Tokyo stock market collapse and a state of emergency was declared. In December 1973, the Arab nations' oil supplies recovered, and Japan had learnt a difficult lesson. As a result, Japan sought alternative sources of supply for the strategic mineral resources and energy essential for its industrial production. Of the African nations, Japan focused particularly on crude oil from the Congo (Brazzaville), Niger, Nigeria, and Zaire, and uranium from Namibia. (MOF 1977)

In January 1974, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka relaxed the conditions on Japanese aid and loans. As a result, the proportion of aid to Africa that was from Japan rose. In addition, a preferential tariff scheme was introduced and tariffs on African goods were lowered. As a result, African exports to Japan increased. By 1982, Japan had become South Africa's second most important trading partner. However, this drew heightened criticism of Japan by other African nations on account of South Africa's apartheid policy. But since South Africa had become such an indispensable source of mineral resources, Japan was not prepared to jeopardise its economic relationship with South Africa, even despite the fact that UN economic sanctions had been imposed.

In October 1974, Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura, in a bid to blunt such criticism, made a historic visit to Africa, the first by a Japanese Foreign Minister. In July 1979, Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda visited the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania. These visits deepened Japan's understanding of Africa's process of independence from colonialism and the anti-apartheid struggle and demonstrated Japan's intent to promote friendly relationships with African nations. (Engel and Olsen 2005, Mangala 2011)

### **(3) African Poverty and Increasing Amounts of Aid from Japan (1980 to 1992)**

Around 1980, African nations went into a serious economic slump recording negative growth. The second oil shock of 1978-79 and the US high-interest rate policy had triggered a global recession. African nations were hit hard by deteriorating terms of trade, falling exports,

and rising interest rates on foreign debt. In 1984, there was also a drought across much of Africa, which took its toll on agricultural production. Moreover, in the early 1980s, the key donor nations, such as the UK and the US, cut their aid budgets. For the African nations, external assistance was essential to ride out their economic woes, so, in exchange for assistance, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) introduced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). This was also the period in which the US was pressing Japan to reduce its trade surplus. While the US was pressing Japan to take its fair share of the Western collective security burden, it was simultaneously calling for the Japanese government to increase the amount of aid it extended to Africa to deal with the trade surplus and to alleviate the negative results of structural adjustment programs. (MOFA *Diplomatic Blue Book* 1981, Koppel and Orr 1993)

Driven by the recommendations of its comprehensive security cabinet meeting to maintain the US-Japan relationship and to deal with IFIs' Africa projects, the Japanese government decided to increase the amount of aid it gave to Africa. In doing so, the formative principles for Japan's aid policy became the 'development of developing nations' and 'humanitarian assistance'. Policy ideals changed from 'pursuit of the national interest' to 'promoting socio-economic stability and global peace'. This indicated that Japan was on the verge of being able to be directly involved with Africa. This direction is evident in the fact that Japan was proactively involved in the debate that led to the adoption of the Declaration on the Critical Economic Situation in Africa at the 1984 UN General Assembly. In fact, Japan was the only country that extended a substantial amount of financial assistance for the structural adjustment programs and special loans to deal with Africa's economic crisis. In this way, from the mid-1980s, Japan's new policies towards Africa reflected the fact that Japan beginning to play a role in the international community commensurate with that of an 'economic superpower'. (MOFA *Diplomatic Blue Book* 1992, Stein 1998, OECF 1989)

### **3. Africa and Japan in the Post-Cold War Period—The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and TICAD**

#### **(1) Africa's Economic Recovery and Japan's Active Involvement**

For Japan, which had adopted a foreign policy that conformed to the post-WWII world order, the end of the Cold War and the aftermath of the first Gulf War meant that Japan had to review its policy goals and how they were pursued. Japan began to redefine the concept of comprehensive security. *The Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter* was drafted in June of 1993. Japan's affirmations included observance of the principal of democracy and basic human needs, the promotion of economic development, and cutting military spending and arms transfers. International peace and stability were made the focal point for Japan's own wellbeing and international relations. (Engel and Olsen 2005)

The end of the Cold War took away Africa's strategic importance and the nations of the West abandoned policies of intervening in the internal affairs of African nations. African nations were left to deal with the failure of the structural adjustment programmes and the political changes that occurred as a result. In the first half of the 1990s, new leaders came on the scene in Africa and nations began trying to achieve political stability, democracy, and economic recovery through their own efforts.

