第１章　A review of theoretical approaches to governance and cross-border governance in the European Union

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1. Introduction.

The following review of research on governance and cross-border governance in the European Union doesn't deal with all approaches available but with those the author considered to be the core concepts developed to the present. The order of exposition goes from the general to the particular, beginning with the concept of governance and network governance as developed by Kohler-Koch and Eising in order to compare the characteristics of EU governance with the governance systems of the nation-states which are its members. Then I turn to the concept of multi-level governance, originally developed to explain cohesion policy. It theorizes more in detail about the direct relations developed between supra-national and sub-national governments.

As part of cohesion policy, cross-border regions developed throughout Europe, even if their origins predate cohesion policy. In the fourth and fifth sections I turn to cross-border governance, dealing with the concepts of political economy of scale developed by Bob Jessop and political entrepreneurship developed by Markus Perkmann. In the final section I introduce the theoretical views of Olivier Kramsch on cross-border governance.

Sections two, three, four and five are based on what I understand to be the quotations that give an idea of the core elements of each theoretical approach. The last section is based on an interview with Olivier Kramsch we had at the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research on September 13th. 2002.

2. Network Governance (Beate Kohler-Koch, Rainer Eising).

Kohler-Koch and Eising define governance as "the structured ways and means in which the divergent preferences of interdependent actors are translated into policy choices 'to allocate values', so that the plurality of interests is transformed into co-ordinated action and the compliance of actors is achieved", while "the core idea of 'network governance' is that political actors consider problem-solving the essence of politics and that the setting of policy-making is defined by the existence of highly organized social sub-systems. In such a setting, efficient and effective governing has to pay tribute to the specific rationalities of these sub-systems. The 'state' is vertically and horizontally segmented and its role has changed from authoritative allocation 'from above' to the role of an 'activator' (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999, p. 5).

In relation to EU governance as a case of network governance, they write that "it involves bringing together the relevant state and societal actors and building issue-specific constituencies. Thus, in these patterns of interaction, state actors and a multitude of interest organizations are involved in multilateral

negotiations about the allocation of functionally specific 'values'. As a consequence, within the networks the level of political action ranges from the central EU-level to decentral sub-national levels in the member states. The dominant orientation of the involved actors is toward the upgrading of common interests in the pursuit of individual interests. Incorporated in this concept is the idea that interests are not given as it is assumed in ideal-type assumptions about pluralism and corporatism, but that they may evolve and get redefined in the process of negotiations between the participants of the network" (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999, p. 5~6).

As in the case of the 'principle of partnership', the Commission has had an active role in the creation of a political framework which facilitates transnational networking and common interest formation, "building up transnational policy communities around those policy issues which it has an interest in promoting. The Commission has often been characterized as a 'political entrepreneur' which manages to give policy issues a European dimension and brings sub-national actors into the game, whether for the sake of promoting European integration or for the sake of its own political standing vis-à-vis the member states" (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999, p. 18) .

"In a system in which the central actor for initiating and pursuing the formulation of policies (i.e. the Commission) lacks democratic accountability, and the Parliament has only a limited influence on the legislative process, functional representation gains in importance. The consent of societal organizations is a welcome substitute for democratic legitimacy. It is quite clear that the Commission is trying to introduce a 'mix' of legitimizing elements of representation to make up for the Community's 'democratic deficit' " (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999, p. 270).

"Despite the widely divergent member-state modes of governance and area-specific variations, most EU policy areas are marked by the preponderance of network governance. The fragility of the EU's democratic legitimacy and its complex and heterogeneous composition and set-up allow for this particular mode of governance. It is widely regarded as being able to bridge the heterogeneity of EU member states and socio-economic actors as well as compensating for the lack of democratic accountability by introducing elements of functional representation" (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999, p. 285).

3. Multi-Level Governance (Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks).

Hooghe and Marks (2001) in the Preface to their book point out that multi-level governance "describes the dispersion of authoritative decision making across multiple territorial levels. Two developments have been decisive in creating multi-level governance in Europe over the past half century. European integration has shifted authority in several key areas of policy making from national states up to European-level institutions. Regionalization in several European countries, including the most populous ones, has shifted political authority from the national level down to sub-national levels of government (p. XI).

