Non-dualistic thinking in mesology (fūdogaku)

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Introduction

There are three types of mesology: the mesology of Tetsurō Watsuji (1889-1960), of Augustin Berque (1942-), and of myself, Nobuo Kioka (1951-). To begin this article, I would like to explain the three forms, noting the differences among them as simply as possible, since this is not the central issue of this essay, in which I wish to reflect mainly on the problem of high technology today. For this reason, I will concentrate on clarifying the indispensability of non-dualistic thinking in this highly techno-governed world. I therefore divide my essay into three parts, as follows: 1) I will try to make clear the significance of mesology, as shown by the different versions above, then 2) I will introduce my theoretical standpoint, which I call the “logic of the form” (かたちの論理), focusing on its non-dualistic aspects, and finally, 3) I will apply it to the problem of technology today.

1 Three types of mesology (fūdogaku)

Different standpoints

The term “mesology” means the “study of milieu” in its original form in French ‘mésologie’. However, I prefer here to use a Japanese word fūdogaku (風土学) instead of employing the term “mesology”. Fūdogaku has a two-fold meaning as follows: a) prototype of the mesology invented by Augustin
Berque who received inspiration from Watsuji \(^2\), founder of *fûdogaku* in Japan, and b) revised version of the theory proposed by myself following the road opened by these two predecessors. Now I will boldly say that I prefer the term *fûdogaku* to “mesology” in the need to put an accent on certain elements that are lacking in them both. My own theory of *fûdogaku* is different from both Watsuji’s and Berque’s mesology. To make distinct the difference among the three of us, I must begin by trying to outline the standpoint of Watsuji.

**Watsuji’s *fûdogaku***

Augustin Berque called Watsuji one of two forerunners of his mesology. (The other is Uexküll [1864-1944], a well-known naturalist in Germany.) These two persons, according to Berque, posed the same problem: “How does reality appear to a given subject?” \(^3\). The answer of one is “milieu” (*fûdo*), of the other “Umwelt”, as is well known. Berque says that these notions refer to different objects — in the case of Watsuji, humans, in Uexküll, non-humans (animals in general) — but what they have in common is their protest against the dualism of Cartesian tradition. Nevertheless, as regards Uexküll, from my viewpoint, he remained attached to epistemological dualism, despite his decisive anti-anthropocentric stance. Proposing a multi-dimensional dualism covering all animal species, he showed himself as none other than a successor of Descartes, like every scientist in modern times, without exception.

How about Watsuji, who studied the phenomenology of the day in Germany? His notion of *fûdo* (milieu), emphasizing the meaning of indivisible connection between humankind and nature, obviously opposes the “Subject-Object” schema of dualism. I must say, however, that this anti-dualistic attitude did not come from phenomenology, — in essence, dualism itself,
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— but from the Asian tradition of Buddhism. Watsuji in his younger days started his academic career from the study of early Buddhism. Under the description in Fudo (風土), 1935, one can perceive a trace of the idea of kū (空 śūnya; emptiness) which insists on the oneness of two things apparently divided, or their relation as being “neither identical, nor different” (fuitsu-fui [不一不異]) as formulated in the introduction of Mādhyamakakārikā (Chūron [中論]) drawn up by Nāgārjuna (Ryūju 龍樹, 150?–250?). This is the very idea of the indivisible tie between humans and nature conceived by Watsuji with the notion of fūdo. This idea is typically Buddhistic —, in other words non-dualistic —, which had never been found before in its explicit form in Western history of thoughts since ancient Greece.

Berque’s encounter with Japan

Augustin Berque was deeply shocked by the strangeness of Japanese culture in his first visit to Japan in 1969. For example, he called its eminent characteristics “lococentrism” for the lack of grammatical subjects in everyday conversation. This lococentrism, seen generally in Japanese life and culture, taught him uselessness of the 'S-O' schema which he had believed to be universal until then. This fact opened his eyes to a new world where the Cartesian dualism does not go without reserve. As regards this discovery happened during his fieldwork in Hokkaidō (北海道), he wrote:

In a word, mediance objects to dualism. This non-dualism became evident to me little by little while studying on Hokkaidō, and next on Japan in general.