Amidst this situation, Japan emerged as the only nation state prepared to raise its level of aid to Africa and was therefore able to exert influence over political and economic changes. In addition, Japan tried to transform relations with Africa by developing a pro-active agenda. The most notable initiative in this process was the Partnership for Democratic Development (PDD). Under this initiative, institutional support is given to various sectors of African nations, such as law, administration, elections, and mass media.

It was necessary for Japan to participate in the UN's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in order to play an international role commensurate with its economic might and receive recognition. Japan began participating in the PKO by contributing personnel to the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) in May 1993. Following this, Japan sent personnel to the International Peace Cooperation Corps in



Rwanda to assist with delimiting the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and contributed to disarmament in Sierra Leone. (Lehman 2010)

One of Japan's contributions to Africa is the fact that through jointly holding high-level meetings it became involved in the prevention and resolution of African conflicts. Examples of this are the 1995 and 1996 conferences held in Tokyo: "Peace and Development—the Issues around Conflicts in Africa" and "Conflicts in Africa—the Road to Nation Building in the Post-Conflict Period", respectively. Japan has supported humanitarian activities and refugee relief activities through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). In addition to providing material support and financial assistance to UN organisations, Japan also contributes to the eradication of HIV/AIDS, polio, and malaria through the US-Japan Common Agenda.

Since *The East Asia Miracle* was published in 1993, Japan, together with newly developing Asian nations, has tried to promote the Asian development model to reduce poverty through economic growth as a key strategy for African socio-economic development. Japan has driven this initiative by supporting workshops in various regions across Africa, encouraging economic development based on the experiences of Asia, and promoting Asia-Africa cooperation. It is hoped that such institutions will form the foundation for establishing South-South cooperation and will also bring the experiences of developing Asian nations to Africa, with Japan providing the necessary expertise, capital, and logistics, to make the transition process easier. (Engel and Plsen 2005)

## **(2) Birth of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)**

In the 1990s, the new leaders who emerged as a result of democratic elections started to think about strategies for Africa to develop by its own hand. For example, South Africa's President Mbeki advocated an 'African Renaissance' to rejuvenate Africa for the purpose of economic recovery and democratization in Africa. This thinking took shape in the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) in 2000. Similarly, in Senegal, at President Wade's initiative, the 'Omega Plan' was formulated to put in place and maintain an African economic development

infrastructure.

The MAP and Omega Plan were integrated and, in July 2001, the New African Initiative (NAI) was adopted at the 37th session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. NAI was renamed New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in October of that same year. At the G8 Genoa Summit in 2001, the African heads of state sought support from the international community in order to implement NEPAD. The G8 developed nations welcomed NEPAD's adoption of the Genoa Plan for Africa, and the Africa Action Plan was adopted at the Kananaskis Summit. These events verify the fact that NEPAD obtained the support of the international community.

The preconditions for African development, such as peace, democracy, human rights, and good governance, as well as the actions that African nations should aim for and the goals they should achieve, are clearly specified in NEPAD. NEPAD's action plan had the cooperation of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and was put together by a steering committee made up of the five nations that played a leading role: South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, and Egypt. What is worth noting in the implementation of NEPAD is the introduction of a peer review mechanism. The purpose of this was to promote the adoption of policies that would be useful in making progress with political stability, sustainable development, and economic integration and to improve governance by allowing African nations to monitor each other's implementation of NEPAD. (Obayashi 1999, 2003)

The developed nations drafted the G8 Africa Action Plan in response to the voluntary actions and self-help efforts of African nations. 'Selective implementation of aid' was adopted in this action plan to enhance support for African nations achieving results based on the idea of 'enhanced partnerships'. Japan had already incorporated selective implementation of aid into its Africa policy based on the various principles of its ODA Guidelines. The development philosophy of *ownership* by the African nations and *partnership* with the international community is common to NEPAD, the G8 Action Plan, and the TICAD process promoted by Japan. (Lumumba-Kasongo 2010, Kawabata 2003, 2006, 2012)

### **(3) Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)**

The TICAD process began when Western nations began to focus on incorporating Eastern countries into the post-Cold War market economy because it was gradually becoming apparent that aid to Africa was not getting results. TICAD I was held on 5-6 October 1993, and was attended by participants from 48 African nations, 13 donor nations, 10 international organizations, and more than 45 observer nations and organisations, including non-government organisations (NGOs). TICAD II was held from 19-21 October 1998. Representatives from 80 countries attended, including 13 heads of donor countries, accompanied by other senior government officials, representatives from 40 international organisations and private-sector organisations, and representatives from 22 NGOs. Five years later, TICAD III was held from 29 September to 1 October 2003, and was attended by 50 African nations, 47 regional and international organisations, and many NGOs. Then from 28-30 May 2008, TICAD IV was held in Yokohama and was attended by representatives of 51 African nations, including 41 heads of state, 34 development partner nations and Asian nations, and representatives of international organisations. A summary of each of the TICAD conferences is given below.