In the first chapter of their book they refer to two models of the European Union: the "state centric model" and the "multi-level governance model". "The core claim of the state centric model is that policy making in the

EU is determined primarily by national governments constrained by political interests nested within autonomous national arenas. According to the multi-level governance model, 1) decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolized by national governments. That is to say, supranational institutions have independent influence in policy making that cannot be derived from their role as agents of national executives; 2) collective decision making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual national governments. Lowest common denominator outcomes are available only on a subset of EU decisions, mainly those concerning the scope of integration. Decisions concerning rules to be enforced across the EU (harmonizing regulation of product standards, labour conditions, etc.) have a zero-sum character and necessarily involve gains or losses for individual states; 3) political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. Sub-national actors operate in both national and supranational arenas, creating trans-national associations in the process. National governments do not monopolize links between domestic and European actors. In this perspective, complex interrelationships in domestic politics do not stop at the national state but extend to the European level" (p. 2~4).

"If the multi-level governance model is valid, we should find that state sovereignty is compromised in collective national decision making, that collective national decision making does not determine policy outcomes, and that sub-national interests mobilize beyond the reach of national governments directly in the European arena. To make headway with this issue, it makes sense to disaggregate policy making. We divide the policy-making process into four sequential phases: policy initiation, decision making, implementation and adjudication" (p. 12).

"Multi-level governance is prominent in the implementation stage. The formal division of authority between the Commission, which had sole executive power, and member states, which monopolized policy implementation, no longer holds. National governments have come to monitor the executive powers of the Commission, and the Commission has become involved in day-to-day implementation in a number of policy areas, and this brings it into close contact with sub-national governments and interest groups (the most prominent example is cohesion policy, which absorbs one-third of the EU budget)" (p. 24).

"Cohesion policy in general, and partnership in particular, has provided an important channel for sub-national governments in several countries. Cohesion policy is far removed from state-centric governance in that European institutions set general rules, sub-national authorities participate in making decisions, and the three parties are in a relationship of mutual dependency rather than hierarchy. The concept of multi-level governance, which was first developed by academic scholars to explain cohesion policy, has now been taken up by the Commission to describe its own achievements. In its 1999 report, the Commission concludes that "as an institution, the delivery system developed for the structural funds is characterized by multi-level governance, i.e., the Commission, national governments, and regional and local governments are formally autonomous, but there is a high level of shared responsibility at each stage of the decision making process. The relationship between these is, accordingly, one of partnership and negotiation, rather than being a hierarchical one" (p. 85~86).

"Sub-national governments have created a large and growing number of networks that stretch across national boundaries. Recent studies of such networks suggest that they number in the hundreds. They range from encompassing peak associations, such as the Assembly of European Regions and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, to more specialized associations that link together sub-national governments with particular problems or characteristics" (p. 88).

"Alongside these associations are three kinds of trans-national networks: 1) organizations financed by the European Commission to promote regional collaboration (examples include associations for objective 2 regions and for objective 1 regions funded under EU cohesion policy, and more narrowly targeted networks financed by Community initiatives such Leader, Urban or I n t e r r e g); 2) regions with common territorial features or policy problems (Association of European Border Regions, Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions, three associations of regions in the Alps, the Working Community of the Pyrenees). Such associations usually have close connections with the Commission and have, from time to time, lobbied for EU funding. In the late 1980s, the AEBR successfully campaigned for a program (Interreg) to prepare border regions for European economic integration; 3) sub-national networks of dynamic regions that wish to exchange information and best practices (Four Motors of Europe, Euro-region partnerships). Such arrangements are often brokered by regional politicians, but most of the action is left to private actors (firms, trade unions, universities, etc.) who set up their own collaborative arrangements" (p. 88~89).

"The institutional design of the 1988 cohesion policy has had broad-ranging implications for EU governance. At the meso level, it has promoted non-hierarchical networks of public and private actors. Public authorities of the European, national and sub-national levels have had to collaborate with each other and with private actors in designing regional development plans. While the Commission did not use the term "multi-level" governance to describe the 1988 reforms, multi-level governance was indeed the goal. The reforms cracked the shell of intergovernmental bargaining in EU regional development policy by admitting sub-national and supranational actors into decision making; they required collaborative networking among public and private actors at multiple levels; and they established direct connections between sub-national and supranational actors beyond the control of national governments" (p. 106~107).