Therefore, Berque had to set about making his own theory non-dualistic. The task meant for him to overcome the Western tradition of
dualism in which he was born and had been brought up until then. Could such an attempt be hopeful? I think it is too hard to carry through, because such a task cannot but compel the agent to doubt or further deny the backbone of his personality, formed with his cultural milieu. Nevertheless, he accomplished this difficult work⁹, the result of which, I think, was a revolutionary method of thinking never seen in the Western history of ideas. He called this new method “trajection”¹⁰.

**Trajection: A revision of dualism**

Why do I think it is revolutionary? The method of trajection is the alpha-and-omega of his mesology. Its essential point consists in the “go-return” process between two poles—: for example, “idealism–realism”, “subjectivism–objectivism”, or “dualism–non-dualism”. This process implies two actions that are utterly opposite (or rather, contradictory): i.e., the double negation of A and non–A, or the double affirmation of A and non–A¹¹. Is this understandable for everyone? I think it is scarcely comprehensible for those who only live in the world of formal logic, perhaps for all the people in the Western world. Through the process of trajection one is led at first to dualism, implied in the system of formal logic¹², in which A and non–A are incompatible, next to non–dualism. Transition between two poles (A–non–A) goes on in such a manner without stopping at either of the two positions. One might say, therefore, that the process of trajection implies not only “double negation” but also “double affirmation” as to the two opposites. Is this thinking style “logical”? No, it is by no means logical, as far as this term means the thinking manner originated from the Greek *logos*. Berque then established the idea of ‘trajection’ as being close the Indian classic logic or “lemmic”¹³ (this also is derived from a Greek word, *lemma*, meaning “intuitional knowledge”), an alternative to “logic”.

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In early years of the 21st century, Berque had contact by chance with the lemmic, guided by a Japanese book *Logos and Lemma*. The encounter with this book caused him great astonishment at the affinity between his own idea of trajectory and the Indian classic logic called the lemmic. This raised in me the question: “The lemmic, perhaps a unique manner of thinking in east Asia, is it also applicable to the Western world?” As regards this question, Berque, for his part, has replied positively by introducing lemmic thinking partially into his theory of mesology. As for me, I am willing to pursue the path once opened by the author of *Logos and Lemma*, Tokuryū Yamanouchi, who called his mission “the synthesis of the Eastern and the Western logical thoughts”, aiming at the goal where a genuine encounter between two worlds will be established.

I noted at the beginning of this discussion that there are three types of mesology: Watsuji’s, Berque’s, and mine. Then, before introducing my theory of *fūdogaku*, the “logic of the form” (*katachi no ronri*), I think I should make a brief account of my theoretical standpoint and how it differs from Berque’s mesology and Watsuji’s *fūdogaku*.

**Kioka’s *fūdogaku***

Learning from two grand masters preceding me in this academic fields, mesology (*fūdogaku*) on my side has been transfigured into a new version that should be regarded as substantially original. I would therefore like to clarify the differences between our approaches. As for my discipline of *fūdogaku*, it should be regarded as a variant version to be distinguished from both Berque’s mesology and Watsuji’s *fūdogaku*, so I think I must introduce it from now on as an utterly different type of mesology (*fūdogaku*).

What, then, are the differences between their disciplines and mine? I must note several viewpoints of my theory never seen in theirs. Among
them, I start with the “decentralisation-recentralisation” approach, devised to explain the encounter with strange milieus. One can understand it through the cases of Watsuji and Berque in their experiences abroad. On the one hand, Watsuji’s *fûdogaku* was created because of his experiences abroad, particularly through information on the various milieus he encountered by himself during his voyage to Europe for study abroad\(^6\). This is typically an example of his “decentralisation” (脱中心化) caused by encounters by chance with milieus other than his milieu (viz. Japan). His text *Fûdo* could never have been written if he had remained in his country. On the other hand, the approach developed in this book describes another process of mesological experience, “recentralisation” (再中心化), forming a pair with “decentralisation”. However, here I cannot deepen this into complete system of “decentralisation-recentralisation”. For the moment, I will restrict my concern to indicate only two facts as follows: 1) the dynamic process in Watsuji forced an invention of a unique method of “analogy” that makes it possible to compare between different milieus, for example “monsoon”, “desert”, and “pasture”, as seen in the description of chapter 2 of *Fûdo*. 2) Berque reached his idea of trajectory through his experience of “decentralisation-recentralisation”.