#### **(a) TICAD I**

The topics of debate at TICAD I were political and economic reform, development of the private sector, regional cooperation and integration, international cooperation, and the 'Asian experience and African development'. Of these five themes, the new topic was 'Asian experience and African development'. Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi said, 'In our thinking, we believe that Asian experiences and specialized knowledge regarding development are useful for African development in the 21st Century'.

The key messages that were conveyed at this conference were that the purpose of growth is to alleviate poverty and to promote African participation in the global economy. The *Tokyo Declaration on African Development* was adopted in order to achieve these goals. The *Declaration* is about embarking on political and economic reforms in the African region under the slogan of 'good governance'. Avenues for

making use of Asian experiences in order to assist with African development were also pursued. The important factors that contributed to noteworthy performance of East Asian economies were cited in this declaration, including rational application of macroeconomic policies, maintaining political stability, long-term investments in education, and the development of human capital. The declaration was manifest in the first Asia-Africa Forum (AAF), organised in Indonesia in 1994, which sought to promote cooperation between Asia and Africa. (ACT 3003 Activity Report Writing Committee 2004, ACT 2003 Activity Towards TICAD III 2003 )

The Asia-Africa Forum was started as part of the South-South cooperation and tried to encourage direct dialogue and cooperation between African and Asian policymakers. The intent was to jointly formulate specific sectors where African development could potentially benefit from Asian experiences. The Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa Co-operation, which incorporates ongoing interaction between leaders of these two regions, was adopted at the forum. Initiatives such as development of human capital and formation of systems for that purpose, improvement of productivity in the agricultural sector, and obtaining the required capital for the development process were recommended. Regional level workshops were also held. One such workshop was held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in July 1995, and another in Yamoussoukro of the Ivory Coast, in July 1996. These workshops were held to evaluate the results of TICAD I and verify the principles of the overall TICAD process. In addition, the Second Asia-Africa Forum in Bangkok, Thailand, was held in June 1997 in preparation for TICAD II, and was designed to confirm the points agreed on at the first forum. TICAD I was successful at least in that it made the international community aware that various African economic and social problems remained fundamentally unresolved. (Ampiah 2007, 2011, Lee 2010, Miyagi 2001, 2004)

#### (b) TICAD II

A preparatory meeting for TICAD II was held in Tokyo on 10-11 November 1997, and was attended by senior officials from 46 African nations, 9 Asian nations, 13 donor nations, 6 international organisations, and representatives of regional organisations. At this meeting,

three main goals were discussed: verification of the initiatives since TICAD I, confirmation of the key themes of the Agenda for Action, and the establishment of an Agenda for Action Preparatory Committee to be proposed at TICAD II. Topics discussed at this Preparatory Committee meeting also included social issues (eradication of poverty, education, sanitation, gender, and population), farming and the environment, conflict resolution, development, and governance.

The Tokyo Agenda for Action was adopted at TICAD II in October 1998. The issues discussed included reducing poverty by speeding up economic growth and sustained development, and the integration of African nations into the global economy. More specifically, the Agenda for Action pertained to the following three areas: (1) Social development (education, sanitation and population, and other measures to assist people living in poverty), (2) Economic development (development of the private sector, industrial development, agricultural development, and foreign debt), and (3) Building the foundations for development (good governance, conflict prevention and post-conflict development). The goal was set to cut the proportion of the population living in extreme poverty to at least half of the current level by 2015 through implementation of the above measures.