"The 1999 reform renews a commitment to partnership among levels of government and extends partnership to include social actors, such as trade unions, firms and local public interest groups. However, the incentives available to the Commission to induce national governments to open up centralized decision making have diminished. In its June 1999 meeting, the Council of Ministers reduced the size of the "performance reserve" to 4% and gave national governments, alongside the Commission, a role in evaluating policy success. It will be more difficult for the Commission to operate, as it did before, as an agent of institutional change" (p. 108).

"The most influential advocate of European regulated capitalism has been former Commission President Jacques Delors. Most social democratic and, selectively, Christian democratic parties support European regulated capitalism, but the coalition also includes trade unionists, environmentalist, local and regional

governments, and even certain business representatives. The project has strong backing from majorities in the European Parliament and the European Commission. EU cohesion policy has propelled regional and local mobilization in previously poorly organized areas –from Greek, Irish, and Portuguese regions and municipalities to the North of England. It has also provided a focal point for trans-national regional collaboration. Furthermore, proponents of regulated capitalism gave exploited cohesion policy for strategic spillovers. The structural funds administrations have sheltered new policies in environment, vocational training, employment-creating investment in infrastructure work, cooperation in new technologies, R&D, and social partnership" (p. 111~112).

"Over time, however, policy inefficiencies and divergent interests among coalition partners have begun to dissolve the glue holding the coalition together. Even in the Commission, which should be the strongest supporter, opinions are divided. If the Commission is divided on European regulated capitalism and on EU cohesion policy, it should come as no surprise that conflict on these issues runs deep in the European Parliament and among political parties and national governments" (p. 112).

"Cohesion policy is regarded as a prime target for spending cuts, particularly by neoliberals, who in any case have little sympathy for the policy. A territorial division is superimposed on this ideological conflict, pitting net recipients against net donors. Sometimes territorial interest trumps ideology. Social democratic governments in richer societies on occasion vote to reduce cohesion spending in poorer societies along with centre-right governments. Such coalitions suggest a north/south cleavage. But territorial contestation runs within as well as among countries" (p. 112~113).

"Initially, cohesion policy was intended to serve two purposes. On the one hand, it was anticipated to reduce disparities among regions. Given that cohesion policy had relatively few resources in relation to the task at hand, this required concentration of spending on the poorest regions. This is the policy rationale of cohesion policy. On the other hand, cohesion policy was envisaged as a way of mobilizing regional and local governments to participate in EU decision making, and this demanded that the available resources be widely distributed across Europe. This is the political rationale of cohesion policy. The tension between the two conceptions of cohesion policy has never been resolved, and it lingers as a source of division among the supporters of the policy. The policy rationale for cohesion policy is supported by poorer regions and governments in the south alongside advocates of local unemployment initiatives in north and south. On the other side are supporters of regional devolution, particularly in the north, who favour a political rationale for cohesion policy. The 1999 reform tilts the balance to the former group by limiting structural funds coverage to 40% of the population" (p. 113).

"Partnership has been defended on contrasting grounds, as a means to allocate resources more efficiently by bringing affected interests around the table and as a means to promote multi-level governance in the EU by upgrading the participation of sub-national actors and strengthening weakly hierarchical networks. Partnership has fallen short of expectations on each of the above respects. It has worked least effectively in the poorer southern regions on account of incompetent or under-resourced local administrations and clientelism. The track record on building multi-level governance is mixed. In a 1996 opinion, the Committee of the Regions

put the blame on the fact that there was often no clear division of competencies among governments. These complaints were echoed by the Commission. Partnership was intended to facilitate consensual decision making across levels of government, but instead it has fuelled political conflict. Regional and local actors have used partnership to challenge their national governments (see the cases of Scotland and the Spanish regions in the text, DM). All in all, rather than mitigating territorial conflict, partnership has incited rivalry between national and sub-national levels, with the Commission often caught in the middle. For those hoping that partnership would solve problems more efficiently, this result is discouraging. Yet, those who perceive partnership as a vehicle to democratize European societies are delighted with increased sub-national activity. The mixed record of partnership in creating multi-level governance has strengthened the hands of those who conceive partnership from an efficiency perspective" (p. 114~115).