However, it may not be necessary to go into the case of Berque, since the inspiration of his method of trajectory which came to him through his encounter with Japan and Japanese culture, as explained above, offers us the strongest model of the process of “decentralisation-recentralisation” as he experienced it. So I want to set about introducing another theoretical point of my *fûdogaku*, the “logic of the form” (*katachi no ronri* [かたちの論理]).
2 The “logic of the form”

Two moments: katachi and kata

I present the “logic of the form” as an appropriate example to criticize the standpoints of science and technology founded by Cartesian dualism. The logic of the form, I think, has its origin in the East Asian tradition of ideas, covering India, China, Korea, and Japan. This means the Buddhistic tradition is non-Occidental. Here I must adhere to Japanese terminology, and make a distinction between katachi (かたち [形], form) and kata (かた [型], style; paradigm).

One can find the original form of this non-dualistic thinking in the notion of ‘kū’ ([空], śūnya emptiness), invented by Nāgārjuna in Mādhyamakakārikā (6th century CE) as mentioned above. In this text are found “eight negations” (happu [八不], four sets of double negation), one of which is named “fuitsu-fui” ([不一不異], neither identical, nor different). Perhaps this phrase sounds too strange to us, as it does to me who has learned the logic of Western philosophy, because such a form of double negation obviously surpasses the law of contradiction of the formal logic working in our daily life.

What does the “emptiness” (kū), or “neither identical, nor different” mean? To answer this question, I must begin with an explanation of dualism. The gist of dualism consists in regarding two things as to be divided in order that they could not be reunified as they were. The two things thus divided cannot but be independent of each other in such a way that there could not be the middle between them; e.g. “mind-body”, “subject-object”, “self-other”, etc. This is due to the third law of formal logic: the “law of excluded-middle”. On the contrary, the standpoint of “emptiness” admits the “middle” between divided two terms, since, according to Buddhistic logic or
the lemmic, there should be interdependent relationships among all things in
the world\textsuperscript{18). The lemmic, opposing formal logic, insists on the reality of the
middle of two things definable as “neither identical nor different”. It admits
the milieu against the “law of excluded middle”, which denies “between-
ness” on the ground of dualistic thinking. Therefore, the lemmic is, in this
sense, nothing but the “logic of the middle”\textsuperscript{19).}

However, I must stop from going further into such a logical subject,
since I must focus on the “logic of the form”, that is the problem of the
“\textit{katachi} (form)–\textit{kata} (style)” relationship. Is there any possibility of non-
dualistic or lemmic thinking in the “logic of the form”? For my part, I would
say “Yes”, and here is my reason.

\begin{quote}
\textbf{Inseparable ties of the two moments}
\end{quote}

Between the two moments, \textit{katachi} and \textit{kata}, a process of mutual
adaptation occurs. On the one hand, \textit{kata} shows itself as a model to be
followed by \textit{katachi}; in other words, \textit{kata} produces various \textit{katachi}. On the
other hand, \textit{katachi} follows \textit{kata} ready-made, and finally becomes \textit{kata} itself.
The preceding \textit{kata} is then substituted by the following \textit{katachi}. Thus, \textit{kata}
and \textit{katachi} change their places in turn in an utterly different manner from
the Western model of production based on traditional dualism\textsuperscript{20), where
the position of a God-like principle (producer) and its result (product) is
definitively fixed.

Here we can see two contrasting models of production, the one dualistic
and the other non-dualistic. The latter, of course, is of the “logic of the form”.
And the former, I believe, is the greatest source of environmental crisis
today\textsuperscript{21). I would like to propose the “logic of the form” as an alternative for
this ancient model derived from Cartesian dualism.

On the ground of non-dualistic thinking, \textit{kata} and \textit{katachi} constitute
relations non-exclusive to each other, since an exchangeable relation exists between the two terms in a way never seen in the case of dualistic production. As for *kata*, its status is relatively unlike the absolute “principle” in dualism. Then, what is the difference between *kata* and *katachi*? One should note that the suffix *chi* is lacking in *‘kata’*. *Chi* in *kata-chi* means **chikara** ([力], power), *‘ikioi’* ([勢い], puissance or might). Kata therefore shows us a state of *katachi* (form) lacking power or puissance. In other words, *katachi* can be regarded as *kata* (style) vivified with vital energy. So we could also define *kata* as sublimed *katachi* in exchange for the loss of its force. The former (*kata*) can characterize itself by its relative stability in contrast with the latter (*katachi*) marking its changeability.