The fact that education was the focus for 'human capital building' stood out in the Tokyo Agenda for Action. This was due to an awareness that education had been the key to accelerating growth and delivering sustained poverty reduction in East Asian nations. The goal was to have at least 80% of children receive a complete primary education by 2005, and to have universal primary education by 2015. It was also hoped that by 2005, that the adult illiteracy rate (particularly for women) would be lowered to half its level in 1990. The Agenda emphasised leaving the initiative for development up to the African nations. A TICAD II review meeting was held in November 1999, and at the same time the Asia-Africa Investment and Technology Promotion Centre (AAITPC) (also known as the Hippalos Centre) was established in order to institutionalize the economic ties between the regions, and the Africa-Asia Business Forum (AABF) was held. The former is a project that is implemented through contributions to Japan's UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and this centre was established in Malaysia. The latter is supported by using the 'Human resources devel-

opment fund', which Japan contributes to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (ACT 3003 Activity Report Writing Committee 2004, ACT 2003 Activity Towards TICAD III 2003)

(c) TICAD III

Two preparatory meetings were held in New York in June and September 2001 leading up to TICAD III. At these meetings, 'African ownership of development initiatives' was emphasised and senior government officials were invited to attend from the nations promoting NEPAD, namely, South Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt. The addition of NEPAD to the TICAD process gave legitimacy to Japan's initiatives.

In December 2001, a TICAD ministerial-level meeting was hosted by Japan, the UN, the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), and the World Bank. At this meeting, an exchange of opinions was conducted on TICAD II and on the development plans drafted by the African nations. Specifically, there was discussion of putting foundations in place for development, investing in human capital, reducing poverty through economic growth, South-South cooperation, regional cooperation, and the principles for development. The Chair's statement emphasised collaboration between NEPAD and TICAD.

A TICAD preparatory meeting was also held in New York, in July 2002, in Japan's representative office in the UN. At a senior government officials' meeting in Ethiopia, in March 2003, the high priority themes were identified. From May to June, a meeting regarding Southern African issues was held in Pretoria, South Africa, a meeting regarding the East African and North African issues was held in Nairobi, Kenya, and a meeting regarding West African issues was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon. The purpose of these meetings was to deepen understanding of region-specific issues and to proceed with work in various sectors according to the priorities in line with regional circumstances. This series of regional summits indicated Japan's resolution to respect African ownership of the development process. In July, an Organisers' Steering Committee Meeting was held in London and, in August, an international symposium of NGOs was held at the United Nations University.

TICAD III was held in Tokyo from 29 September to 1 October 2003.

At the conference, international community support for NEPAD was mobilised, and a broad-ranging debate was conducted over the initiatives of both Africa and the donor nations towards African development. One objective that emerged was the specific aim of forming new partnerships with Asian nations. On the first day of the conference, the previous TICAD process was examined and a comprehensive approach regarding the pressing issues was explored. On the second day, the most serious problems, HIV/AIDS and unemployment, were discussed. The importance of Asian-African regional cooperation was emphasised, including technical assistance from Asian nations to African nations, as well as the importance of trade and investment. There was also a call for cooperation to prevent reoccurring conflicts.

Since the start of the TICAD process, Japan had contributed 12 billion dollars in economic aid to Africa and conducted training in various fields for 10,000 African people. In addition, Japan sent 7,000 experts to Sub-Saharan Africa for the purpose of development assistance. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced that Japan would provide Africa with a total of one billion dollars in grant aid over five years. These grants were intended for education, supplying clean water, and humanitarian aid for victims of HIV/AIDS.

Finally, the 'TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration' was announced, delineating the direction for the TICAD process. At this time, the 'TICAD III Chair's Summary' was released, which summarised the specific priorities. The philosophy of 'human security' pursued by Japan was incorporated into the 'TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration' confirming its importance in African development. (Inoguchi 2005, ACT 3003 Activity Report Writing Committee 2004, ACT 2003 Activity Towards TICAD III 2003)

#### (d) TICAD IV

A TICAD IV regional preparatory conference for Southeast African nations was held in Lusaka, Zambia, in October of 2007, and a regional preparatory conference for Northwest African nations was held in Tunis, Tunisia, in November 2007. During this time, the TICAD IV Secretariat was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. In addition, in early January 2008, Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura visited Tanzania and gave a speech entitled 'Partnership to Create a "Happy and Healthy

Africa” and Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori gave a speech at the 10th AU General Assembly on the significance of TICAD IV.