4. The Political Economy of Scale approach (Bob Jessop)

The Network Governance approach tries to clarify the specificities of EU governance vis-à-vis other types of governance at the nation-state level (pluralistic, corporatist, etc.). The Multi-level Governance approach centers in the analysis of the relations among EU, national, regional and local public authorities and private organizations in decision making taking Cohesion Policy as its preferred object of analysis. Through the following three approaches we go further into the study of the regional and the local centering in cross-border regions and cross-border governance as a case of multi-level governance promoted through Cohesion Policy.

Let's begin with Bob Jessop's "The Political Economy of Scale" (2002). As the author points out, the paper "discusses the general rescaling of economic, political, and social processes in order to clarify what is at stake in studying contemporary cross-border regions. Its starting point is the relativization of scale associated with the growing decline in the relative structured coherence among national economy, national state and national society that characterized the heyday of the postwar boom. The end of the cold war, the decomposition of the Soviet Bloc and the 'opening' of China to foreign capital has reinforced this relativization of scale. These changes are reflected in a proliferation of scales on which attempts are now been made to restructure economic, political and social relations –ranging from economic globalization, global governance and global culture to the promotion of local economies, neighbourhood democracy and 'tribal' identities" (p. 25). The author locates cross-border regions within this wide range of contemporary rescaling strategies.

"Cross-border regions have become specific objects of policy and not just spontaneous, natural economic territories. In this sense, they represent specific forms of innovation in relation to space, place and scale. They involve the production of new types of place and space for producing, servicing, working and consuming. ...And they refigure the scalar hierarchy and modify the position of specific places within this hierarchy" (p. 37).

"Despite their new economic importance, cross-border regions lack both the solid boundaries demarcated by national frontiers and many of the macroeconomic institutional conditions often held to be

essential for stable economic growth. It is in this context that interpersonal networking and interorganizational negotiation become crucial in bridging the public-private divide across frontiers and in securing the cooperation of so-called 'key players' drawn from different functional systems. ...If neither pure market forces nor top-down command from a single political centre can guarantee the structural or systemic competitiveness of an economic space, there may be space for a more cooperative search to provide a stable framework of economic action through other, more heterarchic, more flexible means, ...as various forms of networking, public-private partnership, stake-holding arrangements, and so on. There is considerable scope here for meta-governance (for example, the Council of Europe provides model organizational rules for cross-border region agreements under its Convention on Transfrontier Cooperation)" (p. 41~42).

"...Three major developmental trends in the state and politics. 1) The denationalization of the territorial state. Cross-border regions are significant here in two analytically distinct ways. On the one hand, there is the enhanced role of regional and local states in economic development and, on the other hand, the development of transnational linkages among regional or local authorities. 2) The increased importance of private-public partnerships and networks rather than top-down coordination and more emphasis on functional linkages and joint responsibilities regardless of position within scalar hierarchies. At stake here is the reordering of the relationship between government and governance within the overall political system and, in conjunction with the first trend, major transterritorial and international governance mechanisms at regional and local level. 3) Internationalization of policy regimes. One result of this is to blur the distinction between domestic and foreign policy and to widen the territorial bases of actors who are directly involved in decision-making and/or whose opinions and likely reactions are taken into account.. This trend is by no means confined to national states. It also applies to supranational blocs (such as the EU), to local or regional states, and, particularly clearly, to the newly emerging cross-border regions" (p. 42~45).

5. Institutional Entrepreneurship (Markus Perkmann)

Perkmann, focuses on "the reasons why Euroregions have become so popular with non-central governments located on both intra-EU borders and the external borders of the EU". His two main hypotheses are: 1) "Euroregions have become an institution. The postwar history of European CBC can thus be treated as a process of institution-building within the specific context of the European polity". 2) "This institutionalization of the Euroregion can be attributed to the long-term activities of a trans-European policy network. The strategies and actions of the latter can thus be characterized as institutional entrepreneurship. The hypotheses thus cover both the structural and the agency-related aspects of European CBC" (2002a, p. 103).

"It is evident that European CBC cannot be seen as separate from the process of European integration. Its strong association with EU regional policy indicates the connection with what are often referred to as 'multi-level governance' structures in European public policy" (2002a, p. 103~104).