Despite its alikeness to “principle” based on dualism, *kata* should not be confused with “principle” whose status is utterly different from that of *kata*. The status of principle, bearing the function of “producer”, is fixed in an unchangeable manner in relation to the products brought about by their “producer”. Principle, in this context, distinguishes itself from products. Kata, on the contrary, presents itself as only a provisional model to be followed containing variability in relation to every *katachi*, which changes from one to other by their vivacity. In short, the correlation of *kata-katachi* is constantly reformed through the changes of its components (either or both of them).

**An example: A trick from jūdō**

We can understand the realities of this kind of correlation from certain examples. Cultural tradition in Japan offers many good examples of non-dualistic production (reproduction) modelled on the “logic of the form”. One can easily find them in martial arts (*jūdō* 柔道, *karate* 空手, etc.) or in traditional performance (*kabuki* 歌舞伎, *nō* 能, etc.). I wish to take *jūdō*, a very popular sport in Korea as well as in Japan, as an appropriate case to
explain the “logic of the form”.

I suppose all Korean people are familiar to this sport, and further that many of them are fond of it. As they know, training in jūdō begins with learning kata, the paradigmatic style proper to every trick (seoinage 背負い投げ, ōsotogari 大外刈り, etc.). All beginners are told by their teachers to observe kata faithfully, so as not to deviate from it.

Thus, I would like to pose a question like this: “Does kata mean an absolute model for every jūdō player?” The answer is ‘yes’, in one sense, but ‘no’, in another—I cannot but answer this question in such an ambiguous manner. Why ‘yes’, then? Simply because one cannot master any trick of jūdō without kata as guideline. If so, why would one answer “no” to the same question? Because of the indispensable condition with which kata does its work—it is the cooperation of kata and katachi. For example, kata can vary, as various katachi are practiced by different players in different places. There cannot exist any kata without a katachi that specifies or localizes the kata. And for this very reason, the normative sense of kata is not absolute but relative. In other words, as a dualistic relation between two divided terms cannot be realized, the theory of the dualism cannot but fall invalidated here.

To prove this truth, I want to take an example of the jūdō trick seoinage (背負い投げ, to throw your opponent over your shoulder). This trick depends on the cooperation of two hands, hikite (引き手, the pulling hand) and tsurite (釣り手, the lifting hand). Thus, textbooks of jūdō teach us the necessity of cooperation of the two hands distinguished according to their roles to play. This means “standard” style of seoinage in Japan, where it was born and developed into the martial art jūdō. However, “standard” should not be regarded as “absolute”. As everyone knows, jūdō, through the process of diffusion into the world, has brought about great variations in style in every region. Almost all countries have their own kata of jūdō today and
Korea is no exception. The Korean style of seoinage is unique concerning the use of two hands: hikite and tsurite work in unity without a clear distinction between them as “standard” (or Japanese) style requires. So, there exists an obvious difference of style between Korea and Japan. I hastily add that this does not matter that one is right and the other is wrong—only that there are local differences in kata\textsuperscript{23}.

Here we can acknowledge an example of the Buddhistic “neither identical nor different” explained above, because the two terms (kata and katachi) are tied inextricably to another; i.e., “neither one nor two” (fuitsu-funi [不一不二]).

3 Criticizing high-technology today

Impasse of dualistic technology

I regret that I cannot but addresse the problems of technology today only slightly because my knowledge in this field is limited. I only want to do one thing here, but it is fatal for this problem; to question “How do we get out of the impasse into which our highly techno-governed society has strayed?” Before answering immediately, I must present an overview of how technology has been influenced by modern dualistic thinking. The situation now seems too paradoxical to me who takes a critical stance against Cartesian dualism. Technology traditionally based on the dualism has lost in a maze that is forcing it to abandon the fundamental distinction of two polarities, e.g., “spirit-body”, “thought-extension” or “real-ideal”. These dichotomies have long been believed with their resulting practical uses since the age of the Enlightenment, because without them modern technology could not have attained its aim, that is, mass production as determined by the needs of the consumer. Modern civilization in this context flourished exclusively in the Western world because of dualism’s generalized thinking.
This historical process has been promoted by the “logic of desire” as I will call it. I will give you some examples to clarify the paradoxical situation around technology today.