TICAD IV was held 28-30 May 2008, in Yokohama. Its basic message was ‘Aiming for a Happy and Healthy Africa - The Continent of Hope and Opportunity’. Under this banner, direction for African development was discussed with a focus on accelerating economic growth, establishing human security, and dealing with environmental and climate change issues. In attendance, there were 41 heads of government, including Prime Ministers, representatives from 51 African nations, 34 development partners and Asian nations, and 74 international organisations and regional organisations, as well as representatives from the private sector and civil society. There were over 3,000 attendees making this the largest international conference in Japan’s diplomatic history.

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, who served as overall Chair of the conference, announced Japan’s aid strategy to Africa: to double Japanese ODA and to support the doubling of private investment as well. Former Prime Minister Mori, who had served as the Chair of TICAD III, served as MC of the conference.

The conference drafted three documents. The ‘Yokohama Declaration’, indicated political will regarding the initiatives and direction for future African development. Based on this declaration, the ‘Yokohama Agenda for Action’, indicated specific initiatives for the future TICAD process. Finally, the ‘TICAD Follow-up Mechanism’, intended to verify the status of implementation of the TICAD process. Details of the discussions conducted at TICAD IV were compiled into the ‘TICAD Chair’s Summary’. (Obayashi 2006, 2009)

TICAD IV acknowledge that political and economic progress that had been achieved in Africa since TICAD III while also confirming the need to intensify initiatives by the international community toward further African development. The recent self-help efforts in Africa were acknowledged and the direction of strengthening the cooperative relationship between the AU and TICAD was indicated. However, Africa was (and is) faced with a mountain of issues such as rapid population growth, unemployment problems in farming villages and cities alike, infectious diseases, and soaring food prices, necessitating a renewed call for continued focus. TICAD IV confirmed that in order to solve prob-



lems such as these, economic growth needed to be accelerated by promoting industrial and agricultural development, trade and investment, and human resource development. Additionally, the conference recognized the need to address the Millennium Development Goals relating to the socio-economic aspects of human security, the entrenchment of peace and establishment of good governance, and issues relating to the environment and climate change. Partnerships needed to be further broadened, collaboration with existing initiatives attempted, and proactive participation in civil society would be required. (Lumumba-Kasongo 2010 , Mangala 2010, Yamada 2011)

#### **4. Prospects for Africa-Japan Relations in the New Century**

##### **(1) Africa as the Front Line of Japanese Diplomacy**

One of the elements that make up the historical background of the relationship between Japan and the nations of sub-Saharan Africa is the spirit of the 1955 Asia-Africa (Bandung) Conference. This conference covered the desire to pursue independence from colonialism, to be neutral during the Cold War period (non-aligned movement), and to develop economic cooperation and technical assistance between the attending nations. Japan, as the only industrial nation present, was eager to provide the necessary technology for the economic development of the newly emerging nations of Southeast Asia and in exchange obtain the rights to access their raw materials and markets. This might also mean open access to African materials and markets, as Africa was beginning to show signs of independence. Japanese initiatives through TICAD can probably be seen as an extension of the commitments made at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

Japan's attitude toward Africa during the Cold War period was one of caution. In a period of international political and economic change, the wisdom of dealing with Africa at all was called into question. For example, after the 1973 Oil Shock, Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura chose to visit the African continent, urging Japan to establish politically friendly relations for economic reasons. Although it was dangerous diplomatically, Japan was then able to weather the impact of expanded trade relations with South Africa through negotiations.

New developments in international politics, such as the demise of

the apartheid regime in South Africa, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, added a new dimension to Japan's relationships with African nations. At TICAD I, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa declared, 'Japan will continue to proactively support Africa's political and economic reforms' and, 'Since the end of WWII, Japan has benefited greatly from the generous support extended by the international community. Now is the time for Japan to repay that goodwill by playing a proactive role in assisting Africa'. TICAD marked the start of a new phase in African-Japanese relations and indicated a change in Japan's attitude to the 'Africa problem'.

Prime Minister Mori's visit to sub-Saharan African nations in January 2001 marked a turning point in African-Japanese relations. During his visit to Africa, Prime Minister Mori gave a speech entitled 'Africa and Japan in the New Century' and declared that finding solutions to Africa's problems was a high priority on the Japanese foreign policy agenda. Not only did Prime Minister Koizumi announce 'Collaboration between Japan and Africa - Specific Actions' to the African diplomatic corps stationed in Tokyo in June 2002, he also made the keynote speech at TICAD III in 2003. When he visited Addis Ababa in May 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi, in a speech entitled 'Africa becoming the Birthplace of Self-help Efforts', outlined Japan's diplomacy with Africa. He announced specific assistance measures and detailed the areas in which Japan should cooperate with Africa for achieving international peace and stability. It was envisaged that the relationship between Japan and the African continent required either the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister to visit at least once a year. Africa became the 'front line' of Japanese diplomacy.