"European CBC must be analytically related to the newly emerging, networked European polity, which

provides a fertile ground for undertaking such initiatives. The emergence of Euroregions is therefore just one special case of a series of opportunities that are open to local authorities and other actors, allowing them to engage in institutional innovation" (2002a, p. 104).

"...The institutional form of the Euroregion evolved in a way that rendered it increasingly suitable to function as dedicated implementation agency for EU measures in border areas. In other words, the proliferation of CBRs across Europe can be read as a process of institutional innovation through which the Euroregion became a legitimate partner of the European Commission in implementing regional policy measures targeted at border areas. ...This process was actively shaped by a transnational network of border region interests aggregated around the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR). The lesson from this is that the growing 'cross-borderisation' in Europe does not necessarily point to an increasing territorial fragmentation of nation-state sovereignty. Rather, cross-border regions are to be interpreted as one amongst other forms of policy innovation triggered by the emergence of the EU as a supranational policy-maker that has no proprietary implementation apparatus. In this sense, Euroregions are part of the multi-level governance structure of EU policy-making but are far from posing an imminent threat to the authority of the member-states over these policies" (2002b. p. 12).

"The network –qua institutional entrepreneur- skillfully exploited the opportunities the international context provided for creating legitimacy for Euroregion-type CBC initiatives. ...The formalized expression of the CBC network, the AEBR, established itself as a stable partner of the European Commission in the design and implementation of EU CBC policies. The strong growth of CBC initiatives in the 1990s can to a large degree be attributed to the launch of a large-scale CBC policy of the European Commission, Interreg (2002a, p. 118~119).

"The more immediate causal relationship is between the emergence and proliferation of Euroregions and the changing opportunity structures local and regional authorities face within the context of the ongoing process of European integration. This shows that apparent tendencies of rescaling must not be necessarily and immediately related to changing geographies of capitalist production and consumption (2002a, p. 121).

6. The Nijmegen Centre for Border Research (Olivier Kramsch, Henk van Houtum, Martin van der Velde).

Throughout modernity time governed social relations with structural marxism on the one hand and keynesian capitalism on the other. Duing this long period, space has been neglected as an object of social and political action. Edward Soja (Postmodern Geographies), David Harvey (The Condition of Postmodernity) and Henry Lefevbre (The Production of Space), have tried to reassert space as constitutive not only of physical geography but also of social actions oriented to create a new subjectivity which goes beyond old dycotomies of class, gender and race. Through their work, geography acquires a richer concept of space, epistemologically more open to new ways of considering the subject.

Nowadays, several academics in this field are considering that an unfortunate consequence of this turn

towards space was the reassertion of the local as almost the only field where a politic of resistance against neoliberalism could develop.

The new territorial realities of Europe, with the development of transnational and cross-border spaces, are neglecting this mystification of the local. We need to create a framework to think cross-border politics including the tension between the universal and the particular, throwing light towards political action that goes beyond the local including local, regional, national and international political actors.

This tendency to rethink the universal through the consideration of space has been present in debates about what Ulrich Beck has called cosmopolitics. Kramsch has worked on this concept, as politics already cannot be contained in the sphere of the traditional nation-state, and decision making power is being redistributed towards supra-national and subnational levels. Border research has turned to think politics as post-national. This post-national polity operates in the interstices of spaces which until recently had been reduced to international political realism.

At the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research and elsewhre researchers are trying to understand how a new cosmopolitan polity is emerging at the borders, how a new transnational polity is emerging inside cross-border institutions. The purposes of these institutions are to canalize Interreg funds to the cross-border region and to try to institutionalize a form of transnational governance. There are structural impediments which avoid an authentic integration of cross-border regions, and Kramsch has tried to conceptualize them as a democratic deficit.

For example, the Euregio Maas-Rhine, an Euroregion at the German-Dutch-Belgian border, lacks democratic legitimacy. The members of this foundation are not elected. They are appointed by other members of civil society. The foundation works under Dutch private law (there are Euroregions governed by public law). There is a distance between its parliament and the citizens of the region.