Among the problems, the most typical case is in robotics. There is an enterprise in Japan to pursue an aim to fabricate androids that are not only similar to human, but “equal” to the person who posed as its model\(^{24}\). This unprecedented project, I think, relies on the belief that the distinction between two substances, \textit{res cogitans} (human) and \textit{res extensa} (machine; robot) once established by Descartes, could be, or should be, dissolved. It seems that engineers of robotics have annulled this principle, the starting point of their technical practice. I know nothing more ridiculous than this!

Another example: the confusion of virtual reality (VR) with reality itself. The notion of “virtual” depends on its radical difference with “real” (and is not virtual). Most of the amusement from innovative devices in this field comes from the essential distinction between “real” and “virtual”. Technological development has created a situation in which the real and the virtual seem equivalent. No matter how nearly VR may approach to the reality, however, there exists an undeniable barrier between them, one that is impossible to surmount. This barrier was established by dualism due to which engineers have been able to work.

The two examples above show us a situation in which technology is now caught in a trap of its own making. What caused such auto-contradictory affairs? I would say the controlling influence of dualistic thinking. But this is too simple an answer to such a complicated problem. To completely explain the conflict of technology with the natural sciences since the beginning of the modern era, I cannot but mention psychological mechanism that rules over every human in unseen ways. I would like to call this mechanism the “logic of desire” (欲望の論理).
The logic of desire

What is the “logic of desire”? It is not the subconscious impulse that usually associated with the word “desire”, but a form of so-called logic that is based on human reasoning. That leads me to immediately pose two questions. 1) Why is this “logic” not a simple instinctive drive usually associated with the word “desire”? 2) In what manner is the “logic of desire” linked to “reason”?

“Desire” in the ordinary sense is connected with blind vital energy, like the Freudian libido. But desire is not the same thing as vital energy, since to establish a link between mind and body, there must be some cultural mediation. I would rather say that desire is an unconscious energy promoted by the mediation of dualistic thinking working at a conscious level in cultural fields. So, there would be a cooperation of consciousness over two levels of mind, one explicit and the other implicit. The explicit consciousness, that is, dualistic thinking divides object from subject (agent) to establish a domination of the former by the latter. The desire is materialized through this psychological process to develop endlessly. I must emphasize that dualistic thinking, as well as libido, could not be defined by itself as the cause of desire. Conscious thinking (dualism) and unconscious energy, inseparably united with the appearance of ‘half-logic’, would play their respective roles in this process called “the logic of desire”.

Then let us move on to the second question. Dualistic thinking regards two terms (“subject-object”) as independent. One cannot confuse one with the other, proving a victory of reason. And one cannot find any problem in this dichotomy itself. “Reason”, however, has overlooked until now the existence of a trap of “desire”, hidden under its foot. Of course the link between the conscious and subconscious levels is invisible, but could be picked up so that we realize it as a kind of logic and try to surpass it. This
is why I insist on applying “logic” to this obscure mechanism of “desire”. “Logic” here signifies for me “an operation of the mind, to take something out of the darkness and put it under the control of reason”. Needless to say, this has nothing to do with so-called logic possessed exclusively by logicians living in their logical world.

Conclusion

Innovative technologies (e.g., AI [artificial intelligence], VR, robotics, etc.) are all founded on dualistic thinking. No “middle” between divided two polarized terms can exist, as shown by the algorithm of computer science, the binary numeration of 0 and 1. This explains the domination of the “principle of excluded middle”. It is the result of two terms being perfectly divided: one, a god-like principle and the other, uniform products. As far as it concerns the relation of the two terms, it somewhat resembles katachi (form)–kata (style), but in fact they are polar opposites.

Why do I think so? Kata, producing various katachi, is renewed or substituted by katachi, so it is marked by its flexibility. It therefore differs from the absolute principle ruling dualistic technology. As I noted above, the god-like principle accompanying dualism proves the presence of the “logic of desire”. It is the desire with which dualism has marched through modern times until now. So, to conclude this essay, I must confirm the task left to us. It is to show the applicability of the “logic of the form” to the problem of technology today. This task means to reply to the questions: “How can we overcome the ‘logic of the desire’?” and “How can we apply the ‘logic of the form’ to highly developed technology today?”

**Note**

1) For the purpose of participating an international workshop named “Politics of
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Milieu Today”, (Seoul 9-10 May), I prepared a paper for my presentation (40 minutes allotted) under the same title as this article. This is a revised version augmented with several points that were omitted from the paper because of the time restriction.