TICAD IV was held in Yokohama in May 2008. The conference was covered by 1,300 journalists of whom 1,000 were domestic and 300 were international. Despite the fact that this conference drew so much attention, it seems that, since 2006, Japanese diplomacy with Africa has lacked something of its previous vigour. That is because, since 2006, the conditions that made TICAD diplomacy possible in the past have been gradually diminishing.

One such condition is Japan's economic position in the world. At the turn of the 21st Century, Japan was no longer an economic super power, and in some aspects had also ceased to be the dominant

economy in Asia. As of 2001, Japan's ODA had lost its standing as the top source of aid to Africa. Japan was no longer a key creditor either. Consequently, it became impossible to mention the 'Pax Nipponica' with a straight face anymore. This was symbolized by the article titled, 'Japan is Fading', which ran in the 24 August 2009 edition of *Newsweek*.

Japan's diminishing role in Africa is also suggested by the fact that not one of the Prime Ministers who have taken over from Prime Minister Koizumi in 2005 has visited Africa. Even Prime Minister Taro Aso, who has experience working in Africa in the past, did not have enough time to visit Africa. Given that Prime Minister Aso and those who succeeded him had such short terms in office, this is understandable. Even so, it seems that Japan's African diplomacy is moving into a post-TICAD stage and losing its dynamism as a result. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), website <http://www/mofa.go.jp/> 24 November 2012)

## **(2) TICAD IV Follow Up and Looking Toward TICAD V**

TICAD IV compiled specific assistance measures for Africa into the Yokohama Agenda for Action. At the same time, the TICAD Follow-up Mechanism was established to monitor the status of the assistance measures announced through the TICAD process. This mechanism consists of three layers. The first is the Secretariat, which was established under the Director General, African Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The purpose of the Secretariat is to gather and analyse information in conjunction with the related government organisations regarding the status of TICAD priority areas, as well as carrying out PR activities. The second is the Joint Monitoring Committee of the TICAD Process. This committee puts together an annual progress report and a committee meeting is held once a year. Third is the TICAD Follow-up Meeting. This ministerial-level meeting is held once a year to verify and evaluate TICAD-related activities based on the annual progress report.

A meeting of the Joint Monitoring Committee of the TICAD Process was held on 9 February 2009. The meeting was chaired by Yoshitaka Akimoto, Director-General, African Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Participants included relevant government agencies and organisations, TICAD organisers (UN, UNDP, World Bank), the AU Committee, the African diplomatic corps stationed in

Tokyo, and the donor nations. The meeting verified the state of progress regarding assistance measures to Africa. On 11 March that same year, the 'TICAD Follow-up Symposium-Japan's Efforts to Promote Peace and Stability in Africa: the Case of Sudan and Beyond' was held at the United Nations University. This symposium commenced with Luka Biong Deng, Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Office of the President, Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) reading the speech of the First Vice President. This was followed by an exchange of opinions between experts from home and abroad on the topics of 'The current state of the peace process between North and South Sudan and Japan's assistance in Sudan' and 'The importance of enhancing the peacekeeping capabilities of African countries and Japan's assistance'.

Additionally, the inaugural TICAD Ministerial Follow-up Meeting was held in Botswana on 21-22 March 2009. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone announced assistance to progress the Yokohama Agenda for Action (two billion dollars in grant aid/technical cooperation, three-hundred million dollars in food/humanitarian assistance, and two-hundred million dollars to fight infectious diseases) and to implement the commitments made at TICAD IV. The second meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, on 2-3 May 2010. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada served as co-chair together with the Tanzanian Finance and Economic Affairs Minister Mustafa Mkulo. Foreign Minister Okada declared the new government's resolve to implement the TICAD IV commitments and indicated that Japan would work on certain initiatives in the future. These included extending assistance with three projects designed to enhance cooperation with Africa: two billion dollars in loans over two years for infrastructure projects designed to boost African recovery from the economic crisis, one billion dollars in support of maternal and child health in order to achieve the MDGs, and support based on the 'Hatoyama Initiative' to deal with climate change. The third meeting was held in Dakar, Senegal, on 1-2 May 2011. The meeting was attended by Japanese Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Chiaki Takahashi. Foreign Minister Matsumoto co-chaired the meeting with Minister of Foreign Affairs Madické Niang. Foreign Minister Matsumoto expressed Japan's appreciation for all of the support that had been rendered to Japan by