Most people don't even know that they live in a cross-border region and that they are entitled to enjoy services provided by the Euroregion. One example is the cross-border labour market. If our aim is to develop an organic vision of a cross-border region among its citizens, It is important to promote the posibility of working on the other side of the border. But we find problems of lack of information, and of different tax and social security systems which are still elaborated by the respective central governments. So we can't establish a framework of citizenship (Hirschmann) which could identify the inhabitants of the region.There are other obstacles in relation to technology transfer, the certification of diplomas, etc. There is a high probability that still today, companies located close to the border have more contact with other companies in the same country than across the border.

These problems let us think Euroregions as territories where the European democratic deficit appears in its clearest expression. The dream of becoming an integrated continent, without borders, with free movility of capital, labour and goods, finds its conceptual limit when we try to territorialize them in the so-called laboratories of European integration, namely, the Euroregions.

It would be difficult to take any Euroregion as best practice. There are more than a hundred Euroregions.

At the public policy level perhaps we have to maintain the myth of best practice in order to be able to interact with a range of social actors. But as intelectuals studying cross-border regions our responsibility is to work thorugh the Euroregion in order to problematize, to make a critical reflexion on what is Europe today, in which direction it is moving.

The external frontiers are becoming stronger and more impenetrable. New countries to the east will became EU members (already members since May 2004, DM) and we are going perhaps to create a new Berlin Wall more to the east. We have to think the internal borders, cross-border projects and the rhetoric of a Europe without frontiers without forgetting this broader geopolitical framework.

At the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research researchers have developed a certain division of labour. Kramsch is working on the institutionalization of cross-border regions, their new modes of governance, taking as a theoretical framework the Regulation Approach, and adapting it, as the Regulation Approach finds its limits at the border. It has been alaborated taking as an implicit assumption a national and not a transnational framework. He has another source of inspiration in writers as Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Philippe Schmitter and Wolfgang Streek who worked on the concept of multi-level governance. He is adapting these approaches as the study of cross-border regions problematize both of them.

Kramsch has a critical view of Bob Jessop's approach to the subject. Kramsch points out that whitin the idea of the political economy of scale, Jessop conceive cross-border regions as a spacial fix, an attempt of the state to find new spaces for capital accumulation in order to overcome the structural crisis of fordism through the incorporation of new actors at the supra-national and sub-national levels. Jessop is the first researcher who works on this subject introducing the experiment of the Euroregions as another scale at the sub-national level and as a product of the restructuring of the state and its attempt to reactivate, to revaluate circuits of capital. In this point Kramsch disagrees with Jessop. He doesn't accept that a cross-border region can be understood as another scale at the sub-national level, simply because it exists at a transnational level. Kramsch thinks that from a perspective that includes both political economy and political phylosophy, we cannot apprehend the idea of a cross-border space using the category of scale, which he thinks is a metaphor which is part of the modern tradition of the nation-state. Kramsch affirms that thinking in terms of scale, we are thinking in nested territories, in containers (as in the case of Russian dolls). His hypothesis is that the cross-border region brakes with the notion of space as perceived at a scalar level, at the level of concentric circles. He says that we should think the cross-border reality as something that goes beyond the simple restructuring of the state.

Henk van Houtum is an economist but he is working on the problem of the frontier through a more cognitivist framework. He applies social-constructivism elaborating a theory of mental borders under the hypothesis that European physical internal borders have dissapeared but mental borders continue to exist. The idea of mental borders is being widely used to investigate how borders continue to reproduce themselves instead of their physical nonexistence. Van Houtum studies the subject in a framework that has been strongly influenced by the Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi.

Martin van der Velde works in a more empirist area. He is analyzing through statistical models the

patterns of cross-border consumption in order to complement the idea of mental borders and help to think how they work at the level of the political economy and the regional economy.

These researchers are trying to promote a second wave of reflexion on cross-border governance in the European Union. The first wave of reflexion was active during the second half of the nineties. They thought Euroregions as administrative organizations, as creatures of Interreg. They were pessimistic about the future of Euroregions as their vision was based on a certain functionalism behind most of these initiatives. In this second wave, they try to leave behind that pessimism and to go beyond a descriptive analysis of the functional aspects of Euroregions. They are trying to use Euroregions as platforms to rethink epistemological subjects, cultural policy subjects, which could inform not only the territorial construction of borders but also subjects in human sciences they think have to be urgently addressed.

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