2) Watsuji, in his time, used the term ふどがく (風土学) for the German 'Klimatologie (climatology)', because he learned this discipline during his study in Germany (1927–1928), where the Kilmatologie since Herder (1744-1803) was still keeping its vigour (we acknowledge its traces in the notion of Umwelt in Uexkull or in early Heidegger). I must add hastily that mesology distinguishes itself by its non-dualistic posture from climatology which is in essence dualistic. Nevertheless, Watsuji’s ふどがく meant the non-dualistic relationship between human beings and nature and Berque got great impetus from it to establish his new theory of milieu that he called mésologie.


4) His doctoral thesis (1926) was later published under the title The philosophy of practice in primitive Buddhism (Genshi Bukkyô no Jissen Tetsugaku [原始仏教の実践哲学], 和辻哲郎全集第五巻) , Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1962.

5) I especially keep in mind Plato’s fundamental dualism of real – ideal’.


7) A translation of the Japanese term ふどせい (風土性).


9) I called such a behaviour “decentralization” (脱中心化) in my ふどがく, as a component of correlative process “decentralization-recentralization”. In this regard, please refer to my book Deai no ふどがく (出会いの風土学), Tokyo, Gentōsha, 2018, pp.94-106. In passing, I heard from Berque that the French version, translated by him will be published in 2019.

10) Japanese translation: tsūtaika (通態化)。

11) Two phrases express respectively the 3rd and 4th lemma of the tetralema formulated by Yamanouchi (see note 14).

12) Aristotelian formal logic consists of three principles: 1) the law of identity, 2) the law of contradiction, and 3) the law of excluded middle.

13) I have pointed out to him by e-mail the similarity of his idea of trajectory to lemmic thinking, which he had not been very familiar with until then. To this message, he replied "Yes". He now affirms that “meso-logic is lemmic".

15) See Chap. VI–VII in La mésologie...

16) Forty days’ sailing, stopping at many ports along the route, awakened in him an interest in the problems concerning the “spatiality of the structure of human existence” (人間存在の構造の空間性). This experience, which he called “impressions on various milieus” (さまざまな風土の印象), united with another motivation to protest to Heidegger’s attachment to ‘temporality’ in *Sein und Zeit* just published in 1927, encouraged him to make his own theory of milieu. Concerning these points, see the Preface (序言) of *Fûdo* (風土), Iwanami-bunko, 1979.

17) Chinese characters (kanji) are often confused in practical use. For example, in the case of karate 空手, [形] is read as kata, not as katachi. As kata and katachi are originally Japanese, not Chinese, distinguishing between kanji 形 and 型 is only for convenience.

18) This relationship is called en (縁) (pratyaya, Buddhistic connection). To my regret, however, I can touch on this important notion only briefly.

19) “The principle of included middle” (in French, "le principe du tiers inclu") is a target of multi-valued logic today. I note only the name of the founder of this logic, Stéphane Lupasco (Stephan Lupascu, 1900–1988), a Romanian philosopher, who came to Paris to diffuse his own logic, but in vain. French people, fundamentally dualistic, rejected his new logical device.

20) Here I would recall Platonic dualism (the distinction between idea and the actual world) rather than its modern version, Cartesian dualism, which is derived from the former, its prototype. See note 5.

21) This is, needless to say, one-sided opinion. However, I do not have the space to discuss the merits and demerits of dualism in this paper.

22) See Yûjirô Nakamura (中村雄二郎), *Katachi no Odhissei* (Odyssey of the Form), Tokyo, Iwanami shoten, 1991, p.68.

23) Regarding this topic in May 2019, I referred to Youtube which was preparing to show videos prohibiting the Korean style of seoinage probably because of the reason of danger.

24) These androids are named “Ishiguroid 1”, “Ishiguroid 2”, and so on, after their creator Hiroshi Ishiguro (石黒 浩), special professor at Osaka University.

25) On this subject, I have written several essays in Japanese that have been published in a book focused on the topic, *Kaikô no ronri* (邂逅の論理), The logic of the Encounter), Tokyo, Shunjûsha, 2017. See Chapter 1: “Why should the “encounter” be treated as subject?” (邂逅がなぜ問題になるのか), and Chapter 3: “Questioning the logic” (論理への問い).