African nations and the international community in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake. He declared Japan's determination to faithfully implement the TICAD IV commitments in order to actively promote peace and stability in the international community. The Foreign Minister also announced that in order to contribute to African economic growth, the sectors and countries eligible for loan projects would be handled flexibly and that the granting of new loans would be sped up. State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Takahashi proposed that TICAD deal with the changes occurring in Africa and the Middle East from a 'human security' perspective, calling for cooperation between Japan and the nations of Africa in promoting UN Security Council (UNSC) reforms. This would include striving for close cooperation towards COP17, convening in South Africa, and formulating a strategy for low-carbon growth and sustainable development in Africa.

At TICAD IV, Prime Minister Fukuda had announced the formation of joint missions to promote trade and investments in Africa. The joint missions, made up of representatives from the Japanese business community, political circles, relevant government ministries, and agencies, would be put together to visit the Southern, Eastern, and Western regions of Africa. Their purpose would be gathering information, networking, and unearthing potential trade and investment projects. They would achieve this by having meetings with key leading figures in each country, exchanging opinions with the local chambers of commerce and industry as well as corporate representatives, visiting various facilities, etc. It was expected that dispatching these missions would further expand trade and investment between Japan and Africa, contribute to accelerating economic growth in Africa, and be useful in promoting Japan's resource diplomacy. Since 2008, several joint missions have been sent to various nations across Africa. In September 2008, the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment in East Africa was led by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobuhide Minorikawa. This was followed by a string of missions led by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Yasutoshi Nishimura: the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment in Central and West Africa, the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment in Southern Africa, and the Joint Mission for Promoting Trade and Investment in East Africa. In October 2008, the Joint Mission for

Promoting Trade and Investment in Central and West Africa was dispatched. In September 2010, the Joint Government-Private Sector Southern African Trade and Investment Mission was dispatched, and in October 2011, the Joint Government-Private Sector African Trade and Investment Mission visited Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya.

The fourth TICAD Ministerial Follow-up Meeting was held in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 5-6 May 2012. At this meeting, the state of progress on the Yokohama Agenda for Action was examined, and discussions were held in preparation for TICAD V, which is scheduled for 1-3 June 2013. The attendees outlined the current state of African development and discussed the key themes for TICAD V, as well as the format and approach. The attendees recognized that TICAD V should work towards achieving comprehensive and sustainable growth as well as towards building strong societies in Africa. A senior working group level meeting was scheduled for autumn 2012, to be held in Burkina Faso, and a ministerial level preparatory meeting was proposed for the first quarter of 2013, to be held in Ethiopia. Prior to this, a meeting of African Ambassadors was held from 14-15 December 2011, at which opinions were exchanged regarding TICAD V and regional situations in Africa. On 21 March 2012, the TICAD V Secretariat was set up within the organization under the Director General, African Affairs Department, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The secretariat had begun the overall work of setting up and running TICAD V to be held in Yokohama. Moreover, on 12 June the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and NGOs held their first meeting to exchange ideas regarding TICAD V, and on 2 August, the first government-private sector cooperative conference on the promotion of TICAD V was held. At this conference, there was joint recognition that, while there were business opportunities for Japanese companies in Africa, it would be necessary to invest in industries that would increase in value and add to human resource development in order to promote African business.

Since December 2008, Japan, China, and South Korea have held annual, trilateral consultations on African policy. The fourth consultation fell on 7 December 2011, and took place in Tokyo. At this meeting, the three nations exchanged opinions on their general and economic policies in Africa, as well as political information on Sudan and the Horn of Africa. They discussed initiatives designed to enhance political and

economic relationships with Africa as well as cooperation with the AU and with African regional organisations, as well as each of the three countries' frameworks for cooperation with Africa (TICAD V, 2013, the fifth Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), 2012, and the Third South Korea-Africa Forum (KAFs), 2012, respectively). Japan explained its policy of proactively supporting Africa in expanding development aid, trade, and investment; contributing to peace and stability; and dealing with global issues.

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), website <http://www.mofa.go.jp/> 24 November 2012)

### **(3) Japan and China in Africa**

Japan's African diplomacy has been conducted recently amidst a backdrop of heightened Chinese activity on the African continent. In 2005, China overtook Japan and became the second largest importer of African-produced oil. In 2007, Chinese trade with Africa reached roughly three times that of Japan. China has become one of the major trading partners of many countries in Africa, from Angola to Burundi, from Cameroon to the Central African Republic and Chad.

Compared to Japan, China has few restrictions on its actions in Africa. For instance, China will buy what it intends to, heedless of potential consequences or whether their actions antagonise Western nations. Of course, Japan and China are not rivals in the same sense that China and the United States are rivals. What's more, Japan and China are not as yet equal with each other in terms of economic strength. From an economic perspective, for China and Japan, the relationship with Africa may not be as important as the relationship with the neighbouring countries of the United States and Europe. (Raine 2009)

China is attracting a lot of attention from African politicians. This is not surprising when one considers that China, compared to Japan, is expressing the intention to strengthen all political and economic ties with African nations. Moreover, Africa-China relations have a deeper history compared to Africa-Japan relations. China's major involvement in Africa has given new stimulus to Japan's diplomacy in Africa. A number of aspects of Japan's diplomacy in Africa may be, in part, in response to China's heightened presence in Africa. The Japanese

government was relieved that TICAD IV held in Yokohama, in May 2008, had a comparable number of African leader attendees to that of FOCAC, held two years prior in Shanghai. (Taylor 2009, 2011)

Japan's *ODA White Paper* (2007 edition) states the following in relation to Africa: 'Japan is considering plans to advance infrastructure development in Africa and these include, for example, construction of extensive road networks'. The same message was also present in the 2008 edition: 'Development of regional infrastructure focused on roads and power networks is vital in order to stimulate the acceleration of growth in Africa'. As a result of increased Chinese activity on the African continent, the Japanese government expects a range of business communities to become even more proactive in various sectors. (JICA 2007)

However, the differences in Japan and China's foreign policy approaches to Africa should not be exaggerated. If anything, Japan has created African development plans with a focus on cooperation with international organisations and with other developed nations. Specifically, in regards to TICAD IV, Japan has consulted not just with multilateral organisations, but also donor nations and aid agencies in order to achieve the results of the Yokohama Declaration. Even the TICAD II declaration of 1998 stated that African nations would probably agree to and implement economic reforms or structural reform programs supported by the Bretton Woods system. The fact that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank were key organizers of TICAD I is broadly remembered.

It is worth pointing out that Japan and China's diplomatic approaches on Africa differ on the following points. First, China does not view the Bretton Woods system as having much legitimacy. That is because China has doubts about the process by which the system was made - by whom and for whom it was made. This is not the case for Japan. Japanese activity in Africa has been constrained by the national interest and by its intention to remain an important member of the so-called Western block. In spite of these facts, or because of these facts, two aspects have appeared in Japan's foreign policy on Africa: the ongoing aspects and the changing aspects.

As the only non-European nation that has succeeded in industrialising, and as a sympathetic supporter that pro-actively participated



from the outset in the Africa-Asia group, it is natural that Japan has been regarded by the post-Colonial nations of Africa not only as a reference country but also as a development partner. However, at times, Japan's motives in seeking economic security and international legitimacy in an US-Europe centric world, have, by necessity, taken a different course from that desired by many African nations. Until recently, Japan was not only the first non-European nation to successfully industrialise, but also the first non-European economic superpower. The fact that Japan has had a close alliance with the West in the post-WWII period is also reflected in its policy on Africa.

While the rise of China has added a new member to the non-European nations who have successfully industrialised, in some aspects, its ideology is out of sync with those of Japan and the West. Whether this fact should be welcomed or denigrated depends on each party's perspective according to where they stand.

Controversy is also arising in Africa regarding China's emergence. This is because opinion is divided amongst the African nations as to whether China is starting to emerge as a new colonial power, or whether it is a true partner for African development. While the degree differs, similar doubts arose in the past regarding the relationship between Africa and Japan. By observing this retrospective on the past half century of Japanese foreign policy on Africa, one might infer that what preordains the results of interrelationships between countries is not so much the intentions of the nations, but rather the degree to which their interests coincide. (Adem 2006, Harneit-Sievers, Axel and Naido 2010, Cornelissen, Chru and Shaw 2012)

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